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**The mechanisms of local governance in emerging democracies: A Case Study of Tunisia¹**

**Abstract**

Despite implementing comprehensive decentralization laws, emerging democracies often achieve limited success in improving the inclusiveness of local governance. A potential factor limiting the inclusiveness is the lack of cooperation. What factors determine the inclination of mayors to cooperate, and what are their implications for transparency? I answer these questions through applying E. Ostrom’s “rules in use” vs “rules in form” framework on a case study of Tunisia, where mass resignations paralyze the local governance following the implementation of the 2018 Municipal Law. I evaluate on the mechanisms that produce divergent inclinations to cooperate among mayors based on a set of interview data recently collected among 39 municipalities in socio-economically divergent regions. I examine their implications for transparency based on a Transparency Index developed by an independent organization for all 350 municipalities. The findings from interviews suggest that partisanship ties constitute the most substantive factor perpetuating hierarchical relations among the elected officials and the appointed bureaucrats, as they can enable mayors to focus on large scale projects at the expense of cooperative modes of governance. A mixed effect analysis on the Transparency Index of municipalities within governorates with identified partisanship ties (n=174) indicates that the transparency score is lower in instances where an ideological overlap exists among the partisan affiliations of mayors and governors.

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¹ This is a very early draft. Please do not circulate or cite it.
Introduction

Countries that follow through the process of democratization often initiate fiscal, administrative and political decentralization procedures, which are based on policies advocated by the international institutions, such as the World Bank or the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) (Andersson, 2002; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Clark, 2018). Decentralization can ensure the consolidation of transition processes, as it can enable citizens to develop democratic mores and awareness of their rights, reduce regional inequalities, provide benefits to the poor, check the power of the central government, prevent transition to a tyrannical form of government, and enable a more effective use of common-pool resources (Agrawal et al. 1999; E. Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al 1994; Wang, 2009; Cook and Morgan, 1971; Gellar, 2005; E. Ostrom et al, 2011; Tocqueville, 2010; Westergaard and Alam, 1995). The municipal units constitute the closest political structure to citizens where they can engage in a democratic process (Tocqueville, 2011). If democracy at the local level is weak, the institutional setting will lead to disenchantment at the national level as well (Craiutu, 2015). However, the ability of decentralization to generate these benefits is conditional on activating participatory forms of governance (Cook and Morgan, 1971; V. Ostrom, 2006; Schleeifer, 2000). Local liberties in turn empower circumstantially constituted communities, activating their liberties from the smallest political unit to the national government (Gellar, 2005; Schleifer, 2000).

Despite their widely acknowledged merits, the decentralization programs among the emerging democracies2 often fail to achieve the policy objectives such as eliminating corruption and bringing the decision-making system closer to citizens through greater inclusiveness and transparency, which could lead to a tyrannical form of governance as the local government would become "instinctive, blind, and full of prejudices, devoid of rules (Tocqueville, 2010, 1213)”. Such passive tyranny can lead to a situation where citizens are disengaged from the political process and are unable to exercise their constitutional rights (Gannett, 2005; V. Ostrom, 1997). As Agrawal et al. (1999) indicate, one of the central tenets of

2 By the term “emerging democracy”, I refer to a country that is in the process of transitioning or recently transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy (Marshfield, 2011). Authoritarianism refers to any form of non-democratic form of government (Huntington, 1993, p:11-13), democracy refers to “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Schumpeter, 1950).”
a successful decentralization program is the creation of institutional mechanisms that prevent the consolidation of power among elites. One mechanism that decentralization can fail to bring forward participatory governance is through the “elite-capture” as the local elite can encroach upon the decentralizing laws in order to enrich their personal power (Bardhan, 2002; Clark, 2018; Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Huque, 1986; Johnson, Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Sarker, 2003, Slater and Watson, 1989, Vengroff and Ben Salem, 1992). In particular, the absence of mechanisms of accountability at the decentralized level can remove the incentives for mayors to take into consideration the interests of the local citizens (Andersson, 2002). As a result, in contrary to the initial expectations, decentralization can produce outcomes inimical to equality and more prone to conflict as well as mismanagement of public goods (Ribot, 2002).

In examining the mechanisms of local governance, I am focusing on the case study of Tunisia, the only case that follows the transitioning phase out of the Arab Spring. Examining the case of Tunisia enables me to carry out potential implications for the other emerging democracies, particularly for the regimes in the Middle East and North Africa sharing a similar institutional heritage with Tunisia that may engage in an institutional reconfiguration for decentralization and opening up in the near future.

Local governance and representation is an understudied subject for both emerging democracies and countries within the MENA region. The literature on transitology indicates a distinct lack of interest for understanding the process of governance at the subnational level (Gibson, 2005). The perspective on local representation following the third wave of democratization is that it structured a top-down relationship to the local level that helped the incipient regime gain legitimacy among the masses (Doner and Hershberg, 2009). As a result, studies on emerging democracies tend to view democratization as a process experienced in a uniform manner across the countries (Clark et al., 2019).

The existing scholarship within MENA region gives preference for establishing the democratic institutions, which overlaps with the core goals of Western policy-makers (Mitchell, 2003; Rice, 2005; Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2017, p:185). However, the focus on the studies of democratization on the region is mostly on the arrangements at the elite level with top-down institutional analyses, rarely incorporating the implications for political openings for the day to day life of the citizens (Clark, 2018 ; Comiak, 2011; Pace and Cavatorta, 2011; Volpi et al,2016). However, the challenges in the region stem not only from the authoritarian forms of governance, but also the configurations of state institutions and their implications for the well-being of the citizens (Berman, 2010). The endurance of the transitioning phase, the protection of
individual liberties and enhancing the state administrative capacity are elements conditional on the active engagement of citizens within the democratic process (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019; Back and Hadenius, 2008). The concentration of power at the hands of the elite, despite the presence of extensive decentralization laws, is a common feature among the countries within the MENA as they have an embedded history of centralized governance mechanisms (Clark, 2018). Thus, studying the local governance mechanisms in the Middle East and North Africa can enable scholars to identify the regime trajectories pertaining to citizen engagement in political affairs. In particular, the engagement between the civil servants and local politicians constitute an important dimension to study within the region, as studies focusing on the reform policies elsewhere, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, indicate that a major reason for the failure of the reforms is that the do not consider the incentive structures for politicians and civil servants (Scott 2011; Srivastava and Larizza, 2012).

The studies of local governance in the region focus on the dynamics within an authoritarian rather than a democratizing framework, therefore their discussion on the role of inclusive channels of engagement remain limited as the power is formally tied to the ruling elite, the normative commitments towards democratization and the formal institutional for ensuring good governance mechanisms in these contexts remain weak. However, Tunisia presents a unique case to examine the mechanisms of local governance in MENA region through the lenses of a democratizing structure, where the formal channels provide opportunities for local agencies to implement through inclusive forms of governance. This study contributes to the literature on democratization and decentralization as it examines the process of local governance within MENA in a setting with formally inclusive institutions providing accountability for the stakeholders, which is distinct from other settings with non-democratic and non-accountable regimes.

Following the revolution and the subsequent peaceful transfers, the political developments at the elite level suggest that Tunisia is moving towards democratic consolidation. Yet, the transitions among the political elite tell us little about whether they provide the means for individuals to develop self-sustaining methods of governance for themselves and their communities. Some of the problems that Tunisians experience during the transitioning process, including the absence of development and the endurance of corruption (Meddeb, 2018; GLD, 2016) could be related to the inability of transitions at the elite level in generating a more open and transparent form of governance for the citizen. These process in turn can lead to democratic erosion and the eruption of more authoritarian form of politics. A 2018 survey by Pew Research indicates that 70% of Tunisians are dissatisfied with the democracy in their country, whereas a 2018
Afrobarometer survey indicates that 55% of Tunisians are against multiparty democracy\(^3\). This suggests the importance of understanding the mechanisms as well as the outcomes of democratization for the citizens.

Tunisia’s implementation of a decentralization law in May 2018 was applauded by the domestic and foreign observers alike for bringing the governance closer to citizens for the first time in the history of the country. The optimism followed promises made to citizens that democracy will solve all their local issues. However, conflicts and resignations continue to disrupt local governance, with many resigned council members citing the non-cooperative attitude of mayors in explaining their decisions for resignation. How can we account for the variation of the mechanisms of local governance across different conditions? In the next section, I develop my theoretical framework to examine the local politician-bureaucratic networks in emerging democracies. In order to account for the absence of cooperative behavior among mayors, I refer to the networks among bureaucrats and local politicians.

**Theoretical Framework**

The foundational assumption motivating my study is that all members of the community, including voters, politicians and bureaucrats are utility-maximizer individuals engaging in a “political exchange” while facing a variety of institutional constraints generating alternative political outcomes, including variations in the levels of cooperation (Buchanan, 1984, p:48-50, 1986, p:461; Tullock, 2004, p:17). This framework assumes that the self-interest guides people’s behavior in office or administrative positions, and therefore there is no inherent preference for any policy, ideology or preference for the politician who attempts to maximize political survival, whereas the goals of bureaucrats include expanding the size of one’s own department and improving the benefits accompanying the particular position (Alston et al, 2018, p159; Niskanen, 1975; Tullock, 2004, p:23; ). Hence, the bureaucrats have the capacity to manipulate the agenda for legislative action in order to secure outcomes favorable for their own interest, including setting constituents against one another and the making sure that budgets do not exceed beyond a certain level (Buchanan, 1984, p:57).

The mechanisms of cooperation between the local and central governments in emerging democracies often carry high levels of transaction costs due to the “legacies” of the former regime based on hierarchical governance (Illner, 2003).

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The opening up of the political space creates mutually advantageous relations among the bureaucratic and political networks to profit from such situations through voluntary networks that internalize all the externality (Buchanan and Tullock, 1990, p: 90). The social capital accumulated between these distinct entities enable them to establish these networks, which are “social constructions constituted in large part by the shared understanding of participants (Sowers, 2013, p.13; Loschi, 2018, p 97.)”. Following Putnam (1993, p:167)’s framework, I define social capital as the features of relationships, including trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of interactions through facilitating coordinated actions. The sources of social capital can be divided in two categories, social capital at the level of central government, including bureaucrats, MPs, and party networks, and social capital at the level of local stakeholders, including civil society, council members and local administrative units.

Mayors may consider social capital at the local and national level as substitutable goods and prefer referring to their social capital at the central level rather than the local level. This is because elected officials tend to increase the scope of their own authority over resources instead of establishing transparent and participatory mechanisms for personal and organizational interests, and due to the imperfect information setting between the politicians and voters, politicians prefer to refer “sneaky” methods of redistribution more transparent and efficient methods (Coate and Morris, 1995:1212; McGinnis and V.Ostrom, 1999). These methods include using large public projects including building airports or developing military technologies that benefit certain interest groups rather than direct cash transfers or transparent methods that benefit the society at large (Alston et al, 2018; Coate and Morris, 1995). The employment of such methods can provide the mayors with a comparative advantage in service delivery and help them maintaining their office in the next elections (Hicken, 2011; Matsumoto, 2009; p:303). In return, the political appointment of the bureaucratic units can lead them to prioritize the improvement of their political party rather than their department (Goodnow 1900, 82-3). The future career opportunities for bureaucrats and politicians influence their goals and institutional loyalties (Dahlstorm and Lapuente, 2017). As a result, the partisanship overlap between bureaucrats and politicians encourages badly planned yet prestigious projects such as highways, airports or high speed trains (Dahlstorm and Lapuente, 2017, p:187).

In an environment of high transaction costs and reliance, most transactions take place within a framework of exchange of favors or the pursuit of political advantage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The networks serve to reduce the transaction costs between the units, therefore bringing a greater level of efficiency for the service provision among the
municipal bodies. In that instance, generating hierarchical networks with the bureaucratic structure may constitute a rational response among elected officials in emerging democracies who face enormous pressure from the citizens due to the heightened expectations from the decentralized rule and resource constraints at the local level.

Following two diagrams, modified from E. Ostrom (2014, 94-96) illustrate two alternative production frameworks of local governance based on citizen participation:
Figure 1.1: One way relationships among participants in local governance.

In the case of one-way relationship among participants (Figure 1.1), the only existing mechanism of coproduction is between mayors and bureaucrats who decide on budget and projects, whereas the rest resembles a form of patron-client relationship. The mechanism of co-operation between mayors and bureaucrats at the expense of other stakeholders is developed through the exclusionary network structures. A two-way relationship (Figure 1.2) exists in cases where local governance mechanisms resemble the envisioned structure as citizens, elected officials and governors representing the central government jointly participate in local governance. Citizens constitute active participants of this framework as they engage in local council sessions.

A mechanism that can lead to the endurance of hierarchical ties among the elected mayors and the governors (Figure 1.1) is the political capital established under the authoritarian rule as it can generate mechanisms of trust and bondage among the elected officials and the bureaucrats, contributing to the rejuvenation of hierarchical ties among the local councils. The city council members under the
Authoritarian regime often constitute extensions of the bureaucratic hierarchy, hence they engage in repeated interactions with the members of the bureaucracy. Moreover, serving under the authoritarian regime can provide a mechanism of bonding between mayors and bureaucrats based on a shared ideology built upon upholding the principles of the regime. In much of the emerging democracies the revolutionaries accommodate the existing bureaucratic order rather than engaging in an overthrow to ensure continuity and stability (Suleiman, 1999). This provides a platform for the local elite incorporated into the local governance structure under the authoritarian regime to utilize their existing ties with the bureaucracy under democratic governance, which would in turn decrease the need for mayors to engage with the horizontal social capital at the local level. Hence, the bureaucratic linkages obtained under the ancient regime may provide the mechanisms for mayors with ex-regime backgrounds to construct less cooperative municipal governance structures. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The ideological and network ties derived from serving under the prior regime serve as a bonding mechanism between the elected mayors and appointed bureaucrats to establish social capital and exclude local stakeholders from the decision-making process.

The political ties in democratic settings among emerging democracies could constitute another venue to provide a bonding mechanism between the bureaucrats and the elected local agents. The political parties in emerging democracies often lack policy platforms and focus on “catch all” issues (Innes, 2002). Yet, the political parties can help the mayors and bureaucrats to establish the social capital needed to generate the hierarchical governance mechanisms as similar to other social movements. In democratic regimes the top level of bureaucrats are often appointed by the executive or legislative powers, naturally involving political considerations. The political parties can provide the venues to reduce the collective action costs and provide a group cohesion through establishing a platform for the communication of ideas and strategies (Tarrow, 1995; p:22). Groups who have greater capabilities of solving collective action problems have greater capacities for supporting politicians, assuring a favorable distribution for themselves and prevailing in competition (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965; Alston et al, 2018).
In instances when a group prevails to acquire greater capacity for organization, this leads the group to acquire further power in cases where it is in the winning coalition, and less political power for the governing coalition if it is in the opposition (Alston et al, 2018). Under the repressive institutions the covert organizations depend upon strong social ties generating mutual trust as well as a basis for mobilization to challenge the monopoly of the state (Alhamad, 2008, p:43). The bondages established under the authoritarian rule may provide a comparative advantage for these political parties to establish network relations with various state institutions. The partisanship networks among the local council members and bureaucrats may operate among two venues. First, we may observe greater resource allocation to municipalities in instances where an efficient partisanship and ideological network alignment between the bureaucrats and council members prevails. Second, we may observe less resource allocation in instances where such networks alignments are absent or are located among the bureaucrats and opposition forces within the local councils. These factors motivate me to propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Political and ideological ties through the existing party networks serve as bonding mechanisms between the elected mayors and the appointed bureaucrats to establish social capital and exclude local stakeholders from the decision-making process.

Finally, I discuss the implications of hierarchical ties for the modes of governance. I expect that the presence of social capital at the level of bureaucracy encourages mayors to construct non-transparent forms of governance. In contrast, mayors who lack social capital at the level of bureaucracy would follow more transparent procedures, as they would need to show their cooperative attitude in order to avoid potential repurcations. These arguments motivate me to propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Mayors with political and ideological ties with the appointed bureaucrats are more likely to establish non-transparent modes of governance as opposed to mayors who lack such ties.

In the next section, I outline the case study of Tunisia in order to test the hypotheses.
Case Study: Tunisia

Tunisia constitutes the case study to test my hypotheses, the only success story from Arab Spring that is continuing the process of democratic transitioning. Prior to the revolution, the primary function of local governance was to serve as mechanisms of clientelistic distribution, including money and jobs to regime supporters, the political party and the relevant associations (Clark et al, 2019; Volpi et al., 2016). Any discussion related to the local issues required clearance from the capital as the administrative duties of local councils limited their engagement within the public affairs (Ashford, 1965; p:83; Volpi et al., 2016). While Tunisian municipalities embodied a decentralized administration through a formal framework, the political and administrative decision making was through a deconcentrated order through appointed administrative ties (Loschi, 2018, p:98). Only candidates loyal to the regime were able to contest for the local councils (Sadiki, 2002). ‘Umda (district chief) constituted the foundational structure of a deconcentrated administrative order, expanding the network to the Ministry of Interior and its Directorate of Local Authorities (Volpi, 2013, p. 369). In that framework, the governors were responsible for approving the procedure and execution of the decisions at the municipal level (Tizaoui, 2009). The forms of tutelle and oversight from the central government reduced the responsibilities of the municipalities’ role to the management of buildings and services, primarily trash collection (Clark et al 2019). While municipalities managed urban planning, they exercised little influence over vital services including health and education (Yerkes and Marwan, 2018). Councilors’ role was limited to providing personal services such as official documents and trying to influence the public spending on infrastructure and public goods on projects related to electricity, water, or roads (Benstead, 2019). While lacking any substantive formal or informal powers, most of the municipalities were also in debt, lacked qualified staff and relied heavily on the state for funds (Clark et al., 2019). The hierarchical structure of local councils substantively curtailed the ability of citizens in engaging through the local governance (Turki and Verdeil, 2015, p:23).
The 2014 Constitution and 2018 Municipal Law formally expand the authorities of local decision making bodies and bestow active engagement among citizens within the decision-making process. Local councils chosen through elections elect mayors, who execute the laws pertaining their jurisprudence, such as planning, public security, investment, taxes. Mayors, also in coordination with municipal councils decide on the local budget and projects (Yerkes and Muasher, 2018). Prior to the revolution there was a total of 264 municipalities, covering approximately 64% of the population as the rest fell under the control of delegations that were under direct control of the governor’s authority (Clark et al., 2019; Democracy Reporting International). As of 2019, there are 350 municipalities in Tunisia spawned across 24 governorates, and 86 of these municipalities are new, meaning that they were formed only after the implementation of 2018 Municipal Law. Following the revolution, more resources have been allocated from the national to local level, as the budgets of municipalities quadrupled (Turki and Verdeil, 2015, p:23). However, the funds of municipalities are still deficient to be able to carry out the basic duties of the municipalities, and despite the democratization reforms clientelism remains as a prominent feature of local politics in Tunisia (Benstead, 2019).

The Tunisian Municipal Law leaves it up to the local governance structures to determine the structure of governance (Yerkes and Muasher, 2018) and citizens as well as elected officials often hesitate to take the cases of hierarchical governance at the local level to the Administration Court. Hence, the mechanisms that can ensure an inclusive form of participation are weak, whereas the budget available for municipalities vis-a-vis the central government remains substantively limited. These conditions can provide venue for the clientele relations to persist (Crisis Group, 2019). Many bureaucrats from the prior regime retained their posts, and about 80% of candidates to local councils in 2018 election had ties to the prior regime party, the RCD (Klaas and Dirsus, 2014; Wolf, 2018). This structure provides opportunities with mayors who had former ties to rejuvenate their network to serve their constituencies.

In the Middle East and North Africa, although political parties tend to be weak they nevertheless remain persistent elements within the political sphere across different layers of democratic and autocratic
rule (Storm, 2003). Clientelism and direct linkages serve as main functions of political parties in the Arab World, constituting a substantive determinant of citizens’ political involvement (De Miguel et al, 2017). In Tunisia, the dominant parties under the authoritarian rule, Nidaa Tounes as the regime-successor party and Ennahda as the Islamist opposition party, remained as the major political players within the transitioning period, occupying a majority of seats in the incipient parliament and gaining most of the mayoral posts. These parties carry ideological bondage mechanisms such as Bourguibism, Islamism or a commitment towards modernity as well as extensive network structures that enabled partisans to relate among each other and offered privileges for individuals to join political parties (Strom and Cavatorta, 2018; Wolf, 2017; Wolf, 2018; Zederman, 2015). In authoritarian contexts within MENA the Islamist activism constitutes an important factor of identity construction at the local level (Singerman, 2004). Many members of the bureaucracy under Ben Ali regime participated within the cadre of Nidaa Tounes (Gelvin, 2015). In this environment, both shared ideology and network structures can serve as mechanisms for the elected mayors and bureaucrats to build social capital in order to perpetuate their existing linkages.

The Role of Governor in New Municipal Governance

The partial decentralization framework in Tunisia affords a substantive level of influence for governors, who represent the Ministry of Interior through constituting the head of governorates, subdivisions of the largest administrative units. Under the First Republic the governors exercised direct control over the municipalities, determining the projects and the distribution of resources. The 2018 Municipal Law does not specify managing municipal affairs among governors’ duties. The 11th chapter of the 2014 Directory published by the Ministry of Interior indicates that “the Governor, under the authority of the Minister of Interior, undertakes the administration of public affairs of the governorate and supervises the public security (Wizarat al-Dakhiliya, 2014, p:10).” Currently the chief of government and the interior ministry appoint the governors, which often involves a process of bargaining and conflict among different political parties within the government (Okkez, 2015; Gobe, 2016). The 2018 Municipal
Law identifies the rights and duties of governors pertaining to municipalities as objecting to the decisions of the Municipal Council to the Court of Administration (Clause 278) on issues such as referendum requests (32), tax collection (143) and perceived instances of personalismo⁴ (279). The governor can also take issues associated with contracts, budgets as well as transactions undertaken at the municipal level to Court of Auditors (108, 163, 174) and manage the budget of municipalities at the absence of mayoral initiative (172, 175), oversee the voluntary dissolution of councils (204, 209), assign representatives on license and permit distribution (Clause 258), ensure the execution of environmental policing (266), intervene in the cases of mayor’s neglected power (268), and close of councils engaged in unlawful activities (Clause 302).

The office of governorate continues to hold substantive power within the framework of partial decentralization. In addition to the domains underlined above, the governors continue to hold a substantive level of resources to be allocated to the municipalities. The resource allocation from the central government to municipalities is spawned across a nine year period starting from 2018 with only 45% of the total resources transferred to the local level at the end of the nine-year period (Crisis Group, 2018). Hence, currently there is a great level of dependency on the central government. The authority of governor over national resources is derived from his chairmanship of the regional council. Although there is no official date set, the regional council elections are currently proposed to take place in 2020, until which time the governor continues to be the president of the regional council (UltraTunisia, 2018). As the head of regional councils, the governors cooperate along with the appointed regional representatives of ministries in allocating resources for municipal-level projects.

⁴ Referring to governance based on benefiting the mayors and council members personally at the expense of public interests.
⁵ According to the article 133 of the Tunisian Constitution, the Regional Council members are elected by popular vote. After the elections the regional council the current executive role for the resources exercised by the governors will be transferred over to the internally elected council presidents. However, the delays beginning from 2016 suggest that Tunisians may continue to delay the elections beyond 2020. Moreover, the governor will continue to exert substantive influence over the Regional Councils, as the governor is also responsible for executing the decisions of the regional council regardless of who the president of the council is (Clause 337).
The governor interviewed in this study defines his role as a “soldier” between the ministries and the municipalities as he carries out the orders of the ministries on municipalities. However, he also indicates that governors maintain a certain level of jurisprudence in determining on the allocation of resources from ministries to municipalities. Three factors determine the allocation of resources to the municipalities, with the first factor being the number of people living within the municipalities, as more populous municipalities receive higher amount of resources. The second factor is the ability of municipalities to execute the projects, which is determined by the success rate of the number of projects previously presented. The evaluation criteria, however, is ad-hoc and based upon governor’s personal evaluations and therefore may vary from governorate to governorate. Furthermore, the conflicts within the municipalities that lead to the failure of obtaining majority to execute projects can lead the governor to rescind the budget. Lastly, there is positive discrimination against the small municipalities by providing them more resources based on the belief that these municipalities are more deficient in their resources to be able to self-sustain themselves.

The existing mechanism presents two major venues for personal relations of mayors to acquire resources throughout the governorate for their municipalities. The first is through the role of governors as “soldiers” between the ministries and the local governments as the partisanship relations of ministers make the resource distribution scheme vulnerable to partisan considerations. In fact, many elected officials and civil society activist refer to “triangulate relations” among the partisan mayors, partisan ministries as well as MPs and the governor in describing how mayors develop their ties to provide services for their constituencies. Mayors often refer their concerns to MPs representing their political parties in districts, and MPs refer those issues to ministers who then execute projects through the engagement of governors.

Second, as there is no formulaic scheme that mayors utilize in determining the “efficiency” of municipalities, the personal considerations of governors can determine which municipalities obtain how much of the resources.
Research Design

In evaluating the mechanisms of local governance, I rely on interview-based evidence, with interviews conducted among mayors, civil society members and council members. The data was collected through a three-stage sampling. At the first stage I chose among the geographical regions, in the second stage I chose among the governorates among the regions, and in the third stage I chose among the municipalities among the governorates. There is a wide discrepancy in Tunisia between the levels of development among the regions along the coast versus the regions within the south and interior (Sadiki, 2019). Hence, I included regions with as diverse locations and levels of socio-economic development as possible, conducting interviews in Mid-East, Mid-West, North-West, South-East and Tunis, the Capital regions. In that sense, my research design exploits Tunisia’s high level of within-country variation concerning the levels of socio-economic development and orientations towards governance to nullify the effects of omitted variable bias (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994).

At the second stage, I chose governorates from within the regions. At this level I employ purposeful sampling which enables me to choose interviewees to outline specific mechanisms based on the theoretical framework (Masullo and Ocantos, 2019; APSA). Three factors motivated my choice for the governorates among regions. The first factor is my motivation to include a diverse set of governorates across different socio-economic levels within Tunisia. In that respect, I refer to the relative poverty rates in Tunisia based on 2000 National Survey as a proxy for the development figures prior to the revolution, presented through the following graph:

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6 I was not able to conduct interviews among South-West and North-East regions due to limited resources available.
I diversify the governorates based on their levels of development (Graph 1) through choosing them among mid, high and low levels of development. The second factor is related to my ability to access to interviews. Due to my prior contacts with civil society organizations, I had greater access to municipalities within governorates that had denser populations, which led my sampling to be more heavily along governorates with higher population density. The third factor is related to the theoretical framework proposed in the study, with a particular interest in diversifying the political background of mayors and governors.

The sampling method at the level of governorate and municipality, and a list of the people interviewed, can be found in the appendix. Overall, the interview arenas covered %11.1 of all municipalities in Tunisia. Like any non-randomized selection process, my selection method presents potential biases that need to be considered. The first potential bias is related to accessibility. Due to resource constraints I often lacked access to the regions that are furthest away from the capital of the
governorates (centre ville). Second, due to the snowballing sampling effect I had more access to mayors with political parties. Hence, it is important to note that the independent mayors from municipalities furthest away from the centre ville are undersampled in this study.

I conducted the interviews between May and August 2019. The interview language was mostly Modern Standardized Arabic (Fusha), although in cases where the interviewees spoke English or volunteer translators were available the interviews were conducted in English, and in rare occasions in French. The interviews were semi-structured and recorded in a notebook. Then I transcribed the scriptures on computer.

I test the hypothesis on Transparency through the Transparency Index developed by Al-Bawsala, an internationally recognized civil society organization and anti-corruption watchdog in Tunisia (Yerkes and Muasher, 2017). The Index, ranging from 0 to 100, is calculated through six separate components under administrative and council responsibilities. On the administrative component, the measurement focuses on accessing the information through coordination with national Access to Information Authority (INAI). On the council side, the measurements include the rate of sessions open for citizens, the amendment of articles7 that may decrease the transparency of municipalities, and the number of public contracts available on TUNEPS (Tunisian e-procurement system) or the website of municipality. The maximum transparency score is 68%, the minimum is 0%, the mean is 25.4% and median is 26.6%.

I merge the data on Transparency score with the political affiliation of the mayor elected in 2018 Municipal Elections as well as the political ties of appointed governors. I identify the ties of bureaucrats through researching the newspaper archives. I was able to identify the affiliations of 11 out of 24 governors served in 2019 for at least a period of 6 months, covering 174 out of 350 municipalities8. I code that a governor is affiliated with political movement or shares an ideology if he actively participated in a political organization prior to or after his appointment, served as cabinets as chief of staff under ministers

7 Articles 64, 65 and 104.
8 I was not able to find information about the partisan affiliation for the remaining 13 governorates.
belonging to specific political movements, served in the former regime party (Democratic Constitutional Rally), reported to favor a political organization by at least one major newspaper, considered for ministerial positions by specific political parties, or served in the Union. The details of the governor ties can be found in the appendix. In the next section, I evaluate the qualitative evidence and in the section after I evaluate the evidence on the analysis of Transparency score.

Hierarchical Governance with the Central Government

As a continuation of the practices under the authoritarian regime, it is often challenging for mayors to reach and coordinate with the central government officials throughout the formal coordination mechanisms. As a results, mayors across different governorates almost uniformly agree on the importance of personal relationships in benefiting from the central government resources. In that framework, party networks and ideological belonging enable mayors to acquire greater ability to establish contract with the central government and therefore reduce the transaction costs. Interviews The municipalities belonging the governing political parties tend to have greater access to the central government resources, whereas the access of independent mayors to central government resources is more limited\textsuperscript{9} \textsuperscript{10}\textsuperscript{11}.

In addition to belonging to a ruling political party, having the same political party or the ideological line with the governor of a district also provides favorable treatment for the mayors. In particular, in cases where the governors are closer to a Bourguibist ideological line, they prioritize municipalities where mayors are from Bourguibist parties, such as Nidaa, Machrou or Tahya Tounes. However, in cases where the governors are closer to Ennahda, they tend to prioritize mayors from Ennahda. An opposition council member the municipality of Tbelbou, Gabes indicates: “The governor is close to Ennahda, so our municipality receives more investment than the other municipalities. But if the mayor is not from Ennahda, there would be no investment\textsuperscript{12}.” As a mayor from Ennahda in Gabes

\textsuperscript{9} Interview in Gabes, 07/18/2019
\textsuperscript{10} Interview in Monastir, 07/22/2019.
\textsuperscript{11} Interview in Monastir, 07/25/2019.
\textsuperscript{12} Interview in Gabes, 07/16/2019
indicates, the parties provide the technical skills as well as the venues for maintaining relationships with the ministries and governors. An Ennahda mayor from Monastir indicates that the governor tries to help parties closer to him, and the procedures are easier for the mayors closer to the Bourguibist camp to reach the governor. The political engagement with the governors can enable the municipalities to acquire additional benefits such as new parks and stadiums.

The opinion of a civil society member from Monastir on the role of partisanship for the relationship between the central government and the municipalities, and their implications for participatory democracy, illustrates the dynamics:

“There is a cooperation between the municipality [from Nidaa] and the governorate. The central government gives more importance to our [the municipality from Nidaa] compared to the other municipalities [in the region]. If the governor and the mayor are from the same party, they can have better relations. We asked for a delegation office in our municipality, because we know that it takes time for municipal law to be implemented and the governor continues to exert its influence. The governorate chose to establish the delegation office here rather than the other regions due to the partisanship ties between the mayor and the governor and the strong civil society… In most of the municipalities [in Monastir] Nidaa governs by itself… Here they [Nidaa] have the absolute majority… There is some distribution of resources based on partisanship, as neighborhoods closer to Nidaa receive more resources… There are conflicts between parties… The mayor prioritizes party lines over civil society. We hold the same distance to each party, yet the mayor provides resources to [the civil societies which are] closer to him. There is a civil society here that is Bourguibist, closer to the mayor, and it receives more resources. For the

13 Interview in Gabes, 07/16/2019
14 Interview in Monastir, 07/26/2019.
15 Interview in Gabes, 07/15/2019
16 Interview in Monastir, 07/30/2019.
participatory budgets there is voting. For other things, such as deciding on roads, the mayor makes the decisions by himself.”

Different from the partisanship alignment, the negative partisanship may serve to strain the relationships between the central government and the municipalities. In these instances, the governor can block the advancement of projects by the mayor through halting the resources allocated to specific municipalities\textsuperscript{1718}. An opposition council member from the governorate of Monastir indicates\textsuperscript{19}:

“[There is] no cooperation between the mayor and the governor because the mayor is from Ennahda… There is a partisan clash between the mayor and the governor, so I go to the Governorate of Monastir to handle the affairs related to governance. Mayor [from my municipality] cut his ties to the governor, so the governor cut his programs to [my municipality]. The governor knows that the mayor is supported from Ennahda and he tries to lock the power… Only my personal relationship is present [between the governorate and the municipality]. The mayor does not know that I visit the governor to work on a project for a culture center… After I finalize the culture center, I present my program to the local council all complete, and in this case the council will have to approve it because it will be ready…. The Bourguibist connection between the governor and myself helps in our relationship. [The governor] serves as a linkage between myself and the ministry of culture to build the culture center.”

In another example, in a municipality within Sfax the council members from Nidaa Tounes had resigned in mass in protest of the clientele distribution of resources. The mayor, who is from Ennahda, complained that the governor stopped allocating resources to the municipality\textsuperscript{20}. While this may indicate the prevalence of negative partisanship in Sfax, a mayor from Ennahda in the same governorate indicates that the central government never tries to block the process of local governance because of the party

\textsuperscript{17} Interview in Monastir, 07/25/2019.  
\textsuperscript{18} Interview in Sfax, 07/02/2019.  
\textsuperscript{19} Interview in Sousse, 07/30/2019.  
\textsuperscript{20} Interview in Sfax, 07/02/2019
affiliations\textsuperscript{21}. This suggests that the dynamics of the blocking of the relationship may be specific to instances where the governors observe that the mayors with negative partisanship engage in clientele relations or non-inclusive governance. Moreover, deriving the benefits from the partisanship alignment may not be applicable to all cases, as the two may still exist over the control of local governance due to each side pursing their own political interests\textsuperscript{22}.

Amid partisanship bickering and political conflict at the local councils, some council members resign\textsuperscript{23}, whereas others apply to the Administrative Court to challenge the decisions taken by the mayor\textsuperscript{24}. Another strategy is to resist the mayor through utilizing the existing participatory mechanisms with the civil society and other council members\textsuperscript{25}. Opposition council members can also ally with the local administration in order to block the de jure power of the mayor\textsuperscript{26}, or they may choose to do nothing while letting the former hierarchical modes of governance to take over\textsuperscript{27}. However, the partisanship bickering and political conflict may be less likely to take place in municipalities governed by independents, as they would need resources at the local level since they often lack the political networks within the central government\textsuperscript{28}.

The evidence on the role of serving under prior regime for building networks and excluding other stakeholders appears far more inconclusive. A mayor in Gabes, who served as a council member under the prior regime indicates that his past experience does not help in current relations, because Tunisia changed a lot since then. However, he points out to his party [Ennahda] for helping in the relations because it is a governing party\textsuperscript{29}. Another mayor from Gabes, who served in the period between 1995 and 2010 as a vice-president, also indicates the role of his party [Ennahda] in establishing relations with the

\textsuperscript{21} Interview in Sfax, 07/04/2019.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview in Kef, 08/10/2019.
\textsuperscript{23} Interview in Tunis, 08/16/2019.
\textsuperscript{24} Interview in Gabes, 07/17/2019.
\textsuperscript{25} Interview in Monastir, 07/30/2019.
\textsuperscript{26} Interview in Gabes, 07/10/2019.
\textsuperscript{27} Interview in Gabes, 07/09/2019.
\textsuperscript{28} Interview in Monastir, 07/25/2019.
\textsuperscript{29} Interview in Gabes, 07/17/2019.
bureaucracy rather than his personal relations acquired under the prior regime. Yet, the past relations with the bureaucracy can be helpful, particularly with regards to developing connections with specific institutions, such as the loan fund or passing through the specific bureaucratic hurdles.

**Outcome: Transparency**

I employ mixed effect model in conducting an analysis on the transparency score, which assumes that observations within a level, the random variable groups, are correlated. In this case, the random variable is at the level of governorate. I conduct a “Match Scale” which takes the value of 1 if Governor’s affiliation matches with the political party affiliation of mayor (Bourgibist-Bourgibist or Ennahda-Ennahda), the value of 0 if the mayor is from an independent list and the governor is partisan, and -1 if the mayor and governor have negative political affinities, such as the mayor is close to Ennahda and the governor is closer to Bourgibist parties and vice versa. This coding scheme enables me to capture the dynamics associated with partisanship overlap as well as negative partisanship. The following graph presents transparency score for the top two political parties along with the other parties classified as Left/Liberal as well as the independents:

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30 Interview in Gabes, 07/16/2019.
31 Interview in Monastir, 07/22/2019.
32 Interview in Monastir, 07/29/2019.
33 In one instance (Kbili) the governor’s appointment was criticized by an Ennahda MP. In that instance, I simply coded -1 for that governor’s association with Ennahda, and 0 for the other parties. In another instance, the governor of Baca comes from a unionist (UGTT) background. Since the UGTT has traditionally had negative relations with Ennahda, I code -1 for municipalities in Baca, the leftist party Sagabiyya as 1, and all the rest as 0.
Graph 2

As Graph 2 indicates, the transparency scores of Independent mayors (m=25.2), mayors from left and liberal parties\textsuperscript{34} (m=23.1) and regime successor Nidaa (m=23.1) appear close to each other, whereas the transparency score for Ennahda is slightly greater than the transparency scores of the other three (m=27.5). Graph 3 further breaks down transparency score by Governor’s Affiliation:

\textsuperscript{34} Referring to Harakat Sagabiyya, Tayyar Demoqratiyya and Afaq Tunis.
In this instance, we observe that the transparency score of Nidaa and Left/Liberal mayors are substantively lower in instances where the governor has Bourgibist affiliation, whereas the transparency score for Ennahda and Independent mayors are higher. The situation flips with governors from background in Ennahda: in this case Nidaa mayors have higher transparency score as opposed to Ennahda mayors, who have the lowest score. For the governor affiliated with the UGTT, Ennahda and Nidaa have
high transparency scores whereas the transparency scores for both Left/Liberal and Independent mayors are low. The following table presents the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>21.53****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overlap</td>
<td>-5.91**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1513.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1526.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-752.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. groups: gov</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var: gov (Intercept)</td>
<td>20.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var: Residual</td>
<td>338.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Statistical models

The results suggest a statistically significant and negative relationship between the transparency score of municipalities and the ideological affiliation between the mayors and governors, indicating that for each shift in partisanship from [-1,1] the transparency score decreases by about 5.9 percentage points, and this relationship is statistically significant at alpha=0.05.

**Conclusion**

This research illuminates the relations among the bureaucratic and locally elected units following the implementation of the decentralization law in emerging democracies through a case study of Tunisia. The findings indicate that the partisanship ties constitute formidable venues through which elected mayors establish networks of relations with the appointed bureaucrats in order to decrease their reliance on the horizontal forms of social capital at the municipal level. These networks operate in an environment of high reliance on the central government due to the constraints on the municipal resources as well as the
continuing high transaction costs between the relations among the central government and the local agencies.

The relationships between mayors and the central government established under the authoritarian rule does not seem to generate sufficient level of social capital for mayors to be able to utilize their personal relations to handle municipal affairs and therefore to revert back to the hierarchical structure. This could be because the political capital derived from the prior regime is built upon weak foundations of generating working relations rather than voluntary networks based on a sense of a shared ideology and destiny. The quantitative analysis of Transparency Score indicates that the partisanship networks have ramifications for the transparent forms of governance, as in instances where the partisanship background of mayors and governors overlap the local governance structure tends to become less transparent.

The findings support the literature suggesting that the appointment of bureaucrats based on partisanship loyalty incentivizes them to support the co-partisan office holders (Dahlstorm and Lapuente, 2017). It is possible that the short term improvements in efficiency through partisanship networks can generate more transaction costs in the long term as the appointment of bureaucrats and the election of mayors come to depend on the maintenance and expansion of hierarchical networks at the expense of horizontal, consensus-based resource management. As a result, the framework of local governance can develop in a permanent loophole of high transaction costs and inefficient local governance management.

Following the Regional Council elections in Tunisia, the date of which to be announced, the main resource management duties will fall under the chairperson of the Regional Council. The endurance of high transaction costs, and the importance of partisan networks that accompany them, may continue to dominate the framework of Tunisian local governance for two major reasons. First, the elections will continue to remain partisan in its nature with political parties exerting their resources for their electoral advantage. Therefore the structure of the decision-making at the regional councils may reflect upon the existing partisan cleavages and decisions may reflect partisan interests. Second, the office of governorship
will continue to hold substantive levels of power due to its role as an intermediary between the ministries and municipalities. As the governors will continue to be appointed by the cabinets, the partisanship considerations may reflect their appointments and subsequent decisions on the allocation of resources. Therefore, moving forward de-politicizing the appointment procedure for bureaucrats in Tunisia might be a feasible strategy to improve the oversight as well as an even distribution of resources to the municipalities. Tunisia devised a separate institution, namely “Autorité de lutte contre la corruption (INLUCC)” to fight against corruption. However, such external auditors often lack the insider knowledge needed to understand the day-to-day basis of workings for the institutions, and therefore a two-way monitoring process generated by separate career structures may be more successful at bringing an inclusive governance structure (Dahlstorm and Lapuente, 2017 p: 187). However, this reformation also carries the risk of simply increasing the transaction costs for partisan mayors, as then governors may further lose incentives to engage with any municipality.

Appendix

From the Middle East region, I choose the governorates of Monastir and Sfax. The reason for choosing these two governorates among the four is twofold. The first is to increase the number of mayors with backgrounds in Nidaa Tounes, a regime-successor party with a high concentration of former officials. Monastir is the birth town of Bourguiba, the first president of Tunisia and constituted the center of recruitment for Tunisia’s new elite under the First Republic, constituting regime’s “historic stronghold” and “backbone” (Buehler and Ayali, 2018; Cammett 2007, 57; Entelis 1980, 171). Monastir governorate received the bulwark of investment during the reign of Bourguiba, as Bourguiba’s birthplace, the City of Monastir in the Governorate, is located there. As identified by Şaşmaz et al (2018), much of the former RCD members made comebacks to the political scene through Nidaa lists. At the aftermath of 2018 elections Monastir constituted the governorate where the regime successor party, Nidaa Tounes, became most successful relative to its performance in other governorates, earning 35.48% of the mayoral posts in the governorate. Hence, focusing on Monastir increases my propensity to interview mayors with a
background within the prior regime. Moreover, the governor of Monastir comes from a Bourguibist background with former ties to RCD (Al-Youm8, 2019). This enables me to investigate the potential ties with Bourguibist political agencies and a governor who is close to Monastir. The governorate of Sfax presents a contrasting case to the governorate of Monastir as in Sfax the governor comes from a Bourguibist background whereas Ennahda and the independents combined hold 20 of the 23 mayoral positions. Therefore, choosing the governorates of Monastir and Sfax from the Middle East region enables me to compare the mechanisms of governance among similar cases with one major distinction: in Sfax the majority of mayors do not belong to the same political/ideological line that the governor is close to, and in Monastir a substantive portion of the mayors belong to the same political/ideological line that the governor is close to.

From the South-East region I choose the governorate of Gabes, because Gabes presents a case where a majority of mayors coupled with the governor have ties to Ennahda. In particular, 11 of the 16 mayoral posts belong to Ennahda in Gabes, whereas the independents hold the rest of the posts. Moreover, governor was a member of Ennahda Shura Council prior to his appointment to the position of the governorate (Babnet, 2016; Tuniscope, 2013).

In addition to these three governorates I conducted field research within the governorates of El-Kef, Kairouan, Tunis and Jendouba. The governor of El Kef, prior to his appointment to the governorate posts served as the regional coordinator for Nidaa Tounes party (Zoom Tuniziya, 2015) whereas Kef presents a case with Bourguibist parties, independents and Ennahda.

I relied on a multiple mechanisms in sampling at the municipal level. First, I used direct outreach through visiting municipalities without any prior contact and asked the elected officials present if they would like to participate in my study. In that matter, I attempted to find the most similar cases as I limited the only difference to the variable of theoretical interest. I interviewed the mayor if she agreed to take part in the study. In some cases the mayor was not present or available during the time frame, and I interviewed the available council members present at the council. Another method that I used was
snowball sampling through my personal contacts, particularly from the civil society organization of Al-Bawsala, which focuses on transparency in local governance, in order to establish contacts with the civil society members who engage in observing the local governance structures. After establishing my contacts, Al-Bawsala volunteers often provided me the contact information of mayors. I also employed snowball sampling, where I asked the interviewed subjects if they could provide contact information for potential subjects. In addition, I tried to oversample the new municipalities as through the early stages of my research I discovered that these municipalities often face additional challenges with regards to resources that present additional components for the relationships between the central government and the municipalities. The following table presents the list of municipalities that I visited along with their population, municipality type (new or old) and the people interviewed, with “M” standing for “Mayor”, “C” standing for “Council Member”, and “CSO” standing for “Civil Society Organization”.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>People Interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Kram</td>
<td>74132</td>
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<td>1 M, 1 CSO</td>
</tr>
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<td>71961</td>
<td>Old</td>
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<td>Old</td>
<td>1 C</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tunis</td>
<td>637568</td>
<td>Old</td>
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<td>32247</td>
<td>Old</td>
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<td>Chiha</td>
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<td>Old</td>
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<td>Hajeb</td>
<td>19455</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Old</td>
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<td>Awebed Khazanet</td>
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<td>Sfax</td>
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<td>Chenini Nahal</td>
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<td>Old</td>
<td>1 M</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gabes</td>
<td>99426</td>
<td>Old</td>
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<td>Ghannouch</td>
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<td>El Kef</td>
<td>Marja</td>
<td>5472</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>Monastir</td>
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<td>8432</td>
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<td>2C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastir</td>
<td>Manzil Farsi</td>
<td>3603</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jammal</td>
<td>50275</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>1 M, 1 CSO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monastir</td>
<td>Ben Hassan</td>
<td>8801</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>1 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastir</td>
<td>Amiet Hojjaj</td>
<td>8121</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>1 M , 1 C, 1 CSO</td>
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<td>Monastir</td>
<td>Amiet Touazra</td>
<td>6261</td>
<td>Old</td>
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<td>Monastir</td>
<td>Ksar Hellal</td>
<td>49376</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>1 M</td>
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Table 1: The List of Interviewees
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<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Party/Ideology</th>
<th>Tie type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ariana</td>
<td>UGTT</td>
<td>High executive position in the UGTT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Arous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bizerte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Kef</td>
<td>Nidaa/Bourguibist</td>
<td>Nominated by Qalb Tounes for the position of Interior Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabes</td>
<td>Ennahda</td>
<td>Former official of Ennahda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gafsa</td>
<td>Ennahda</td>
<td>Ennahda lobbied for his appointment to the national government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jandouba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kairouan</td>
<td>Tahya</td>
<td>Resigned to run for Tahya Tounes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasserine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kbili</td>
<td>Ennahda MP</td>
<td>Appointment criticized by an Ennahda MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdia</td>
<td>Bourguibist</td>
<td>Appointment in 2015 encouraged by Nabil Qaraoui from Nidaa Tounes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manouba</td>
<td>Bourguibist</td>
<td>Appointed and served as a chief of staff in a the ministry under a Bourguibist minister: Ministry of Defense in 2013 (Zubaidi or Sabbagh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mednine</td>
<td>Bourguibist</td>
<td>Listed as belonging to Pre-Revolution Bourguibist Party in a newspaper and criticized for favoring Nidaa Tounes by the local office of Machrou Tunis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastir</td>
<td>Nidaa/Bourguibist</td>
<td>A previous candidate of Ennahda Party, served as the chief of staff under Ennahda-led Ministry of agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabeul</td>
<td>Ennahda</td>
<td>Considered joining the Constitutional Movement (A Bourguibist Party) prior to his position as a minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>Bourguibist/Free Destour</td>
<td>In his CV listed as the founding member of the Machrou Tounes Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Bouzid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siliana</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatouine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tozeur</td>
<td>Bourguibist/Machrou u</td>
<td>Listed as a member of Al-Nahda Shura Council and governance and transparency committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagouan</td>
<td>Ennahda</td>
<td></td>
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Table 2: Identified Ideological Affiliations of Governors
Citation


Commons, J. R. (1924). Legal foundations of capitalism.


American economic review, 100(3), 641-72.


Sasmaz, A., Blackman, A., Clark, J. (2018) One third of new municipal councilors in Tunisia are from independent lists. How independent are they? Democracy International


