Ruling Rebellions: Learning about governance from rebel groups

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Abstract

Recent work has problematized state-centric assumptions to explore governance by a variety of actors. Scholars have challenged the concept of “ungoverned space” referring to areas outside state control, instead acknowledging that areas of “alternative governance” or “limited statehood” are often governed to some extent. When the states’ power fails to expand to its sovereign borders, powerful local actors frequently fill the governance void. This article centers on core concepts related to rebel governance, synthesizes existing work, raises new questions and critiques, and shows how investigating governance by rebel groups advances our understanding of governance more broadly. The nature of rebel organizations provides a unique opportunity to researchers to both problematize and expand the state-centric focus on governance because rebel actors vary widely in form, operate in a multiplicity of contexts, and have no universal legitimizing principle that allows consistent membership as a class of political actors.

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Introduction

Recent work has problematized the state-centric assumptions used to explore governance by a variety of actors. For example, scholars have challenged the concept of “ungoverned space” referring to areas outside state control, instead acknowledging that areas of “alternative governance” or “limited statehood” are often governed to some extent (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Lemke 2019; Lemke and Crabtree 2019; Florea 2014; Scott 2010). When the state’s power fails to expand to its sovereign borders, powerful local actors frequently fill the governance void. Alternatively, non-governmental organizations, criminal syndicates, or gangs supplement state power in certain areas (Tsai 2011). In other cases, rebel groups challenge state sovereignty, frequently governing in the territories in which they operate (Mampilly 2011; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Huang 2016; Heger and Jung 2017; Stewart 2018).

This article centers on core concepts related to rebel governance, synthesizing existing work, raising new questions and critiques, and shows how investigating governance by rebel groups in particular advances our understanding of governance more broadly. The nature of rebel organizations provides a unique opportunity for researchers to both problematize and expand the state-centric focus on governance. This is possible because rebel actors vary widely in form, operate in a multiplicity of contexts, and have no universal legitimizing principle that allows consistent membership as a class of political actors.

Rebel actors vary widely in their composition, internal structure, and relationship to civilians. Some rebels emerge from narrow constituencies and are particular with recruitment, some develop complex hierarchies to manage diverse membership groups, and some create a variety of different governance systems to shape interactions with non-members (Arjona 2016; Braithwaite and Cunningham forthcoming; Gates 2002; Staniland 2014). Rebel groups also operate in a plethora of contexts, often evidenced by their juxtaposition to states. For example, some rebel groups work with states to deliver local governance to underserved populations; others destroy state institutions and rebuild their own (Mampilly 2011). Moreover, rebel groups have no universal legitimizing principle and hence attempt to legitimate their existence in a number of different ways (including links to “nations”, religious tradition, and specific political ideologies, such as communism and democracy). The international community of states does not agree upon any one legitimating principle for these groups, and responses to them are extremely heterogeneous.

Given these aspects of rebel politics, rebel groups offer an important laboratory for exploring how “governance” develops and fails. A better understanding of rebel governance politics sheds light on experimentation with forms of governance, competitive and complementary dynamics of non-state governance, and legitimation processes related to governance. In this article, we begin with a discussion of general conceptions of governance, emphasizing the three observable components of rule-making, rule-enforcing, and goods and services provision. Next we define rebel governance as it is currently studied, highlight the ways rebel organizations govern, and address variation across form, context, and legitimacy within rebel groups. Third, we problematize several aspects of the conventional
wisdom in the rebel governance literature, linking these to problems highlighted by scholars of governance more broadly, in order to motivate future research to question or relax some of the common assumptions. We find a number of key questions that warrant further investigation. We conclude with insights generated here and thoughts on how researchers may meet the challenges for advancing research on rebel governance both theoretically and empirically.

**Conceptions of Governance**

Political science is fundamentally the study of governance (Borzel, Risse, and Draude 2018; Fukuyama 2013; McGinnis 2011; Ostrom 2000; Levi-Faur 2012; Rhodes 1997; Risse 2011, 2012; Rosenau 1995). Governance broadly consists of the introduction of rules for the exercise of power, the enforcement of those rules, and the provision of order and control over the distribution of goods and services. In short, governance is the institutionalization of the process that determines “who gets [access to] what, when, and how.” Most research on governance has been anchored in the study of state power and behaviors, defining parameters in ways that exclude the relevant activities of political entities that do not “look” like or have aims to be states.

Much of the work on governance follows from a definition of governance as the “institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, and/or to provide collective goods” (Risse 2012, p. 700). Though only one of many proposed in the literature, this definition includes the key dimensions that approximate a consensus, emphasizing the formal and informal rules and norms that coordinate social interactions and purposefully generate distributional outcomes. Governance refers to social coordination through a variety of structures, each of which may or may not be engineered and enforced by a specific actor. Within this, scholars have highlighted differential structures, such as governance by *hierarchy* (characterized by political actors with ultimate authority to design and enforce rules and with subordinate actors of some limited autonomy), and non-hierarchical arrangements (such as *market*-governance, *network*-governance, and *community*-governance). All of these draw attention to the ways in which societal-level rules and norms are aggregated through decentralized interpersonal relationships and interactions. The literature examining “global governance,” for example, emphasizes the forms of decentralized cooperation among sovereign states, sometimes through “nonsovereign bodies outside the state system,” to solve collective problems in a globalized world (Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Fukuyama 2016), and sometimes with transnational nonstate actors as (near) equals alongside states.

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7 For a recent synthesis of the variety of definitions for governance, see Levi-Faur (2012, p. 8) and Borzel, Risse, and Draeude (2018).
10 See Bowles and Gintis (2002).
11 For summaries, see Fukuyama (2016) and Lake (2010).
From the wealth of work related to governance, we highlight three observable components that we will employ in our subsequent analysis of rebel governance: 1) rule-making, 2) rule-enforcing, and 3) goods and services provision.  

*Rule-making*

A key function of governance is to propagate universally recognized “systems of rules” (Rosenau 1995, p. 13) and norms to regulate public affairs and guide social interactions by enhancing individuals’ ability to predict others’ behavior. As Lake (2018) notes, all societies face, to some extent, the central “governance problem”: limitations on, or the absence of, “an ‘ultimate’ authority that can regulate competition and possibly conflict between social actors” (p. 293). There is thus an innate risk that multiple authorities will compete, sometimes violently, over the right to set the rules establishing political order. The lack of ultimate authority undermines political stability, economic development, social trust, and the predictability of social interactions. Governance is the resolution of this problem of regulating and containing social conflict, accomplished through the provision of clear and widely accepted rules.

Though the state represents the ultimate source of governance-as-rule-making in many settings, circumstances in which the state lacks legitimacy or has limited capability to rule (e.g. areas of limited statehood) are common. A variety of actors may make bids to seize authority over the entire state or to establish authority to govern a slice of geographic or policy space in parallel to the state. Rebel groups in the context of armed conflict represent but one example of emerging political contenders challenging the state for authority. Further, multiple actors can govern simultaneously, with varying degrees of compatibility and substitutability or competition. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework has referred to this as *policentricity*, defined as “a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes” (McGinnis 2011, p. 171). This concept includes overlapping governance by formal governments at different administrative unit levels (multi-level governance), and by various sectors of society from the public/formal institutions to private and civil society organizations (multi-sectoral governance).

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12 These dimensions are roughly related to the four dimensions highlighted in Levi-Faur (2012, p. 8): *structure* (formal/informal institutions), *process* (“steering” policy-making), *mechanism* (procedures for decision-making/social control), and *strategy* (manipulating institutional design to influence preferences and outcomes).

13 As Lake (2018) notes, this relates to the “cycling” problem identified in social choice theory. See pages 296-300 for a summary of the relevant social choice theory.

14 Uncertainty over which social and economic rules prevail deters citizens from investing in productive assets and activities that fill the state’s coffers with tax revenue and allow for the enforcement of rules and delivery of goods and services that improve quality of life.

Rule-enforcing

Enforcement is a key component to governing. If individuals do not believe transgressions will be properly addressed, then they may expect a breakdown in compliance to behavioral norms that established governance has created. Even rulers enjoying a high degree of legitimacy are expected to punish violations to deter would-be rule-breakers and maintain the widespread expectation that members of society will act according to the rules. Police and judicial institutions, for example, often perform this punitive function. Informal mechanisms may also provide enforcement in certain contexts, especially where the state’s administrative capacity is weak or it operates in non-hierarchal governance systems.

While governance systems often rely on formally designated actors to enforce rules, some rules are self-enforcing, or enforced via informal, decentralized methods (e.g. market and network governance) rather than formal, hierarchical institutions. For example, behaviors for which community members impose social sanctions, or material sanctions in the form of withdrawing benefits of community redistribution, may deter additional violations and strengthen the resilience of the governance system to political upheaval. Nevertheless, hierarchical imposition of rules may be necessary to complement market or network failures, requiring a political actor to enforce adherence to the rules to maintain order.

Goods and Services Provision

In addition to establishing and enforcing the rules that may have distributional consequences, governing actors typically invest in the resources to create and deliver goods and services to the governed. Provision of some goods (especially local order) has long been seen as essential to the social contract that underpins successful governance projects (Rousseau 2018). As the modern state developed, political actors were increasingly expected to provide more than just local order to civilians (Spruyt 1996).

Though the delivery of goods and services is distinct from governance-as-rule-making and enforcing, goods provision has distributional consequences that reshape the locus of power and alter policy priorities within society in ways that conform to our conceptualization of governance. For example, providing girls access to education empowers young women to impact the political process. The provision aspect of governance is most closely and commonly associated with “official” governments. Conventional understandings of statehood hold governments responsible for, at a minimum, providing security to the population under their sovereign jurisdiction, as well as other basic services such as healthcare, education, transportation infrastructure, and so on. However, we also see many types of non-state actors engaging in goods and services provision, which suggests that this element of governance can play a key role in non-state governance projects.¹⁶

Governance by Rebel Groups

Rebel groups are organized nonstate actors who use violent (and often nonviolent) tactics against incumbent governments in pursuit of political objectives. In the process of waging their conflict, rebels interact with civilians, local authorities, and formal and informal institutions. As a result, rebels confront questions of governance: whether and to what extent to engage in rule-making, how to enforce those rules, and whether and how much they can and should intervene in the everyday lives of civilians through the provision of goods and services. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly (2015, p.3) define rebel governance as “the set of actions insurgents [i.e. rebels] engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of noncombatants during war.” In comparing this with Risse’s definition of governance as “institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, and/or to provide collective goods” (2012, p. 700), we see a key difference in focus. Arjona et al. center on “actions” to “regulate” “noncombatants”, suggesting that rebel actors have primary agency. Risse’s definition, in contrast, centers on “coordination” and “collective goods”. Moreover, Risse (and many others) explicitly focus on the “institutionalized” nature of governance, suggesting a high degree of success for a governance project before it even enters the realm of consideration. In contrast, rebel governance is frequently contested and attempts to institutionalize rebel governance projects regularly fail.

When deciding whether to invest resources in governance behaviors, rebel groups must assess how governance activities serve both their immediate political objectives (obtaining resources for war-fighting, broadening their support base, expanding their realm of territorial and social control, etc.), as well as their broader political goals (Mampilly 2011; Arjona 2016; Huang 2016; Florea 2017; Stewart 2018). Empirically, we see great variation in rebels’ willingness to shoulder the costs of governance projects, as well as large differences in the nature of their governance. Some rebel groups, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda, do little to govern civilians during armed conflict. Others, such as the FMLN of El Salvador and the LTTE of Sri Lanka, establish themselves as a political authority and seek opportunities to showcase their governance capabilities to both domestic and international audiences (Wood 2003, Mampilly 2011). Rebel groups also vary in the depth of intervention in regulating civilian affairs. Arjona (2016) distinguishes between rebelocracy—deep intervention in setting the rules for a broad range of social, political, and economic aspects of society—and aliacracy—in which rebels intervene minimally in key strategic areas, such as security and taxation, while leaving governance of other aspects of society to local rulers.

Unlike that of territorially defined states, rebel governance is not necessarily predicated on territory. Functioning states often organize their governance structures territorially, and the notion of the state’s juridical sovereignty over space precedes the investment in governance. Following this model, scholars

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17 Some scholars avoid the term “rebel” in favor of other terms like “armed group” (Abrahms, Maynard, and Thaler 2018; Hoover Green 2017) or “insurgents” (in Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). While there is a certain negative connotation to “rebel,” it directly denotes contestation of the central authority, making it the most accurate descriptor for our purposes.
investigating governance by other nonstate actors have typically adopted the framework that presumes territorial control as a necessary condition for rebel governance (e.g. Kasfir 2016). But staying true to the definition of governance—and adopting a broader historical view of governance not directly tied to the state-based system—reveals that the link between territorial control is probabilistic, rather than deterministic, and conditional, not universal. In some circumstances, the causal relationship may even be in the reverse direction: providing governance may aid in rebels’ subsequent efforts to control territory by establishing support and legitimacy in advance of kinetic operations against an adversary.

For instance, Jackson (2018) notes that the Taliban’s governance frequently precedes the control of territory by the rebel group. The looming threat of rebel retaliation for breaking social norms or security protocols in towns not yet controlled by rebels is frequently sufficient to secure collaboration of civilians by rebels (e.g., Rubin 2018, 159-163, 173). As ISIS has receded in territorial control, there is strong suspicion it still maintains a potent, if weakened, governing presence. Rebels have also established governance institutions within refugee camps that are located in states the rebels do not contest, but that are populated by civilians from the state they aim to control. For instance, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) undertook a program to educate Eritrean refugees in Sudanese refugee camps (Guy 1988, 2). Like the pre-Westphalian Catholic Church, governance was shaped more by identity than by connections to territory in these instances. This notion also highlights and empirical disconnect: many states, both well and poorly functioning, do not exercise a complete monopoly over territory as a whole. Understanding (non-)governance in states, and the opportunity for and emergence of rebel governance remains an open agenda (Borzel and Risse 2020).

Rebel groups facilitate the rule-making function of governance in a number of ways, such as through the introduction of legislatures or general assemblies. For example, UNITA of Angola established “modern bureaucratic institutions” comprised of a president, a number of ministries, and a constitution (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005, p.370). Rebels may also pursue legalization, or the introduction of their own “laws” (Ledwidge 2017). The Maoists in the Nepalese Civil War, for example, had a legal practitioner lead its legal department and draft Maoist laws, which were applied in the territories they wrested from state control (Sharma 2004). Rebel groups may also stipulate their own social and economic policies through land reform, curriculum development, the promotion of women’s participation in politics and society (e.g. the TPLF in Ethiopia; see Young 1998), or the introduction of tax and trade policies (e.g. the CPP-NPA in the Philippines; see Kessler 1989).

Rebels maintain order and enforce rules via “policing” communities, as well as creating parallel rebel courts and judiciaries. A top priority early on for the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka was to establish a security force in order to “ensure compliance with its rule and normalize civilian life under rebel control” (Mampilly 2011, p.116). The Pathet Lao of Laos convened “people’s courts” to try civilian offenders of serious crimes, which included attempts to escape, adultery, and passing information to government forces; more minor offenses, such as petty theft, were adjudicated at the village level through self-criticism sessions (Zasloff 1973, p.61). Rebels vary in the degree to which their legal and judicial systems approximate the “rule of law;” some are closer to a system of kangaroo courts where “offenders” are arbitrarily detained and punished without recourse to publicized rules (Loyle 2018). Mozambique’s
RENAMO, for example, “had no consistent approach to handling behavioral problems,” which created much fear among civilians (Weinstein and Francisco 2005, p.177).

Rebel groups also govern civilians through the provision of public goods and services (see Mampilly 2011; Cammet 2016; Arjona 2016; Huang 2016; Heger and Jung 2017; Grynkewich 2008). They may open schools and literacy programs and establish medical and health services (Lippert 1992, p.648); keep factories running in order to maintain production of basic goods (Martinez and Eng 2018; Perlez 1990); establish banking services (Sharma 2004, p.46; Rubin 2002, p.259); and dispatch “ambassadors” abroad for international diplomacy and activism (Huang 2016; Huddleston 2019; Kaplan 2019). They also provide public security by appointing “police” officers, guards, and self-defense forces, as well as creating procedures to inform communities of any need for cover or escape when enemy forces approach (Ngoga 1998; Young 1998)

The variety of rebel governance activities observed around the world makes an exhaustive inventory untenable. However, Table 1 provides a selective list in which we categorize activities under the three broad forms of governance discussed in the preceding section. We offer a list of suggested readings offering case-specific examples of these practices in the Appendix. Note that there is wide variation in the level of institutionalization, functionality, and civilian responses to these activities within and across conflicts.

Table 1: Dimensions of Governance as Practiced by Rebel Groups (a non-exhaustive list)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Governance</th>
<th>Rule-making</th>
<th>Rule enforcement</th>
<th>Goods and services provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive and legislative branches</td>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>Dispute adjudication and resolution</td>
<td>Medical services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicialization, legalization, and constitution-drafting</td>
<td>Punishment (e.g. fines, imprisonment, executions)</td>
<td>Border and port control</td>
<td>Schools and other education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular elections</td>
<td>Political indoctrination</td>
<td>Public security</td>
<td>Agricultural programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of economy (e.g., tax policy, trade, currency)</td>
<td>Tax collection and extortion</td>
<td>Diplomacy and international activism</td>
<td>Banking services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land policy/reform</td>
<td>Designation and control of holidays</td>
<td>Information communication and media</td>
<td>Public security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare programs and humanitarian aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure development and</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Ruling like the state? Conceptualizing Rebel Governance

Rebels can and do perform many of the actions associated with broader conceptualizations of governance, as Table 1 suggests. Yet, as noted in the introduction, there are important ways in which rebels, as potential governors, differ from modern states and from other non-governmental organizations providing limited governance. Furthermore, recall rebel actors: 1. vary widely in form, 2. operate in many contexts, and 3. have no universal legitimizing principle that allows consistent membership as a class of political actors. We return to these differences now and explore how work on rebel governance has tackled these issues, where it needs to push further, and the ways that broader works in governance and political institutions, as well as those more specifically on rebel groups can inform one another.

Rebel Governance and Rule-making

Rule-making is primarily about the structure of decision making (especially with respect to the distribution of power), and more broadly about societal regulation. Rebel governance research provides a great deal of information on variation in governance structure, both across rebel groups and across space and time for the same rebel group. This work highlights the variety of contexts in which these groups operate. Research has also shown a number of ways that civilians interface with rebels beyond being targets of violence and the impact that legitimacy and the potential quest for legitimization has on rebel strategy.

The study of rebel governance has begun with the assumption that rebel groups do not necessarily need to govern. In fact, many studies highlight the costly nature of governing for rebels and that it diverts resources from fighting (Kasfir 2005). Rebel governance also carries additional costs such as the potential for backfire effects which may cause a group to lose support or legitimacy from the civilian population (Cunningham et al. 2018).

One key difference between the realm of rebel politics and other NGOs is the variation in form of rebel groups. Specifically, rebels as political actors and as governor can begin with direct violence against the state and civilians. A few other non-state actors can begin this way, including terrorist networks and gangs, but much of our understanding of non-state actor governance comes from more cooperatively and peacefully created actors (such as international courts, and regional IGOs. Due to the context of violent conflict, a central part of the exploration in the rebel governance literature has been about the successful implementation of governance, its collapse, and the implications for the overall war-making agenda of the group. Despite the costs of doing so, governance can lead to key benefits for rebels. For example, groups that create and maintain governance are seen as stronger challengers to the state. This
is (at least) two-fold. Rebels that govern have more (and maybe) better resources to fight and withstand counterinsurgency. Rebels that govern areas also undermine state authority by providing an alternative authority within the same territory.

Work in the rebel governance tradition then, highlights governance as a costly but potentially high pay off investment for rebels. Insights about the costliness of institutional development may be relevant to the study of other non-state actors that seek to exercise increasing authority in different areas. Moreover, this work raises questions about our understanding of the benefits of governing. They are clearly not uniform for rebel groups. Is that a unique feature of rebel governance related to the violent context? Or the lack of more homogeneity across rebel governance institutions? Or are there similarly varying governance benefits for other actors?

The broader literature on political institutions and governance can also shed light on under-explored questions related to rebel governance. For instance, much of the work on post-conflict and international governance embodies a stronger focus on the downstream implications of different ways of structuring preference aggregations. That is, the different styles of governing institutions shape who maintains power, who has access to power in different policy areas, and creates incentives for different types of aggregation of civilian preferences (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Toft 2009).

Beyond post-conflict governance, work on stable political institutions has yielded a number of insights about the implications of different types of autocratic structures, and who supports those power structures (see, e.g., Fjelde 2010; Gandhi 2008; Weeks 2008). For example, different sizes of “selectorate” are argued to radically alter incentives for how to distribute goods in society (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Cunningham and Sawyer (2019) show that, at least for the process of getting into power, rebel leaders have varying sized selectorates. This raises questions such as how does the size of the rebel leaders’ power base matter for governance decisions? And how do different types of governance arrangements facilitate or impede the development of local rebel strongmen?

This section has highlighted how the form of “rule-making” is different for rebels because governance is elective and costs of doing so may diminish fighting capacity. In other ways, we can use the research on state institutions (especially autocratic institutions) and post-conflict governance to ask new questions about the likely downstream effects of rebel governance choices.

Rebel Governance and Rule-enforcing

Rule-enforcing, as noted above, is about compliance with governance projects and with norms that follow from them. Rebels have, perhaps, a comparative advantage in direct enforcement when compared to non-armed actors in that rebels engage in violent coercion as a primary (though not only) means through which to achieve their goals.
The variation in rebel organizational forms offers scholars of governance a valuable window into the role of structure in making rule-enforcement more or less effective. This is particularly valuable in light of the significant homogeneity and isomorphism across states and many other forms of governance. Compliance might be generated via—sometimes more democratic or autocratic—structures or induced via norms or more personalistic appeals.

The emergence of rebel courts offers a particularly clear view into how the variation in form may matter. While rebels can, like states, have highly institutionalized forms of rule-enforcement, in the form of courts, even in this realm, Loyle (2018) shows the use of rebel courts by a variety of rebels, some of whom are in competition with the state, others of whom seem to complement the state. Whereas Jung and Cohen (2019) show the effects of an absence—by the state or illicit actor—of robust judicial institutions, populations resort to self-help, community justice. Additionally, more networked organizational forms allow for different forms of rule-enforcement to come to the fore including social sanctioning, norms transmission that may be more self-enforcing rather than hierarchical in nature. Berman (2011) offers yet another alternative that is self-enforcing but relies on extensive screening, reducing the population governed to a highly ideologically homogeneous group.

As noted above, rebels operate in a variety of contexts, allowing a window into variation in some of the key principles associated with governance, particularly the state, and its relationship with rule-enforcement over different stages of their lifecycle. While states also create and maintain legitimacy, their existence as political actors is bolstered by the norms of territorial sovereign states in the contemporary international system. Regimes may lose power, but state very rarely die (Fazal 2007). Rebel groups, on the other hand, die frequently—about one-third die before the reach a year of life (Cunningham 2011).

Conventional perspectives ground governance in Weberian definitions of sovereignty: territorial space over which states enjoy a monopoly of the legitimate use of force (Gerth and Mills 1946). As with states, territorial control plays a central role in rebel governance (McColl 1969; Kasfir 2015). It facilitates the creation of more permanent rule-making and -enforcing institutions as well as infrastructure for the delivery of goods and services. Territorial control delineates in-group beneficiaries from out-groups, establishing clear demarcations for who controls what and whom. These characteristics imply a strong empirical relationship in which territorial control increases (with) the scale and quality of governance.

Legitimacy is at the heart of many questions of governance in international relations, closely tied to the question of international sovereignty. International sovereignty implies or contains legitimacy, as perceived by other states, and is sometimes equated with de jure recognition by these states as sovereign. International sovereignty is assumed to be both uniform and static across units and time—all states are formally equal, and enjoy the same monopoly on “rightful rule.” But this conception of legitimacy as international legal sovereignty breaks down for states that are not universally recognized (e.g., Kosovo), and for quasi-state entities with no recognition but potentially extensive external support (e.g., Iraqi Kurdistan), or for rebel groups with de facto legitimacy derived from their own population but no one else (e.g., Somaliland). Legitimacy is more nuanced than Krasner’s conceptualization of
international sovereignty, rendering it difficult to reconcile nonstate actors’ power and authority with state-centric conceptions of legitimacy underlying rule-enforcement.

In addition to (un)realized claims of sovereignty, rebels also demonstrate significant variation in the role of territory and territoriality in rebel governance. We contend rebel governance demonstrates that territorial control is not necessary for governance. Prior to the rise of the Westphalian system, forms of governance were not inherently linked to territoriality. For instance, the Catholic Church exercised rule-making authority, claiming all Catholics as subjects of the Pope and necessitated their obedience of its laws, but authority was based upon identity as opposed to where subjects were located in space (e.g., Nexon 2009; Philpott 2000). Like the rebel groups discussed above, pre-Westphalian Catholic Church, governance is sometimes shaped by identity more so than by connections to territory. Even as the Church’s power waned, it nevertheless served as a non-territorially based force for social control and public goods provision throughout the world. Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, missionaries worked in colonized countries “civilizing” colonized people and educating them on the rules of the Church as part of its religious social control (Majeke 1952; Gallego and Woodberry 2010). Additionally, other non-state actors that frequently lack territorial control also are nevertheless able to provide public goods (Tsai 2011; Börzel, Hönke and Thauer 2012). Though the rise of the state-based international system encouraged the territorialization of governance, non-territorial forms of governance never disappeared entirely, and have contributed to recent debates regarding the primacy of state sovereignty and states as the (only) relevant actors in the international system.

Another body of work that can inform our understanding of rebel governance is the work on state capacity. While state may not face existential threats for survival, they still vary widely in their capacity to govern and to enforce rules. State capacity shapes the context in which rebels form (and in some ways the form they adopt); this is also an area where we can continue to work to understand the interaction between state capacity and rebel authority.

The rebel governance research program has focused intensively on understanding non-coerced compliance, primarily as a question of rebel legitimacy. Recall, there is no universal legitimizing principle for rebel groups that allows consistent membership as a class of political actors. This is perhaps a unique feature of violent non-state actors. If they want compliance without direct coercion, they must justify their existence and agenda to the population in their sphere of influence.

In particular, with the lack of a single legitimizing principle allows this literature to examine rule-enforcement on and by several different populations. We see value in disaggregating rebel activities, and distinguishing among the variety of audiences to which these actions may be directed, to avoid common analytical traps and assumptions. While many rebel organizations do want to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of all three audiences, some may focus on one of these audiences, others on none. Secessionist rebels, for example, may be more concerned with legitimation through international recognition by a great power state (Coggins 2011). Others seeking to take over the existing state apparatus may be primarily concerned with legitimacy among the population, leading them to take
logistically costly and risky steps such as holding elections for local offices and councils (Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer nd).

The ability of rebels to generate local compliance through legitimacy building has implications that may travel to other areas. First, as successful creation of rebel legitimacy highlights how legitimacy can be drawn away from established states. Second, the focus in the rebel governance literature on external legitimacy, including recognition by states and other NGOs, show how external actors can impact legitimacy dynamics in critical ways.

Beyond their direct engagement with rebel governance, civilians can grant (or deny) legitimacy to the rebel governance exercise. When offered the opportunity, civilians might participate in elections for rebel leadership (Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer nd). Legitimacy could also be conveyed by willingly providing resources to the rebels, and perhaps simply by discouraging resistance to the presence of rebels in local communities. Civilians might help rebels gain international legitimacy through attracting attention to the rebels’ cause—this has been more common within diaspora communities such as Tamils outside of Sri Lanka, and the Irish in the United States. However, civilians are also able to delegitimize rebels by attracting international attention in the event of abuses targeting noncombatants. For example, the widespread international condemnation of Boko Haram for the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria was enhanced by the efforts of the “Bring Back Our Girls” campaign on social media.

Additionally, rebel activities commonly assumed to be legitimacy-building may be done for a first-order reason that is entirely practical (e.g., keeping soldiers healthy requires healthcare provision; education may be used to indoctrinate the population and create a literate population from which to draw fighters; infrastructure projects address economic grievance by employing a critical segment of the population). Even more challenging perhaps is the question of whether observers can know if rebels are ever viewed as legitimate while monopolizing violence. Civilians, for instance, might simply obey rebel rules out of fear of punishment. This same challenge applies to states: even in the U.S. today, persons of color or undocumented migrants might obey police out of fear, more so than a belief in their institutional legitimacy. Thus, a political actor’s ability to secure a monopoly on the use of force, even if semi-permanent, may not be useful to conceptualizing governance.

Understanding the range of rule-enforcement, by rebels, highlights many new questions particularly around the nature of authority to enforce. In particular, rebel rule-enforcement highlights that there may be many instances of conflicting rule-enforcement based on the nature of rebel enforcement—of which there is a wide range—and the nature of state enforcement and authority. The theoretical variety and new advances in data on rebel enforcement allow for many new questions—and, we hope, answers—in this space.
Rebel Governance and Provision of Goods and Services

Studies of rebel governance have increasingly shown that rebel actors provide a number of different public goods and social services to local populations, as shown in Table 1. Studies have identified a number of factors that affect rebels’ decisions to provide services, ranging from the quality of the state’s prewar institutions and the availability of natural resources for rebel financing to rebel goals, rebel ideology, their military capacity, and their need to win local and international support (Weinstein 2006; Mampilly 2011; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Arojona 2016; Huang 2016; Stewart 2018). This suggests that rebel groups have a complex mix of motives for engaging in governance. By offering goods and services and interacting with civilians and local authorities as they do so, they may be seeking civilian support or international backing, or they may be emulating state institutions, gathering information about levels of civilian compliance, or preventing defection through the offer of carrots and sticks (Flynn and Stewart 2018).

Goods provision plays a central role in our broader understanding of governance. Spruyt (1996) highlighted the key role played by nascent states’ provision of legal order in their competition with religious authorities to establish and consolidate governance. Rebel provision of public goods aligns, to some extent, with this process in early state formation. Providing such goods happens in competition with other actors (including the state, but potentially also with other I/NGOs). Moreover, rebels seem attuned to the payoffs of providing goods, from local compliance, to open support, to increased local legitimacy.

After early state formation, public goods provision by states has been studied as a question of state capacity, or as an inquiry about sub-optimality (i.e. why can’t states provide the appropriate level of a public good). Both of these streams of research have something to offer for our understanding of rebel provision of public goods.

A key finding from work focused on state capacity is the pernicious effect of natural resource wealth and (potentially) of foreign aid. Both natural resource endowments and high levels of foreign aid allows governments to operate and function without making deep investments into societal development and infrastructure. Essentially, the revenue stream inhibits the development of a reciprocal relationship between state and society wherein the state provides public goods and the population supports the governor (through taxes and rule-following). This allows for a relationship of accountability to the populous to develop. Rebel actors that attempt to govern are faced with a similar challenge. Some rebels have direct access to natural resource wealth (such as the RUF in Sierra Leone controlling diamond mines), and many rebels are supported by external actors (who provide a number of different things - from financial support, to weapons, to training). These can create incentives for rebels to treat the local population in a predatory way (Weinstein 2006). Yet, resources can also have longer term implications for how governance develops. Rebels that govern can face challenges developing

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18 See especially the literature on ethnic diversity and public goods provision (e.g. Miguel 2004; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999).
accountability with civilians, which can limit their ability to govern without coercion. Moreover, if rebels succeed in winning the state (as we see, for example, in South Sudan), governance institutions may carry over to state institutions and lead to low capacity state.

Rebels’ reliance on local populations reveals an important role for civilian agency to shape the goods and services provision side of rebel governance. Because there exists so much variation in rebel governance, it provides an excellent opportunity to study the varieties of relationships, absent the isomorphism that often comes with states. Civilians can respond to rebel governance in a variety of ways—which speak to how they respond to the rules made and enforced—including: fleeing, acquiescing (passively accepting rebel rule without supporting or resisting it), actively assisting rebels or directly participating in their activities, and actively resisting rebels through violent or nonviolent mobilization (Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017; Shesterinina 2016). They can allow their existing services, political, security, and judicial institutions to be used and coopted by rebels (Breslawski 2019; Mampilly 2011).

Civilians also facilitate rebel governance by providing financial resources—willingly or unwillingly—through taxation and extortion by armed actors (Revkin forthcoming; Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014). Whether voluntarily or by force, civilians can use their personal and professional expertise to help rebels offer social services to the populations they govern, including the provision of education, health care, legal work, farming, and so on. Civilians may also provide rebels with informational resources in terms of sharing intelligence about the movements and identities of government agents and informers, enabling the rebel group to police defection and minimize efficacy of counterinsurgency efforts in the communities where such loyalty exists (Kalyvas 2006).

Similarly, work on the suboptimality of public good provisions may offer insights for understanding rebel provision of public goods. Much of the rebel governance work has an implicit assumption that rebels can provide public goods if they choose to. But, this same research stream also highlights the difficulty of governing and the fact that rebels sometimes fail in their governance aspirations.

In some cases, civilians endeavor to deter rebel governance by challenging these armed actors through nonviolent or violent mobilization (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015; Okeowo 2017). For example, a number of Colombians adopted strategies of civil resistance, including the formation of “peace communities,” when confronted with the presence of violent organizations during their decades-long civil war (Idler, Garrido, and Mouly 2015; Kaplan 2017). In contrast to this approach, armed tribal militias were created in southern Sudan by ethnic groups subjected to violence by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the 1980s (Blocq 2014).

Taken together, this raises questions about the ability of rebels to produce collective public goods. Do the same factors that impede public goods provision for states affect rebel groups? To what extent does the process of war fighting affect the development of a reciprocal relationship between rebels and civilians?
This section has explored three major areas of governance—rule-making, rule-enforcing, and goods provision—through the lens of rebel governance. Governance by rebel groups offers a fruitful area for examining governance dynamics as they share some features with other non-state actors and states, but are also unique in a number of ways. In particular rebel governance provides a way to look at extreme variance in governance institutions, as well as to explore questions about how actors try to govern in the context of violent conflict and persistent existential threat.

Moving Forward

This article provides needed clarity on what is meant by rebel governance, and how this concept offers lessons for governance more broadly. We have challenged some key assumptions in the existing literature related to state-centric definitions of governance, the circumstances required for rebel governance to occur, the forms it may take, and its consequences for conflict processes and civilians in contested territory.

Our discussion also identifies a number of lingering questions pertaining to dynamics and consequences of rebel governance. To answer these questions, scholars require new sources of empirical evidence, including both within- and across-case quantitative data capturing variation in rebel governance activities and rich qualitative analysis to compare new cases beyond those driving much of the rebel governance literature. Existing cross-national data on rebel governance is limited in scope to specific samples of groups—e.g. UCDP rebel groups (Stewart 2018), groups that fought in large-scale conflicts (Huang 2016), or Cronin’s (2009) list of “terrorist groups” (Heger and Jung 2017)—and to specific governance activities such as education and healthcare (Stewart 2018), for example. Future data collection may leverage the typology provided above (as a starting point) for more comprehensive data collection. Furthermore, a growing number of studies are beginning to examine within-conflict variation in rebel governance in large-N data. Recent innovations in text analysis and machine-learning, in addition to expert knowledge of differences in rebel governance activities throughout their zones of operation, could yield important returns to understanding the dynamics of rebel governance.

Finally, this work is additionally important because the study of rebel governance is relevant to scholars from a variety of fields within and beyond political science. Rebel governance studies speak to and are informed by scholarship in comparative politics and international relations, as well as in sociology, regarding state building and international diplomacy, regime change and democratization, social movements, organization theory, and more. Thus, we recommend inter-subfield and interdisciplinary scholarship to advance the study of rebel governance, and governance by nonstate actors more broadly.

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19 See, for example work investigating specific elements of FARC governance in Colombia (Arjona 2016, Kaplan 2017).


APPENDIX (also to be posted on RGN website)

Extension of Table 1 in the manuscript: Dimensions of Governance examples and citations

**RULE-MAKING**

Executive and legislative branches


Judicialization, legalization & constitution-drafting


Popular elections


Regulation of economy (e.g. tax policy, trade, currency)


Land policy/reform

Curriculum reform


Propaganda


**RULE ENFORCEMENT**

Policing


Dispute adjudication, resolution, and punishment (e.g. fines, imprisonment, executions)


Border and port control


Political indoctrination


Tax collection and extortion


Designation and control of holidays

**GOODS AND SERVICES PROVISION**

**General**


**Medical services**


**Schools and other education**


**Agricultural programs**


**Banking services**


**Diplomacy and international activism**


**Information communication and media**


Welfare programs and humanitarian aid


Infrastructure development and maintenance (e.g. water, roads, electricity)

