Politicians change their behavior and fulfill public expectations after achieving office*

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Abstract: We show that individual politicians change their behavior once changing from one elected office to another. In particular, we analyze behavioral changes once politicians from the Swiss Lower House of Parliament are elected to the Upper House between 1996 to 2014. Public expectations stipulate that politicians serving in the Upper House should more closely represent the preferences of their constituents, they should focus relatively more on their constituency than on the nation and they should react less to party pressure. We empirically identify all these directional behavioral changes *after* politicians are elected. Our evidence is consistent with the existence of an incentive effect of the office itself, which acts on politicians to fulfill public expectations. Such an effect would be complementary to the established relevance of elections as a selection and incentive device.

Keywords: Preference representation, Elections, Incentives, Electoral systems, Voting, Political presentation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Why do political representatives seek to correspond to voters' preferences and public expectations *after* elections? Commonly, the answer is that they do so because voters elect politicians who are motivated to correspond to public expectations and because re-electoral constraints incite politicians to consider voters' preferences (see the seminal works by Downs 1957; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Mueller 2003).[1] Thus, elections are seen as a selection and an incentive device. The electoral system is argued to determine the way voters select politicians and it influences electoral incentives through competition (see the seminal works by Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Powell 2000). Typically, centripetal forces are said to be relevant in majoritarian (winner-takes-all) systems while centrifugal forces are considered relevant in proportional systems (see, e.g., Cox 1990; Myerson 1999; Morelli 2004; Dow 2011; Stadelmann et al. 2017). More specifically, politicians elected under majoritarian systems may face pressure to shift towards the electoral center and voters may elect those who appease the preferences of their constituency. On the other hand, politicians elected under proportional systems may focus on specific groups of voters over the entire electoral spectrum and they may be chosen for appeasing preferences of these groups.

This contribution provides empirical evidence for a complementary view to explain why politicians' decisions in office may be aligned with the preferences of voters. We try to extend the existing dichotomy of electoral selection and electoral incentives. To do so, we show in a first step that politicians change their behavior towards their constituency's preferences *after* changing from a proportionally elected office to a majority elected office. The behavioral change is aligned with public expectations of the respective office that the politicians hold, i.e.

[1] Up to today, the Downsian view of electoral competition and variants thereof have remained the backbone for numerous models of politician behavior (see, e.g. Wittman 1983; Alesina 1988; Besley and Case 2003; Congleton 2003; Lee et al. 2004; Grofman 2004; Padovano 2013; Portmann and Stadelmann 2017).

being elected under a proportional system, politicians correspond less to the preferences of the majority of their constituents than when elected under a winner-takes-all system. We empirically identify behavioral changes by analyzing the decisions of the *same* politicians who we observe in *both* elected offices. Thus, the behavioral change with respect to their constituency's preferences is identified independent of politicians' personal characteristics, ideology or valence[2] and, as such, it is unrelated to how voters *select* politicians based on these characteristics in different electoral systems. Second, we provide evidence that the identified behavioral change cannot be consistently attributed to standard election and re-election incentives, i.e. we do not observe that election and re-election incentives *affect* politicians' decisions regarding representation of their constituency's preferences.[3] Instead, our empirical results are consistent with the view that serving in an elected office acts as an incentive in itself to fulfill public expectations that are associated with the office. This view stresses the relevance of public expectations of the office itself as a behavioral incentive. It is complementary to the relevance of electoral selection and incentives induced by electoral systems and competition, which are typically discussed in the literature.

To provide evidence for our claims, we analyze data for Swiss members of Parliament and Swiss referendum decisions. Our empirical setting allows us to identify the behavioral change of MPs according to public expectations with respect to representation of the *preferences* of their constituency. The setting has five distinctive features, which make our challenging endeavor feasible: (1) We observe elected MPs regarding their legislative decisions in the Lower House and in the Upper House of Parliament. We also observe the behavior of

[2] The literature points to the relevance of personal characteristics and valance to explain the behavior of politicians once in office (see, e.g., Levitt 1996; Besley and Coate 1997; Ågren et al. 2007; Washington 2008; Padovano 2013; Ruske 2015; Kauder and Potrafke 2016; Berggren et al. 2017).

[3] This does not mean that election and re-election incentives induced through competition are generally irrelevant (see Lee et al. 2004) but they do not seem to be the only explanation for different behavior of politicians with respect to the representation of voter preferences after politicians are elected to an office.

individual MP who are elected form the Lower House to the Upper House, i.e. who served in the Lower and in the Upper House. (2) Both Houses have the same legislative power. MPs from both Houses decide on legislative issues, which entail real policy consequences for their constituents. (3) MPs from both Houses represent the identical geographical constituencies, i.e. the electoral districts of the two Houses are identical as are prerogatives to be elected. (4) Public expectations regarding the behavior of MPs in the two Houses are shaped by the electoral systems in place. The members of the Lower House are elected by a proportional system while members of the Upper House are elected by a winner-takes-all system (two round majority-plurality system). Public expectations as well as electoral selection and incentives predict that the former *should* correspond to a lower degree to the preferences of their constituency than the latter. (5) Constituents reveal their preferences for legislative proposals through referendum decisions in Switzerland. Referendum decisions are held on word-for-word identical legislative proposals as members of both Houses have decided on in Parliament. Thus, we can observe whether *what MPs do is, what their constituencies want*, i.e. we obtain a natural measure for MP congruence with voters by comparing MPs' decisions with decisions of their constituencies.[4]

These features of our empirical setting allow us to determine whether the *same* individual MPs who are elected from the Lower to the Upper House represent the preferences of their constituency differently once they are active in the Upper House, i.e. *after* elections. In particular, we can compare elected MPs who *will* be elected to serve in the Upper House to their peers, when both are still in the Lower House. Once MPs serve in the Upper House we can still compare them to their *former* peers who remain in the Lower House and continue to

[4] Political representation is the activity of making the will of citizens present in the political process (see Pitkin 1967). Comparing potential differences between observed preferences of constituents and their political representatives' decisions may, thus, be regarded as a direct way of analyzing political representation (see Stadelmann et al. 2017; Matsusaka 2017).

decide on identical legislative proposals affecting the identical constituencies. Thereby, we empirically identify how individual behavior of MPs towards their constituency's preferences changes once politicians are elected to a different office. We show that they change their behavior according to the public expectations of the office.

In a second step, our setting allows us to provide support for the view that electoral selection and electoral incentives are unlikely to be the only drivers to explain the observed behavioral change of MPs. As long as MPs who will be elected to serve in the Upper House remain in the Lower House, they behave statistically identically to other members of the Lower House. However, once in the Upper House, the newly elected politicians behave statistically identically to members of the Upper House. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that elections to the Upper House induce politicians to more closely represent the preferences of their constituency *prior* to their election nor do we find any statistically significant effects of potential re-election incentives once MPs serve in the Upper House.

Instead, our evidence is consistent with the notion that the office an MP serves in acts itself as an incentive to induce behavior according to the public expectations. We show that although MPs cannot be held legally accountable, they tend to put more emphasis on their constituency in comparison to the nation, once serving in the Upper House. This is consistent with public expectations of the office and the constitutional task of members of the Upper House in comparison to members of the Lower House. Second, we observe that party loyalty decreases for MPs who are elected from the Lower to the Upper House, which is again consistent with public expectations of the office of the Upper House.[5] Third, we explore lobby group affiliations of MPs. Public expectations are that MPs should not accumulate more lobbies when changing from the Lower House to the Upper House. This corresponds to what we

[5] Interestingly, party loyalty decreases even though parties decide who runs as their candidatesfor the Upper House.

observe. Apart from lobbies with a regional aim, we do not find any increase in the number or the share of lobbies that an MP affiliates with *after* changing Houses. All this evidence supports the view of the existence of an incentive effect of the office itself, i.e. public expectations linked to the office itself *affect* the behavior of politicians towards their constituents. We call this effect a *Thomas-à-Becket incentive*[6] of the office itself.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: A detailed description of the institutional setting, the data, and our empirical methodology are presented in Section II. We provide empirical results identifying a directed behavioral change of MPs when changing form the Lower House to the Upper House in Section III. Section IV provides evidence consistent with the existence of a Thomas-à-Becket incentive linked to the office itself. We offer concluding remarks and further research avenues in Section V.

II. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND METHODOLOGY

Institutional setting

a. The Houses of Parliament

Switzerland's federal constitution from 1848 established a bicameral parliament comprised of a Lower House (National Council, "Nationalrat" in German) and an Upper House (Council of States, "Ständerat" in German).

The two Houses share the same 26 geographical constituencies (electoral districts), called the Cantons. Elections for the two Houses take place at the same date, since 1851 always on a Sunday in October.[7] Elected MPs in both Houses serve for four-year terms. The Lower House

[6] The incentive is named after Thomas-à-Becket a close friend, confidant and Lord Chancellor of King Henry II of England. After becoming Archbishop of Canterbury the King had to witness that his presumed associate became a guardian of the interest of the Church in his new office (see Barlow 1986).

[7] For the Upper House, there are additional run-off elections, usually in November.

has 200 members who are elected under a proportional electoral system. Parliamentary seats for the electoral districts of the Lower House are allocated according to the districts' national population shares with a minimum of one[8] representative per district (e.g. the Canton of Uri) going up to 34 representatives (the Canton of Zurich). The 46 members of the Upper House are elected under a two round majority-plurality system.[9] There are either one or two seats per electoral district for the Upper House and voters have either one or two votes, accordingly. Apart from the electoral system, formal election requirements and prerogatives in the two Houses are identical. Candidates for both Houses are typically appointed by parties, which are active in the constituencies.

Both houses have equal rights and the same legislative power. Members of both Houses decide on exactly the same laws and constitutional amendments. Legislative proposals have to be approved by majorities of both Houses. Opinions regarding legislative proposals are exchanged between MPs of both Houses. Final roll call votes take place at the end of a parliamentary session and are proximate to the adoption of governmental policies (see Krehbiel 1993). There is no specific sequence whether the Lower or the Upper House vote first on a legislative proposal. Final roll calls of the members of the Lower House are recorded by an electronic voting system since 1996. 1996 is the year where our sample of observations starts. There has been no electronic voting system for the Upper House until 2014 but since winter 2006 a camera records its sessions (see Stadelmann et al. 2014; Stadelmann et al. 2017). The

[8] If there is only one seat, the proportional system collapses to plurality voting.

[9] If the candidate achieves a majority in the first round, she is directly elected. Otherwise, there is a second round where only a plurality of votes is required. Exceptions are the Canton of Jura and since September 26, 2011 the Canton of Neuchâtel were the two members of the Upper House are elected under a proportional system. Omitting these cantons does not affect our results or interpretations.

camera recordings allow the identification[10] of individual voting behavior for the members of the Upper House.[11]

b. Referendum decision and MP congruence

Switzerland features a system of direct democracy. Citizen may challenge parliamentary decisions in a referendum. Thus, parliamentary proposals do not directly turn into law. Referendum decisions permit voters to judge legislative proposals and rank them against the status quo. Thereby, referendum decisions present measures of revealed preferences for policies (see Noam 1980; Schneider et al. 1981; Frey 1994; Brunner and Ross 2010; Brunner et al. 2011; Portmann 2014; Hessami 2016). Swiss referendum choices are implement and entail policy consequences.

After both Houses of Parliament have adopted a new law, citizens can demand a facultative referendum by collecting least 50,000 signatures (out of approximately 4.9 million registered voters) within 100 days. Any new law or law change proposed by Parliament is rejected, if 50% of voters decide against it. Any constitutional amendment by Parliament is automatically subject to a mandatory referendum. The amendment is accepted if a double majority of more than 50% of voters nationwide and voter majorities in more than eleven and a half cantons ("Ständemehr" in German) agree. By collecting 100,000 signatures citizens may initiate a referendum on a constitutional amendment drafted by themselves. Members of parliament cannot change the wording of an initiative. Nevertheless, they are required to vote on the proposal once the necessary signatures are collected and prior to the referendum. Their

[10] We include all decisions since the installation of the camera in our dataset. In a small number of cases individual votes cannot be observed due to a too slow movement of the camera during the voting phase (see discussion the appendix to Stadelmann et al. 2017).

[11] Using camera recordings to identify voting behavior of members of the Upper House has aroused media interest (e.g. "NZZ am Sonntag, No. 35, 28.08.2011, p.15" or "Die Weltwoche, No. 42.11, 2011, p. 44") and ultimately contributed to the introduction of an electronic voting system in 2014.

vote serves as a parliamentary recommendation (see Stadelmann and Torgler 2013). Referendum results are available for every constituency and they cover a wide range of issues including demographic, economic, health, social, and defense proposals, among others. All information on the topics and results are provided by the Swiss Parliamentary Services.[12]

The law and constitutional proposals presented to voters in referendum decisions are word-for-word identical to the proposals on which MPs decided in their parliamentary roll call votes. By matching individual decisions of MPs with referendum decisions of their constituency, we compare whether the choices of MPs in Parliament correspond to the preferences of their constituency: Either an MP corresponds to the preferences of the majority of her constituents or she does not (see Stadelmann et al. 2013; Carey and Hix 2013). Thereby, we obtain a binary, natural measure of congruence between an individual MP's choices in Parliament with the revealed preferences of her constituency.[13] We call this measure *MP congruence with constituency* and it will serve as our main dependent variable of interest.

Using roll call votes and referendum decisions to measure MP congruence has been established in the literature and is gaining interest (see, e.g., Hersch and McDougall 1988; Garrett 1999; Hermann and Leuthold 2007; Matsusaka 2010; Portmann et al. 2012; Carey and Hix 2013; Brunner et al. 2013; Potrafke 2013; Giger and Klüver 2016; Barceló 2017; Stadelmann et al. 2017; Matsusaka 2017). As decisions of MPs and their constituents are observed on identical legislative proposals, difficulties regarding comparisons are avoided, which normally arise when the decisions are measured on different scales (see Achen 1977; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Powell 2009; Matsusaka 2010). Our measure of MP congruence obtains external validity as MPs do not know in advance what their constituency wants. They

[12] Readers may go to https://www.parlament.ch/de/services/volksabstimmungen to find referendum titles, official booklets, deliberations, etc. in three of the four official Swiss languages.

[13] This measure of congruence corresponds to a many-to-one relationship (see Golder and Stramski 2010) as each individual MP is compared with her constituency.

have to revert to standard means to *predict* constituents' preferences when voting in parliament (see Garrett 1999; Stadelmann et al. 2013; Brunner et al. 2013).

Figure 1 shows average congruence levels for MPs of the Lower and the Upper House.

Figure 1: Average MP congruence with constituency in the Lower House and in the Upper House



Notes: The figure represents average (unweighted) congruence levels of MPs with the preferences of their constituency as revealed in referenda. 10% confidence intervals are indicated.

Consistent with public expectations regarding the office of the Upper House, its members have on average a congruence level with their constituency's preferences which is approximately 6.1 percentage points higher than that of members of the Lower House (70.9% v 64.8%).

c. National preferences, party loyalty, lobby groups, and other variables

Similar to measuring *MP congruence with constituency*, our institutional setting allows us to measure an MP congruence with national preferences. As referendum decisions reveal the preferences of the constituency, they also reveal the preferences of the national majority of voters. By matching the parliamentary decisions of individual MPs with the revealed

preferences of the national majority, we obtain a measure for congruence with the nation, which we call *MP congruence with nation*. This additional measure in combination with our measure for *MP congruence with constituency* will permit us to distinguish whether MPs who are elected from the Lower to the Upper House tend to align themselves more with the constituency or the nation after elections.

A further distinctive feature of our setting is the fact that we measure party loyalty of MPs regarding their party's ideological preferences on legislative proposals. Parties in Switzerland proclaim voting recommendations *prior* to referendum decisions. Thus, for all parliamentary decisions with a subsequent referendum, we directly observe the ideological preferences of parties by their voting recommendations. We obtain a measure of party loyalty by matching the ideological preferences of the party with the legislative decision of MPs belonging to that party. This measure is called *Party loyalty* and serves as a dependent variable for further hypotheses tests when investigating the role of the office itself as a Thomas-à-Becket incentive.

Swiss MPs have to disclose all their mandates such as executive board seats in companies and foundations, committee memberships, expert and counselling activities as well as other activities for lobby groups according to federal law (Art. 11, Parlamentsgesetz). The Swiss Parliamentary Services is required to collect this information and provide it in a public register of all lobby affiliations (see Péclat and Puddu 2017). The register is now published online, easily accessible, and it is frequently referred to in media reports. We count the number of lobby groups for each individual MP and every year in our data set. To better understand which type of lobby groups affiliate with MPs, we follow the political science literature and group them into sectional and cause lobbies (see Stewart 1958, Giger and Klüver 2016; Stadelmann et al. 2016). Sectional lobbies tend to focus on specific segments of society and on special interests (e.g. the energy industry). Cause lobbies, on the other hand, tend to focus on a general belief or principles such as public health or human rights (e.g. human rights groups). We also

classify lobbies according to whether they promote regional goals. Our approach yields in four measures of lobby groups for each MP and year in our sample, namely, the *Number of lobby groups*, the *Number of sectional lobby groups*, the *Number of cause lobby groups*, and the *Number of regional lobby groups* which we use as control variables and for further explorations of our hypotheses.

Additionally, we collected MP specific time variant characteristics. These variables were taken from the official homepage of the Swiss Parliament where short biographies for each MP are available (see Portmann et al. 2012 who started the data collection and Portmann 2014 for detailed descriptions). These additional variables serve as controls in our empirical specifications. All descriptive statistics and variable descriptions, and sources are provided in the Appendix.

d. Datasets employed in analysis

We examine the full universe of 156 legislative decisions with subsequent referenda for the years 1996 to 2015.[14] Our dataset comprises the 45th to the 49th legislature of the Swiss Houses of Parliament.

The main sample of MPs who have served in the Lower House includes 547 politicians who made a total of 28308 individual legislative decisions.[15] Averaged over the whole sample, 26.1% of decisions are made by female MPs, the average age of an MP is 52.6 years and the average time they have been in Parliament when deciding on legislative proposals is 6.5 years.

Out of 547 MPs, 32 have served in both Houses of Parliament over the time period analyzed. After having served in the Lower House, these MPs were elected to the Upper House.

[14] Our dataset starts with the introduction of the electronic voting system in the Lower House of Parliament (prior to that time final roll calls are not systematically collected) and ends with the last election in 2015.

[15] MPs may be absent or abstain from voting due to sickness, voyage, political duties, professional bias, or other responsibilities, as well as early resignation or death. We analyze all decisions where MPs voted pro or against a legislative proposal.

In the Upper House they continue to represent the same geographical constituency as previously in the Lower House. In our main sample, we observe their behavior towards their constituency in both Houses, i.e. we observe their legislative decisions as MPs in the Lower House and as MPs in the Upper House for a total number of 2301 decisions. 1532 of their legislative decisions were made in the Lower House, 769 decisions were made in the Upper House. The sample of MPs who changed House is comprised of 32.3% women, with an average age 51.5, and they on average have been in Parliament for 8.9 (Lower House and Upper House time combined). We observe their legislative decisions in the Upper House from 2007 onwards (after the installation of the camera recording the sessions). In our empirical analysis, we compare the behavior of MPs who change from the Lower to the Upper House to those who only served in the Lower House regarding *MP congruence with constituency*, *MP congruence with nation*, *Party loyalty*, and four different measures for lobby groups.

Additionally, we analyze two separate samples of MPs from the Lower and Upper House. These samples are restricted to MPs while they serve in the respective Houses only, i.e. we do not include MPs *after* they have been elected from the Lower to the Upper House. These samples serve to analyze the behavior of MPs who will change/have changed while serving in the Lower/Upper House. Put differently, we do not specifically look at behavioral changes when MPs are elected from one House to another. Instead, we investigate whether MP who will change/have changed behave any differently towards their constituents, the nation, their parties, and lobby groups than their peers while serving in the respective Houses. This allows us to explore if voters specifically select MPs according to their behavior when electing them for the Upper House (elections as a selection device). Empirical results will should that MPs do not behave any differently to their peers while still in the Lower House, nor do they behave any differently to their new peers when serving in the Upper House.

Methodology for empirical strategy

a. Identification strategy

We hypothesize that any behavioral changes when changing office are directional according to public expectations of the respective office, i.e. congruence with the constituency changes when MPs change from the Lower to the Upper House. Public expectations may be shaped by the electoral system (proportional system in the Lower House; winner-takes-all in the Upper House). Thus, the same MPs serving first in the Lower House are expected to increase congruence with their constituency's preferences once in the Upper House, i.e. an increase in congruence is expected to happen *after* they are elected.

The experiment implied by this hypothesis is the following: Two MPs are observed regarding congruence with their constituency in the Lower House. Voters elect one of the two MPs to the Upper House. The MP remaining in the Lower House and the one elected to the Upper House are again observed in their respective office. Initial differences in congruence between the two MPs in the Lower House are compared to differences in congruence between the one MP in the Lower and the other in the Upper House. A behavioral change is causally identified, if the two differences differ. The behavioral change is directional and in line with public expectations of the office, if the MP in the Upper House has increased her congruence in comparison to the MP in the Lower House. Thus, the effect we aim to identify is independent of personal traits and valence of an MP because we analyze changes in congruence for the same MP over time in comparison to her peer. The effect is also independent of the selection induced by electoral system and of electoral competition *at the time* of election. Both MPs are observed twice in time and twice *after* election to the specific House they serve in.[16]

[16] It may be argued that voters *elect* MPs that they expect to increase congruence once in the Upper House. While possible, this is semantics as our setting still identifies a change in behavior of the *identical* MP due to a change in office.

Our institutional setting allows us to observe what MPs do in the Lower and in the Upper House of Parliament and what their constituency wants. Thus, we can directly analyze whether MPs change their individual behavior towards the preferences of their constituency *after* having changed office, i.e. once they are *elected* from the Lower to the Upper House. Our baseline empirical specification is a fixed effects difference-in-difference estimation and given as follows:

$$(\textit{MP congruence with constituency})_{ir} = \alpha + \beta(\textit{MP changes House})_{ir} + \gamma_i + \boldsymbol{X}_{ir}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \epsilon_{ir}.$$

The dependent variable $(\textit{MP congruence with constituency})_{ir}$ is an identifier for whether an MP *i* is congruent (identifier equals 1) with the preferences of her constituency in referendum *r*. The variable $\textit{(MP changes House)}_{ir}$ is an identifier whether an MP who changes House is in the Lower House (identifier equals 0) when deciding on the legislative proposal presented to voters in referendum r, or whether she is in the Upper House. γ_i is a fixed effect for every MP. It captures all time invariant MP characteristics and individual-specific congruence independently of the House in which the MP currently resides. Taking account of γ_i insures that independent of personal characteristics, ideology, valence or other MP-specific characteristics that voters use to make their election choice, the coefficient β causally identifies the effect of a change from the Lower to the Upper House on congruence, i.e. it captures how a change of House changes *MP congruence with constituency*. The fixed effects for every MP allow us to interpret β comparable to a difference-in-difference estimator: The same MPs, while in the Lower House, are compared to their peers in the Lower House. Once they are elected to the Upper House they are, again, compared to their former peers who remain in the Lower House. $\boldsymbol{X}_{ir}$ is a matrix of time variant variables (such as the number of lobby groups an MP

affiliates with, time in office, type of referendum, or time-specific fixed effects, among others) which may affect congruence and whether an MP changes House. ϵ stands for the error term.

As MP congruence with constituency is a binary variable, the above equation is formulated in terms of a linear probability model.[17]

b. Identifying assumptions

Our empirical setting is intended to capture the change in the behavior of MPs towards their constituency' preferences when changing from the Lower House to the Upper House. Thus, we must observe the same person in her respective roles in both Houses of Parliament. Our setting insures this. However, other identification assumptions need to be defended.

To isolate the consequences of the change in House, however, we have to assume that, conditional on year-specific fixed effects and other controls, individual MPs being elected from the Lower House to the Upper House decide on legislative proposals that are not treated differently by the Lower and the Upper House after their individual elections.[18] We do not observe that politicians decide on the *identical* legislative proposal *twice* (once in the Lower and once in the Upper House) which would be the perfect experiment.[19] Nevertheless, MPs of the Lower and the Upper House were all elected in the same constituencies and they decide on identical proposals that affect their constituency. Looking at the policy proposals that are decided in a referendum, there is no reason to believe that the Lower House and the Upper House treat them any differently *after* individual MPs changed House, especially when

[17] We opt to present the main results from a linear probability model for ease of interpretation of the coefficients. Estimating logistic models (see Appendix) yields qualitatively identical and quantitatively highly similar results. We estimate robust clustered standard errors clustered at the individual level for the coefficients in recognition of the likelihood that observations from the same politicians are not independent. Other forms of clustering yield similar results (see Cameron and Miller 2015).

[18] This assumption is similar to the parallel trend assumption used in standards difference-in-difference settings.

[19] Parliamentary proposals which are subsequently presented to voters in a referendum are decided upon in the referendum.

controlling for time-specific fixed effects. We note that there has been an increase in recent years regarding the number of initiatives in comparison to mandatory and facultative referendum decision. We control in our empirical setting for the type of referendum when analyzing congruence. There has been no institutional change over time that would affect the two Houses differently regarding how MPs behave towards their constituency. While an identification assumption cannot be proven, there are strong reasons to believe that there is no selection of specific referendum decisions, which would affect congruence of the Lower and the Upper House differently.

Elections lead to changes in both Houses. Elections for the Lower and the Upper House take place at the same date. Thus, the comparison group in the Lower House changes: Some politicians who previously served in the Lower House together with the MP who were elected to the Upper House may not serve anymore. They may have withdrawn from Parliament or they were not reelected. We note that the use of MP fixed effects in our empirical specification takes into account all time invariant characteristics of old *and* new members of the Lower House. Consequently, factors like gender (we observe an increase in the number of women in parliament over time), party affiliations (there has been a rise in right party affiliations of MPs over time), valance (there has been a stronger focus on personal traits), etc. are captured, even if the MPs change due to elections.[20] Moreover, by analyzing a sample of observations starting at a later date than 1996 in an Appendix, we try to insure that MPs who were elected to the Upper House have a higher likelihood to be compared to members of the Lower House who they actually served with.

[20] It may be argued that newly elected MPs in both Houses need a learning period of how to act towards their constituency regarding congruence. To account for a such a learning period, we include the variables *First year in parliament* and *First term in Parliament* in some of our estimations. Of course, we also control for *Time in parliament*.

Even in specifications accounting for MP, time and referendum type fixed effects as well as additional time variant MP controls, voters may elect *new* members to the *Lower* House in the believe that they focus more on the preferences of the constituency. If this is the case, however, it should go against us finding a substantial differential effect for those MPs who change from the Lower to the Upper House because we would compare them against new members of the Lower House who are more congruent. Thus, any remaining effect behavioral change would be a conservative estimate.

III. RESULTS FOR MP CONGRUENCE WITH CONSTITUENCY

Changes in MP congruence after changing office

Table 1 presents our main results regarding the effect of the change in office from the Lower House to the Upper House of Parliament.

Table 1: The effect of a change from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament on MP congruence with their constituency's preferences

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	*MP congruence with constituency*		
Sample	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample
MP changes House	**0.0730*** (0.0277)**	**0.0737*** (0.0277)**	**0.0776*** (0.0263)**
MP fixed effects	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**
Time variant MP controls	no	no	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	no	yes	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	28308	28308	28308
R2	0.0867	0.1018	0.1025

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Linear probability models are estimated (logit estimates provided in the Appendix) and standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP changes House" takes the value of 1, once an individual MP has changed from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "MP fixed effects" capture all time invariant MP specific heterogeneity. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in Parliament", "Time in Parliament squared", "First year in Parliament", "First term in Parliament", "Number of sectional interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups".

We introduce our primary variable of interest, *MP changes House*, together with individual fixed effects in specification (1). Thereby, we insure that all individual time-invariant characteristics are taken account of. Consequently, we identify the effect of a change

from one House to another on the behavior of MPs with respect to their constituency's preferences. The change in behavior happens *after* MPs are elected, i.e. we observe their behavior prior and after their election such that we identify the individual behavioral change.

The empirical results indicate that changing Houses increases congruence by approximately 7.3 percentage points which closely corresponds to the difference between the average congruence levels of Lower and Upper House of Parliament (as illustrated in Figure 1). The behavioral change of MPs with respect to congruence with their constituency is consistent with public expectations, i.e. MPs fulfill the tasks of the new office. These results show that it is not only selection by voters electing MPs who have had high congruence levels in the Lower House (we further explore this in the next subsection). Instead, it is also MPs who adapt *after* being elected the Upper House and serving there.

Specifications (2) and (3) provide further support for our results by adding referendum type fixed effects (specification 2) as well as time variant MP controls such as *Time in Parliament* (and the squared term of it), *First year in office*, *First term in office*, and three measures for a number of lobby groups affiliations (specification 3).[21] We account of these additional controls to ensure that the results of the change in office are not driven by other variables, which are potentially affected by the House change. Specifications 2 and 3 provide further evidence that individual MPs change their behavior towards their constituency once changing from the Lower House to the Upper House. MPs increase their congruence *after* being elected to the Upper House by between 7.4 to 7.8 percentage points. These quantitative effects fall in line with the results of specification (1).

Furthermore, we show in the Appendix, that the results of Table 1 are robust in terms of statistical significance and economic magnitude when estimating logit models. They are also

[21] MP fixed effects account already for all time invariant personal characteristics including party affiliations.

robust to the exclusion of politicians who participated in fewer than 10 legislative decisions resulting in a referendum and when looking at a restricted sample from the year 2000 onwards for reasons of more timely comparisons between MPs in both Houses. Of course, any different stepwise inclusion or omission of control variables does not affect our interpretations.

Adapting the behavior to the office

In Table 2, we explore two elements which are consistent with the previous observation that politicians change their behavior when changing office. In particular, we analyze whether MPs who will be elected to the Upper House House (but have not yet changed House) behave statistically the same way as their peers in the Lower House. Moreover, we analyze whether newly elected MPs who changed from the Lower to the Upper House behave statistically similar to their new peers who are in the Upper House of Parliament. To do so, we introduce a new indicator variable which captures whether an *MP is a House changer*.[22] In the sample of MPs in the Lower House only, this new variable captures whether an MP *will be elected* to the Upper House.[23] In the sample of MPs in the Upper House only, the variable captures whether an MP *has been elected* from the Lower to the Upper House.

We observe that MPs, *prior* to their election to the Upper House, behave statistically identical in the Lower House as their peers in that office (specifications 1 and 2). The coefficient for the variable *MP is a House changer* is statistically insignificant and quantitatively close to zero in a nonrestrictive setting (specification 1) as well as once we control for an array of variables and fixed effects[24] in a more restrictive setting (specification 2).

[22] This variable is fixed over time and can be interpreted like a personal characteristic.
[23] Evidently, MPs cannot be certain that they will be elected to the Upper House such that the result implies that MPs prior to elections perform their task in the Lower House as other members of the Lower House.
[24] In Table 1 party fixed effects are captured by MP fixed effects.

Table 2: Prior to changing House, MPs behave like members of the Lower House. After having changed House, MPs behave like members of the Upper House.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	*MP congruence with constituency*					
Sample	Lower House only	Lower House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	House changers only	House changers only
MP is a House changer	**0.0097 (0.0300)**	**0.0219 (0.0200)**	**-0.0367* (0.0210)**	**-0.0150 (0.0277)**		
Post change of House					**0.0801** (0.0313)**	**0.0791* (0.0420)**
Time variant MP controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Party fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	27539	27539	2086	2086	2301	2301
R2	0.0223	0.0726	0.0176	0.0633	0.0362	0.0787

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Linear probability models are estimated (logit estimates provided in the Appendix) and standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP is a House changer" takes the value of 1 if an will/has changed (sample for Lower House/Upper House) from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. The indicator variable "Post change of House" takes the value of 1 once an MP has changed from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in Parliament", "Time in Parliament squared", "First year in Parliament", "First term in Parliament", "Number of sectional interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups". "Party fixed effects" includes all parties in the respective House. "MP fixed effects" are not included (in comparison to Table 1) as they coincide with the identifiers "MP is a House Changer" and "Post change of House" in the settings analyzed.

Once MP have changed to the Upper House, they behave statistically similar to their new peers from the Upper House. While we observe a quantitatively small, negative and marginally statistically significant effect at the 10% level[25] for the variable *MP is a House changer* in the nonrestrictive setting (specification 3), we do not observe any statistically relevant effect once introducing further control variables (specification 4). The quantitative effect of the variable *MP is a House changer* tends to approach zero. Thus, once in the Upper House, MPs who changed from the Lower to the Upper House behave as if they had always been members of the Upper House in terms of congruence with their constituency.

Figure 2 suggests that the results found in the econometric specifications (1)-(4) even hold when looking at the whole distribution of MP congruence with their constituency. It shows the distribution of congruence levels of MPs in the Lower House as well as in the Upper House for MPs that change Houses (lighter blue). Their congruence level in the respective Houses is

[25] In the social sciences, it is standard up to now to consider the p-values of 0.1 still as statistically significant (independently of the number of observations which is 2086 in the sample).

confronted with the congruence of other members (lighter red) of the Lower House (left panel) and the Upper House (right panel).

Figure 2: Distribution of MP congruence with constituency for MPs who are House changers and their peers in the respective Houses of Parliament



Notes: The figure represents the distribution congruence levels of MPs with their constituency. Congruence for MPs who are House changers are confronted with their peers while both are in the same House, i.e. the left panel shows congruence levels for MPs who are House changers and other members of the Lower House while both serve in the Lower House; the right panel shows congruence levels for MPs who are House changers and other members of the Upper House while both serve in the Upper House.

We observe substantial overlaps of the distributions of congruence of MPs who are House changers and those that do not change office while both groups are in the same House. Thus, regarding congruence with the constituency, MP who are Houses changers are equivalent to other MPs from the respective House as long as they are in office together with their peers. It is worthwhile to note from the distributions, that some MPs who will be elected to the Upper House have lower congruence levels with their constituency's preferences that other MPs from the Lower House who are *not* elected to the Upper House. Thus, Figure 2 does not provide support for the view that voters specifically elect MPs from the Lower to the Upper House because of higher congruence *prior* to being elected (elections as a selection device).

From Figure 1 and from the descriptive statistics, we know that MPs from the Lower House have *on average* lower congruence levels compared to MPs from the Upper House. Combining this information with the results of Figure 2, we can derive that, once politicians change office they change their behavior with respect to congruence. This insight corresponds to our baseline result in Table 1. It is reconfirmed in specifications 5 and 6 of Table 2 where we restrict the sample to MPs who change Houses (a sample of House changers only).[26] As expected, we observe an increase in congruence levels once MPs are in the Upper House in specifications (5) and (6). It is further reassuring to observe that the quantitative effects are around 8.0 percentage points and, thus, in line with the estimates from Table 1.

These results and the robustness tests provided in the Appendix provide evidence that MPs change their individual behavior towards their constituency and tend to correspond to the public expectations of the office they hold. Our contribution so far identifies a directional behavioral change. As MPs change their behavior *after* changing office, electoral incentives such as re-election concerns may be considered to play a role. Alternatively, MPs may change because serving public expectations associated to the office act in itself as an incentive. We provide evidence that is inconsistent with the former channel but consistent with the latter.

[26] Our data does not allow us to look at MPs from single or two-member-districts in the Lower House who are elected to the Upper House. However, analyzing MPs from districts with fewer than seven seats in the Lower House (first quartile of distribution of seats) who are elected to the Upper House, we observe that their congruence increases from 65.2% to 70.0%.

IV. PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS AFFECT BEHAVIOR IN OFFICE

Election and re-election incentives

Election an re-election incentives could explain the behavior of politicians in office but Table 3 suggests that such incentives may be less relevant when explaining MP congruence with their constituency's preferences.

In specifications (1) and (2), we analyze whether MPs who *will* be elected to the Upper House have higher congruence levels as elections approach.

Table 3: Election and re-election concerns are a weak incentive to explain changes in MP congruence with their constituency's preferences

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	*MP congruence with constituency*					
Sample	Lower House only	Lower House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	Upper House only
MP is a House changer	0.0106	0.0230	-0.0413**	-0.0264	-0.0549*	-0.0332
	(0.0293)	(0.0198)	(0.0210)	(0.0290)	(0.0282)	(0.0322)
Months to election (standardized)	-0.0056	0.0010	0.0234	0.1124***	0.0176	0.1059***
	(0.0062)	(0.0074)	(0.0236)	(0.0270)	(0.0267)	(0.0293)
Age (standardized)			-0.0024	-0.0191	0.0014	-0.0165
			(0.0097)	(0.0127)	(0.0119)	(0.0135)
Professional MP			0.0294	0.0234	0.0065	0.0134
			(0.0228)	(0.0222)	(0.0272)	(0.0284)
Months to election * MP is a House changer	0.0146	0.0194			0.0171	0.0191
	(0.0190)	(0.0187)			(0.0264)	(0.0251)
Age * MP is a House changer					-0.0072	-0.0050
					(0.0199)	(0.0202)
MP is a House changer * Professional MP					0.0478	0.0216
					(0.0435)	(0.0445)
Time variant MP controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Party fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	27539	27539	2086	2086	2086	2086
R2	0.0224	0.0727	0.0186	0.0692	0.0193	0.0696

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Linear probability models are estimated and standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP is a House changer" takes the value of 1 if an will/has changed (sample for Lower House/Upper House) from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in parliament", "Time in parliament squared", "First year in parliament", "First term in parliament", "Number of section interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups". "Party fixed effects" include all parties in the respective House. "MP fixed effects" are not included (in comparison to Table 1) as they coincide with the identifier "MP is a House Changer" in the settings analyzed. Standardized variables are z-standardized. Excluding "Time fixed effects" yields similar results.

Suppose that electoral incentives matter for MPs in the Lower House who run for the Upper House. Then, we would expect their congruence to increase prior to the election as the Upper House has a winner-takes-all electoral system. Put differently, if electoral incentives

matter, MPs should move closer to the majority of the constituency. What we observe in specifications (1) and (2) is different. We count the number of months elapsed since a referendum decision to the next election (*Months to election*). We then interact this variable with the variable *MP is a House changer*. Looking at the interaction term, we do not find any evidence that MPs who will be elected to the Upper House have statistically higher congruence levels as elections approach than other members of the Lower House.[27] If anything, we observe that MPs who will be elected to the Upper House *increase* their congruence levels with the distance to the election (the interaction term between *Months to election* and M*P is a House changer* is *positive*).[28] Thus, we find no evidence for a behavioral change of MPs who will be elected to the Upper House as elections approach, i.e. there is no change in behavior with respect to congruence *prior* to elections for MPs who are elected under a winner-takes-all system.

In specifications (3) to (6) we look at the sample of Upper House politicians only. Three control variables are supposed to measure standard hypotheses in the literature regarding future re-election concerns: (1) If re-election incentives matter, we would expect that as the election approaches Upper House politicians increase congruence with the preferences of their constituency. (2) We would expect that older politicians have less pronounced career concerns such that incentives matter to a lower degree for them. Thus, their pressure to be congruent with the preferences of the constituency would be smaller, even though they were/are elected in a winner-takes-all system. (3) Finally, we would expect that if election incentives matter,

[27] Counting the number of months elapsed since the parliamentary decision to the election yields similar results. Performing a Wald test for the statistical significance of the sum of the coefficients for *MP is a House changer*, Months to election and the interaction of the two variables does not yield statistically significant effects.

[28] Excluding time fixed effects results in a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the variable *Months to election* and in a positive but statistically insignificant interaction term. Thus, our interpretations for MPs who will change office do not change when excluding time fixed effects.

professional MPs, i.e. those not having another career apart from politics, would care more about re-election and thus try to achieve higher congruence with their constituency.

Specifications (3) and (4) show, that all these hypotheses regarding re-elections are not supported by the data at statistically significant levels. In fact, the distance to the next election even emerges, if anything, as a *positive* predictor for MP congruence. This evidence can be seen as inconsistent with the hypothesis that strong re-election concerns matter for MPs of the Upper House in general. In specifications (5) and (6), we interact these variables with the identifier *MP is a House changer*. This allows us to analyze whether the above stated hypotheses matter at least for MPs who changed from the Lower to the Upper House. We do not find any statistically significant interaction effects and the quantitative sizes of the interaction terms point to no potential relevance of such effects. Thus, members of the Upper House do not show any stronger reactions to re-election incentives but MPs who were elected from the Lower House to the Upper House do not show any strong evidence either that re-election incentives matter for them.

The above results do not imply that election and re-election incentives play no role at all. However, we have no evidence that they matter for explaining congruence when MPs change office and the positive but statistically insignificant coefficients of *Months to election* are inconsistent with the view that electoral incentives determine the behavior of MPs with regard to their constituency's preferences. To some extent, these results should not be too surprising. The literature has established the existence of strong incumbency effects (see Caselli et al. 2014 for a recent overview of some of the literature). If anything, incumbent MPs only need to care about clearing a re-election hurdle and, of course, politicians who have not served in Parliament before have no record of congruence and are consequently at a disadvantage.

Importantly, the results in Table 3 support and extend the insights of Table 2 and Figure 2: As long as politicians are in the Lower House, they act statistically equivalent to other

members of the Lower House. As soon as they change to the Upper House, they behave like other members of the Upper House. The change in behavior seems to be largely unrelated to election and re-election incentives.

Serving in office as an incentive in itself

If election and re-election concerns are not the only driving force for MP congruence, the question is which other incentives explain the behavioral changes observed regarding representation of the constituency when MPs are elected from the Lower House to the Upper House. Note that such a behavioral change is astonishing: The same politicians behave in there service in the two Houses differently with respect to the preferences of their constituents. Neither constituents electing MPs, nor the individual MPs themselves change. The selection by voters through the electoral system is accounted for in our setting as we observe politicians in both roles, i.e. standard explanations of moving to the center and selection are excluded by our setting (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000; Mueller 2003).

Our endeavor is to explain the behavioral change by incentives linked to public expectations the office *itself*. We argue that public expectations of the office, in our case public expectations regarding behavior in the respective House of Parliament, are in itself a behavioral incentive. We call such a behavioral incentive a *Thomas-à-Becket incentive* in reference to the historical figure of Thomas-à-Becket: In 1162 Thomas-à-Becket, a close friend and the Lord Chancellor of the English King Henry II, became the Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry II himself desired his confidant to serve in this office. But instead of supporting the King in his disagreement with the Pope Alexander III in Rome, Thomas-à-Becket dutifully served as an Archbishop and fulfilled the public expectations of the new office he held. As the Archbishop, he was expected to represents the church and not the King. Thus, Thomas-à-Becket took the side of the church against Henry II. This change in the behavior of Thomas-à-Becket resulted

in a confrontational stance with the King. Eight years later the Henry II ordered his knights to free him of his former friend but now meddlesome Archbishop. Thomas-à-Becket was slain 1170. He became canonized by Pope Alexander III (see Barlow 1986 for a biography on Thomas-à-Becket).

The story of Thomas-à-Becket suggests that the office itself may change the person such that her interests align with the expectations of the office she holds (see Hillman 2009 for a brief argument on such an effect for politicians; see the formal central banker Issing 2006 who suggests a Thomas-à-Becket incentive for central bankers). For our purposes, the term *Thomas-à-Becket incentive* shall refer to a situation where officials detach themselves to some degree from their earlier office and fulfill the public expectations of their new office. We note that in public and political discourses references to the "dignity of an office" or the expectation that an "office will change the person" are frequently made.

Our main results of Table 1 can be interpreted as consistent with the view that a Thomas-à-Becket incentive acts on politicians. To provide further evidence consistent with the existence of such an incentive, we explore three further dimensions in Tables 4 to 6.

a. Shifting from the nation to the constituency

The electoral districts for Lower and Upper House politicians are identical. Thus, the electoral incentives and the re-election constraints of MPs of both Houses is to focus on their constituency or diverse subsets thereof. Thus, regarding their own individual utility, self-interested politicians have no reason to represent the nation as a whole. In practice, preferences of nation and constituencies correlate, i.e. Swiss citizens will broadly hold similar preferences regarding certain policies independently of which constituency they live in, but exceptions and diverging views are frequently occurring.

Self-interested politicians of both Houses of Parliament would focus on their constituency only in order to maximize re-election chances. They would not consider the interests of the nation as a whole and congruence with the nation would only be a byproduct of congruence with the constituency. Normatively, the Swiss constitution stipulates that politicians of the Lower House are supposed to be representatives of the nation while politicians of the Upper House represent their Canton, i.e. their constituency.[29] This normative view is consistent with the German, French and Italian translations for the names of the respective houses, e.g. the "Nationalrat" (Lower House) refers to the "nation" while the "Ständerat" (Upper House) refers to the "states"/"cantons". Thus, the constitutional article appeals to the office itself. Evidently, any constitutional article is open to interpretation but public expectations regarding Lower and Upper House MPs are clearly different. Moreover, it is evident that politicians cannot be held legally accountable for acting more in the interest of the nation than the constituency or vice versa and electoral incentives are imperfect at best (as shown above).

Our setting allows us to analyze whether politicians correspond to the constitutional task which they are expected to fulfil. We know how individual MPs from both Houses have decided on policy proposals in Parliament. We know how their constituencies have decided in referenda, and, of course, we know how the nation as a whole has decided. Hence, we distinguish the variables *MP congruence with constituency* and *MP congruence with nation* (see the description of the institutional setting for details). We investigate whether politicians who changed from the Lower House to the Upper House change their behavior with respect to representation of the constituency v. the nation, i.e. we test whether they rather represent the preferences of their constituency as opposed to the preferences of the nation as a whole.

[29] More precisely, article 149(1) states the Lower House is composed of representatives of "the people" while Article 150(1) states the Upper House is composed of representatives of "the cantons".

To perform the analysis, we proceed as follows: The two variables *MP congruence with constituency* and *MP congruence with nation* jointly form a new single vector as a dependent variable called *MP congruence with nation or constituency*. We then define an indicator variable *Representing constituency*, which serves as an independent variable. It equals 1 if the dependent variable measures congruence with the constituency. We estimate the following model with an interaction term between *MP changes House* and *Representing constituency*:

$$(MP\ congruence\ with\ nation\ or\ constituency)_{ir} = \alpha + \beta_1(MP\ changes\ House)_{ir} +$$
$$+ \beta_2(Representing\ constituency)_{ir} + \beta_3(Representing\ constituency)_{ir}*(MP\ changes\ House)_{ir} +$$
$$+ \gamma_i + \boldsymbol{X}_{ir}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \epsilon_{ir}$$

The coefficients β_1 and β_3 of the interaction term are of interest for our interpretation: In this setting the variable, *MP changes House*, indicates whether MPs changing from the Lower to the Upper House have higher congruence levels with the preferences of the nation (if *Representing constituency* is set to zero). The interaction term indicates whether MPs changing office additionally increase their congruence levels by better representing their constituency.[30]

Specifications (1) and (2) of Table 4 show that MP who are elected from the Lower to the Upper House represent their constituency as well as the nation more closely than MPs who remain in the Lower House, i.e. the variable *MP changes office* is office changer is positive and statistically significant.[31] The estimates suggest an increase in *overall* congruence of about 4.9 to 5.2 percentage points. The variable *Representing Constituency* is not statistically significant, suggesting that politicians who remain in the Lower House represent the nation and the

[30] *Representing constituency* indicates whether the constituency is on average better represented than the nation.

[31] Knowing from Table 1 that MPs who change office have higher congruence levels with the constituency and that preferences of the constituency are correlated with the preferences of the nation (the correlation coefficient is higher than 0.75), this is not surprising.

constituency equally well.[32] The interaction term between *MP changes House* and *Representing Constituency* is positive. It reveals that MPs who changed House have even higher congruence levels with the preferences of their constituency. Thus, they put an additional emphasis on their constituency, thereby corresponding to their constitutional task. The *additional* congruence with their constituency's preferences is at least 3.8 percentage points.[33] This is consistent with the view that politicians change their behavior after changing House in a directional wa according to the public expectations, i.e. it is consistent with the existence of a Thomas-à-Becket incentive of the office.

Table 4: House changers become more congruent with their constituency than with the nation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	*MP congruence with nation and constituency*			
Sample	Fully sample	Full sample	Lower House only	Upper House only
MP changes House	**0.0487**** **(0.0240)**	**0.0524**** **(0.0225)**		
MP is a House changer			**0.0090** **(0.0097)**	**-0.0361*** **(0.0217)**
Representing constituency	0.0033 (0.0036)	0.0033 (0.0036)	0.0027 (0.0036)	-1.3e-15 (0.0123)
MP changes House * Representing constituency	**0.0383*** **(0.0206)**	**0.0383*** **(0.0206)**		
MP is a House changer * Representing constituency			0.0104 (0.0217)	0.0416* (0.0245)
MP fixed effects	**yes**	**Yes**	no	no
Time variant MP controls	no	Yes	yes	yes
Party fixed effects	no	No	yes	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	no	Yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	Yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	56616	56616	55078	4172
R2	0.0887	0.106	0.0891	0.0926

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Linear probability models are estimated and standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP changes House" takes the value of 1, once an individual MP has changed from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "MP fixed effects" capture all time invariant MP specific heterogeneity. The indicator variable "MP is a House changer" takes the value of 1 if an will/has changed (sample for Lower House/Upper House) from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. The identifier "Representing constituency" takes the value of 1 if the dependent variable refers to the preferences of constituency and 0 if it refers to the preferences of th nation. "MP fixed effects" capture all time invariant MP specific heterogeneity. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in parliament", "Time in parliament squared", "First year in parliament", "First term in parliament", "Number of section interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups". "Party fixed effects" include all parties in the respective House.

[32] This result is consistent with the view that politicians from the Lower House fulfil their constitutional task to some degree, i.e. they do not focus more strongly on the constituency in which they are elected than on the nation. Neglecting the existence of a Thomas-à-Becket incentive, this results would require explanation because MPs represent citizens who do not vote for them to the same degree as citizens who vote for them.

[33] We say "at least" because this is the *additional* effect that we can causally identify. It might be the case that the quantitative effect estimated in Table 1 of 7-8 percentage points higher congruence is due to a focus on the constituency only. If members of the Upper House focused only on their constituency's preferences, they would still also represent the nation's preferences as the two variables correlate.

Specification (3) provides evidence that MPs prior to changing office are not different regarding to how they represent the constituency v the nation to MPs who do not change office (Lower House sample). The interaction term between MPs who *will* change House (*MP is a House changer*) and the variable *Representing constituency* the constituency is not statistically significant nor relevant in magnitude.

We observe similar results, namely that MPs once *having been elected* to the Upper House behave as if they are normal members of the Upper House in specification (4). We obtain a statistically marginally significant negative effect for politicians who have changed House, i.e. they have slightly lower congruence levels for the nation than politicians who were not in the Lower House before serving in the Upper House. At the same time, the interaction term between politicians who have changed office and the indicator for the constituency is positive and marginally significant, i.e. MPs who changed House have higher congruence levels with the constituency. Adding up the two coefficients results in an insignificant overall difference between MPs who changed House and those in the Upper House who did not. If anything, the results in specification (4) suggests, that MPs who are House changers may be more eager in representing their constituency rather than the nation in comparison to other MPs of the Upper House, i.e. they take their constitutional task of representing the constituency more to heart.

b. Becoming less loyal to the party

In comparison to MPs from the Lower House, MPs from the Upper House are also expected to be more independent from their parties.[34] Put differently, the loyalty of Upper

[34] As they are elected by a majority of constituents and not through a party list the incentive to correspond to the policy view was held by the party is also less relevant. At the same time, Upper House MPs are supported and nominated by their parties.

House MPs is more to their constituency and less to their party. Translating directly from the story of Thomas-à-Becket: His loyalty was to the King and not to the church while acting as a Lord Chancellor; once an Archbishop his loyalty was to the church until his death. Thus, MPs who change House can be expected to be less congruent with their parties once in the Upper House. We test this hypothesis in Table 5 by employing *Party Loyalty* as a dependent variable.

Table 5: House changers become less loyal to their party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	*MP loyalty with party*			
Sample	Fully sample	Full sample	Lower House only	Upper House only
MP changes House	**-0.0317****	**-0.0294****		
	(0.0126)	**(0.0127)**		
MP is a House changer			**0.0130****	**0.0143**
			(0.0060)	**(0.0191)**
MP fixed effects	**yes**	**Yes**	no	no
Time variant MP controls	no	Yes	yes	yes
Party fixed effects	no	No	yes	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	no	Yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	Yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	28308	28308	27539	2086
R2	0.065	0.0712	0.043	0.0914

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Linear probability models are estimated and standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP changes House" takes the value of 1, once an individual MP has changed from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "MP fixed effects" capture all time invariant MP specific heterogeneity. The indicator variable "MP is a House changer" takes the value of 1 if an will/has changed (sample for Lower House/Upper House) from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in parliament", "Time in parliament squared", "First year in parliament", "First term in parliament", "Number of section interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups". "Party fixed effects" include all parties in the respective House.

Specifications (1) and (2) show results from the now typical difference-in-difference fixed effects setting. The evidence is that MPs change their loyalty to the party once being elected from the Lower House to the Upper House. The behavioral change is directional and supportive of a Thomas-à-Becket incentive, i.e. party loyalty decreases once MPs start serving in the Upper House. The quantitative effect corresponds to a 2.9-3.2 percentage points decrease in party loyalty.

We also analyze whether MPs who *will be elected* to the Upper House but are still in the Lower House are statistically different to other MPs in the Lower House in specification (3). The identifier for whether an *MP is a House changer* is positive and statistically significant.

This indicates that MPs who are candidates for the Upper House (but still serving in the Lower House) tend to be more loyal to their party than other members of the Lower House. This is consistent with the view that constraints matter: Candidates for the Upper House have to appeal to their party, at least prior to elections. It is parties that finally decide who will be running as their candidate. The positive coefficient of *MP is a House changer* in specification (3) makes the change in party loyalty of MPs *after* elections to the Upper House (specifications 1 and 2) even more astonishing. Prior to the election, they are *more* loyal to their party but after the election the Thomas-à-Becket incentive seems to kick in and they become *less* loyal to party.

Specification (4) suggests that once MPs have been elected to the Upper House, they are not statistically different to other MPs who did not enter the Upper House from the Lower House. The coefficient identifying MPs who joined from the Lower House is positive but it is statistically insignificant.[35]

c. Exploring office change and lobby group affiliations

Our results highlight a directional behavioral change when changing House with respect to the representation of the preferences of the constituency, the relative importance of the constituency in comparison to the nation, and party loyalty. Our setting allow us to explore a further dimension regarding the behavior of politicians, which is often disregarded due to a lack of data: We can explore whether a change in House induces a change in lobby group affiliations. All lobby affiliations are registered by the Swiss Parliamentary Services (see Section II). Being an MP in the Upper House may be seen as more prestigious, and individually related to more influence. This could make politicians in the Upper House more attractive for lobby groups. At the same time, public expectations for MPs in the Upper House imply that they should be

[35] Given the number of observations the statistical significance is not even marginal. If we do not include control variables, the coefficient remains statistically insignificant.

representatives of the constituency and they should not be influenced by lobby groups to any greater degree than members of the Lower House.

We analyze whether a change from the Lower House to the Upper House affects the number of lobby group affiliations of different kinds in Table 6.[36]

Specifications (1) to (4) provide support that a Thomas-à-Becket incentive may outweigh other incentives provided by lobby groups: Changing from the Lower to the Upper House does not lead to any statistically significant increase in the number of lobby groups. If anything, the coefficients for the variable *MP changes House* suggests that the number of sectional groups and the number of cause groups is decreases, i.e. changing House may be associated with a smaller influence of lobby groups, though not at statistically significant levels. Thus, there is no change regarding the number of lobby groups of different kinds for MPs who change House.

In specifications (5) to (7) we express the different types of lobby affiliations as shares of total lobby groups. Again, we observe no statistically nor quantitatively relevant effects for sectional and cause lobby groups, i.e. changing House does not affect the share of these lobby groups. However, changing from the Lower to the Upper House has an effect on the share of regional lobby groups. The share of these groups increases for MPs once serving in the Upper House in comparison to their former peers in the Lower House. This can be explained, as the total number of lobby groups tends to decrease while regional lobby groups tend to increase (all not statistically significant) so that the share of regional interest groups increases by even more, resulting in a statistically significant increase. Having more lobby groups with regional ties is consistent with the view that MPs in the Upper House change their behavior by considering the interests of their constituency.

[36] We have always included lobby group affiliations as a control variable precisely for the reason that the change in office may affect congruence.

Table 6: The effect of a change from the Lower to the Upper House on the number and type of lobby groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent variable	*Number of lobby groups*	*Number of sectional lobby groups*	*Number of cause lobby groups*	*Number of regional lobby groups*	*Share sectional lobby groups*	*Share cause lobby groups*	*Share regional lobby groups*
Sample	Fully sample	Fully sample	Fully sample	Fully sample	Fully sample	Fully sample	Fully sample
MP changes House	**-0.8255**	**-0.5655**	**-0.2496**	**0.3754**	**-0.0311**	**0.0323**	**0.0459*** **
	(1.0488)	**(0.4946)**	**(0.8055)**	**(0.2289)**	**(0.0468)**	**(0.0468)**	**(0.0171)**
MP fixed effects	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**
Time variant MP controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	28308	28308	28308	28308	25008	25008	25008
R2	0.7776	0.8137	0.7417	0.7026	0.847	0.8462	0.751

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Linear probability models are estimated and standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP changes House" takes the value of 1, once an individual MP has changed from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "MP fixed effects" capture all time invariant MP specific heterogeneity. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in parliament", "Time in parliament squared", "First year in parliament", "First term in parliament", "Number of section interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups".

Table A4(a) in the Appendix show that as long as MPs have not yet changed to the Upper House but are in the Lower House, the number of their lobby groups of all kinds is not statistically different to other MPs from the Lower House. Similarly, Table A4(b) indicates, that once politicians are in the Upper House they tend to have the same number of lobby groups as other members of the Upper House.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This article endeavors to provide a complementary view to the prevalent argument that only elections act as selection and incentive devices to align politicians with the preferences of their constituency. We provide empirical evidence that politicians seek to correspond to public expectations *after* achieving political office. The empirical results support that view that public expectations of holding an office are of relevance, a topic which has been neglected in the economic literature. Politicians who are elected to office also corresponds to the public expectations of the office they hold. Our evidence is in line to the story of the historical person of Thomas-à-Becket, who dutifully served in the office as Lord Chancellor and later in the office of Archbishop, although, the expectations of the two offices were inconsistent. Thomas-à-Becket changed his behavior to fulfill the respective office, the office did not change. Our results are supportive for the existence of a Thomas-à-Becket incentive in politics.

Our setting allows us to compare the same politicians once in the Lower House of the Swiss Parliament and once in the Upper House of the Swiss Parliament. We observe their behavior with respect to the revealed preferences of their constituency and we employ a natural measure for MP congruence with their constituency. Analyzing the behavior of MPs in the Lower House *prior* to being elected to the Upper House, and analyzing the behavior of the same politicians in the Upper House, we identify that a behavioral change towards the preferences of their constituents. Our results suggest that it is not election and re-election

concerns as standard incentives which explain the identified behavioral change. As politicians only change their behavior *once elected*, voters do not select politicians based on their previous congruence with the preferences of the constituency. In fact, we observe that MPs who will be elected to the Upper House behave statistically identically to their peers in the Lower House as long as they themselves serve in the Lower House. Constitutionally, Upper House politicians should represent their constituency rather than the nation, they should be less loyal to their party but they should not represent lobby groups to any greater degree than when in the Lower House. All these *normative* public expectations are fulfilled for politicians changing from the Lower to the Upper House. Along all these dimensions the evidence suggests that former Lower House MPs are statistically similar to Upper House MPs once they serve in the Upper House.

Our evidence is suggestive for the existence of a Thomas-à-Becket incentive of the office, i.e. the office may change the person. This view does not exclude that standard election incentives and selection are relevant too. Politicians in our sample do not perfectly fulfil the expectations of their office, i.e. they do not perfectly match their constituency.

It might be argued that voters specifically select politicians under the expectation that they will change *once* in office. We consider this argument as semantic: Practically it means that such a type of selection is based on a *belief* in the existence of Thomas-à-Becket incentive. As a consequence, our empirical results do not and cannot exclude such a selection of politicians.[37]

In policy discussions, we frequently hear that arguments of the type "once in office, the person will adapt". These arguments are essentially referring to a potential Thomas-à-Becket incentive. Our results are, to our knowledge, the first to provide empirical evidence which can

[37] Considering the evidence that MPs do *not* behave differently regarding congruence with the preferences of their constituency while they still serve in the Lower House it is unlikely that voters could select politicians who want to adapt to the public expectations of the Upper House.

be seen as consistent with the existence of such a type incentive for congruence of politicians with the preferences of their constituency. We believe that we hereby provide a complement to the strict dichotomy of elections as a selection and incentive device. It is worthwhile to extend the existing dichotomy by allowing for the potential existence of a Thomas-à-Becket effect, to collect further evidence for its existence and to explore in in future research.

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Appendix Table A1: Data description and sources

Variable	*Description and sources*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*
Sample		Full sample		Lower House only		Upper House only	
MP changes House	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 once an MP has changed from the Lower to the Upper House of Parliament. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.027	0.163	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
MP is a House changer	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 if an MP has served in both the Lower and the Upper House of Parliament. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.081	0.273	0.056	0.229	0.369	0.483
MP congruence with constituency	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 if an MP votes in parliament as her constituents in the referendum decision. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.650	0.477	0.649	0.477	0.709	0.455
MP congruence with nation	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 if an MP votes in parliament as the majority of the nation in the referendum decision. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.645	0.478	0.645	0.478	0.693	0.461
Party Loyalty	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 if an MP votes in parliament according to the voting recommendation of her party. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.921	0.270	0.921	0.270	0.892	0.310
Number of lobby groups	Number of lobby groups affiliated with an MP. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	5.476	5.257	5.388	5.198	9.084	6.363
Number of section lobby groups	Number of sectional lobby groups affiliated with an MP. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	2.972	3.908	2.947	3.888	4.912	5.029
Number of cause lobby groups	Number of cause lobby groups affiliated with an MP. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	2.502	3.110	2.438	3.050	4.171	3.597
Number of regional lobby groups	Number of regional lobby groups affiliated with an MP. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	2.502	3.110	2.438	3.050	4.171	3.597
Time in Parliament	Member of parliament's age in years. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	6.498	5.145	6.300	4.981	9.250	6.275
First year in Parliament	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 if MP is the first year in parliament. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.130	0.336	0.133	0.339	0.094	0.292
First term in Parliament	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 if MP is the term year in parliament. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.385	0.487	0.395	0.489	0.224	0.417
Months to election	Indicator variable: Number of months elapsed since a referendum decision to the next election. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	24.350	12.415	24.270	12.469	27.730	10.219
Age	Member of parliament's age in years. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	52.620	8.436	52.510	8.435	56.940	7.200
Professional MP	Indicator variable: Takes the value of 1 if MPs main profession is in politics. Swiss Parliamentary Services.	0.235	0.424	0.232	0.422	0.242	0.428

Notes: Unweighted descriptive statistics for all referenda in dataset. Data sources indicated next to variable descriptions.

Appendix Table A2: Further robustness tests for baseline result: Logit estimates & sample restrictions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent variable	*MP congruence with constituency*						
Estimation type	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*OLS*	*OLS*
Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	>10 decisions	since year 2000	>10 decisions	since year 2000
MP changes House	0.3385**	0.3479***	0.3614***	0.3605***	0.3716***	0.0777***	0.0791***
	(0.1324)	(0.1349)	(0.1289)	(0.1301)	(0.1372)	(0.0266)	(0.0290)
MP fixed effects	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**
Time variant MP controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	28308	28308	28308	27779	21681	27779	21681
(Pseudo) R2	0.1174	0.1389	0.1398	0.1386	0.1355	0.1017	0.1001
Brier score	0.2081	0.2046	0.2044	0.2048	0.2096	-	-
Discrete effect for "MP changes	0.0523***	0.0604***	0.0441**	0.0436**	0.0754**	-	-
House"	(0.0182)	(0.0213)	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0318)		

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP changes House" takes the value of 1, once an individual MP has changed from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "MP fixed effects" capture all time invariant MP specific heterogeneity. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in Parliament", "Time in Parliament squared", "First year in Parliament", "First term in Parliament", "Number of sectional interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups". The sample entitled "> 10 decisions" restricts the analysis to MPs for who we observe at least 10 parliamentary and referendum decisions. The sample entitled "since year 2000" restricts the analysis to observations from the year 2000 onwards.

Appendix Table A3: Further robustness tests for Table 2 - Logit estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	*MP congruence with constituency*					
Estimation type	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*
Sample	Lower House only	Lower House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	House changers only	House changers only
MP is a House changer	**0.0438**	**0.1082**	**-0.1796***	**-0.0708**		
	(0.1366)	**(0.0975)**	**(0.1013)**	**(0.1440)**		
Post change of House					**0.3577****	**0.3694***
					(0.1403)	**(0.1969)**
Time variant MP controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Party fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	27539	27539	2086	2086	2301	2301
(Pseudo) R2	0.0296	0.0989	0.0254	0.0957	0.0491	0.1086
Brier score	0.2229	0.2118	0.2028	0.1922	0.2138	0.204
Discrete effect for "MP changes	0.0088	0.0176	-0.0290*	-0.0115	0.0664***	0.0592**
House"	(0.0273)	(0.0155)	(0.0169)	(0.0234)	(0.0247)	(0.0296)

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP changes House" takes the value of 1, once an individual MP has changed from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "MP fixed effects" capture all time invariant MP specific heterogeneity. The indicator variable "MP is a House changer" takes the value of 1 if an will/has changed (sample for Lower House/Upper House) from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in parliament", "Time in parliament squared", "First year in parliament", "First term in parliament", "Number of section interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups". "Party fixed effects" includes all parties in the respective House. "MP fixed effects" are not included (in comparison to Table 1) as they coincide with the identifiers "MP is a House Changer" and "Post change of House" in the settings analyzed.

Appendix Table A4 (a): Prior to change of House politicians are comparable to Lower House members with respect to the number and share of their interest groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent variable	*Number of lobby groups*	*Number of sectional lobby groups*	*Number of cause lobby groups*	*Number of regional lobby groups*	*Share sectional lobby groups*	*Share cause lobby groups*	*Share regional lobby groups*
Sample	Lower House only	Lower House only	Lower House only	Lower House only	Lower House only	Lower House only	Lower House only
MP is a House changer	**0.2863**	**-0.2210**	**0.5081**	**-0.0172**	**0.0254**	**-0.0254**	**-0.0050**
	(0.7652)	**(0.5690)**	**(0.5911)**	**(0.0463)**	**(0.0640)**	**(0.0640)**	**(0.0051)**
Time variant MP controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	27539	27539	27539	27539	24256	24256	24256
R2	0.2366	0.2144	0.196	0.0666	0.2252	0.2243	0.0524

Appendix Table A4 (b): Prior to change of House politicians are comparable to Lower House members with respect to the number and share of their interest groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent variable	*Number of lobby groups*	*Number of sectional lobby groups*	*Number of cause lobby groups*	*Number of regional lobby groups*	*Share sectional lobby groups*	*Share cause lobby groups*	*Share regional lobby groups*
Sample	Upper House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	Upper House only	Upper House only
MP is a House changer	**-0.6897**	**-1.8842**	**1.1924**	**0.2476**	**-0.0526**	**0.0525**	**0.0225**
	(1.3575)	**(1.4600)**	**(1.1568)**	**(0.3023)**	**(0.0878)**	**(0.0878)**	**(0.0214)**
Time variant MP controls	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**	**yes**
Party fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Referendum type fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	2086	2086	2086	2086	2036	2036	2036
R2	0.4351	0.3441	0.2417	0.3589	0.3141	0.3138	0.3155

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Linear probability models are estimated and standard errors are clustered for MPs. All estimations include an intercept. The indicator variable "MP is a House changer" takes the value of 1 if an will/has changed (sample for Lower House/Upper House) from the Lower House of Parliament to the Upper House of Parliament. "Time variant MP controls" include "Time in parliament", "Time in parliament squared", "First year in parliament", "First term in parliament", "Number of section interest groups", "Number of cause interest groups", and "Number of regional interest groups". "Party fixed effects" include all parties in the respective House.