

# **Kenya's Constituency Development Fund and the Politics of Resource Allocation (DRAFT)**

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**Abstract:** Why do politicians in ethnically diverse polities target co-ethnics with patronage resources? Existing explanations for this phenomenon typically assume, rather than examine, the political salience of ethnic differences. I argue that, in settings of ethnic diversity, leaders are most likely to target co-ethnics when they have both the ability and the political incentive to do so. Ethnicity itself must be a salient political cleavage for politicians to exploit, and politicians must possess a means for directing this patronage at desired clients. Kenya's Constituency Development Fund (CDF) provides an ideal setting in which to examine the strategic allocation of patronage resources. Management of the Fund varies substantially across constituencies. Using both survey data and in-depth qualitative interviews with local stakeholders, I compare three different ethnically diverse constituencies to assess the effects of ethnic salience on resource allocation by the CDF. In settings where ethnicity is salient and politicians can feasibly target CDF resources towards members of their ethnic community, their co-ethnics are more likely to report a CDF project in their community or to suggest that the CDF is helpful to people like them. When these conditions are absent, ethnic identity fails to predict resource allocation.

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## **Introduction**

Over a decade of research has documented a robust relationship between ethnic diversity and adverse economic outcomes. Ethnically heterogeneous countries invest less in public goods, experience lower levels of economic growth, and remain poor as a result. While scholars have put forward a number of explanations for this phenomenon, one of the most prominent explanations – especially in Sub-Saharan Africa – is that leaders target cronies and co-ethnics for patronage spending at the expense of their national populations. Existing explanations for this phenomenon, however, typically assume, rather than examine, the political salience of ethnic differences. I argue that, in settings of ethnic diversity, leaders are most likely to target co-ethnics when they have both the ability and the political incentive to do so. Ethnicity itself must be a salient political cleavage for politicians to exploit, and politicians must possess a means for directing this patronage at desired clients. I test this argument in a sub-national study of Kenya's Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The CDF places substantial resources for local infrastructure projects at the discretion of each member of Kenya's National Assembly. Using semi-structured qualitative interviews with local political figures and civil society leaders in three ethnically diverse parliamentary constituencies, along with representative survey data from these locations, I examine both within and between-constituency variation in perceptions of resource allocation and access to CDF projects by citizens. In places where ethnicity is a salient political division, citizens are more likely to report that they have access to a CDF project or to view the Fund as helpful to people like them, but are no more likely to grade the Fund's performance positively.

## **A negative relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision**

At least since Easterly & Levine's (1997) article linking national-level ethnic diversity with public policies that undermined economic growth, researchers have documented a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision. These scholars, and others, have pointed to Africa's high levels of ethnic diversity as an explanation for low levels of service provision and the slow pace of economic growth on the continent.<sup>2</sup> Gerring et al. (2015) refer to this causal link as the "diversity debit" hypothesis – a price that countries pay for non-homogeneity. The focus on ethnicity has occasionally been preoccupied with debates about how best to measure diversity (Alesina et al. 1999, Alesina et al. 2003, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005, Campos & Kuzeyev 2007). More fruitful, however, have been attempts to explain the mechanisms linking ethnicity to the underprovision of public goods. One plausible explanation is that ethnic factions are "permanent interest groups" (Kimenyi 2006, 69) who hold different preferences about the level or content of public spending (Easterly & Levine 1997, Alesina & La Ferrara 2005, 763). Certainly "horizontal inequality" – systematic differences in the average incomes of different groups – can play a substantial role in shaping the political and economic group members (Baldwin & Huber 2010, Lieberman & McClendon 2013). A second explanation is that, by embedding individuals in networks with shared social ties and expectations, "co-ethnicity" facilitates the resolution of collective action problems and enables the

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<sup>2</sup> Scholars have, it should be said, pointed out that diversity does not always result in the underprovision of public goods, or in biased development outcomes. Examining sub-national units of several dozen countries, Gerring et al. (2015) argue that diversity is not always harmful for public goods provision. Kramon & Posner (2013) demonstrate that even within ethnically diverse settings, patterns of distribution vary depending on the resources being allocated.

production of public goods (Kimenyi 2006, 64; Habyarimana et al. 2007, 2009; also MacLean 2004, Varshney 2002, Tsai 2007).<sup>3</sup>

### **Patronage in Africa**

The explanation most consistent with descriptions of governance in post-colonial Africa, however, is that low levels of public goods provision are a byproduct of ethnic favoritism: leaders channel resources towards co-ethnics at the expense of the population as a whole (Wantchekon 2003, van de Walle 2003, Franck & Rainer 2012). This, indeed, is one of the enduring explanations for African underdevelopment. African governance has often been referred to as “neopatrimonial” – characterized by personal rule, governance via patron-client networks, and the exploitation of state coffers for personal gain (Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Jackson & Rosberg 1984; Chabal & Daloz 1999). This system is at least partly rooted in the African colonial experience of “decentralized despotism,” in which European administrators reified, or even manufactured, ethnic identities as the basis of belonging and representation – installing their own “chiefs” and empowering them to serve as local demigods on behalf of the colonial regime (Mamdani 1996, Bates 2005 [1989], Young 1994). The colonial experience shaped the state-building strategies of post-colonial leaders. These elites constructed networks (often a “party-state”) which functioned by dispensing patronage resources or prebends to strategically important subordinates as a way of ensuring support for the regime (e.g. Zolberg 1966, Jackson & Rosberg 1984, van de Walle 2007, Arriola 2009). Co-ethnicity was a critical component to these networks, and

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<sup>3</sup> A significant problem with this latter explanation is that it largely excludes the state as a body capable of authoritatively resolving this collective action problem and determining, by fiat, how public goods will be produced and provided to its citizens. Although highly applicable for understanding club or public goods provision by non-state actors, its utility for explaining the underprovision of public goods by the state is limited.

leaders often targeted supportive co-ethnics with public funds as a means to sustaining themselves in power (Barkan & Chege 1989, Branch & Cheeseman 2008). And leaders could also bolster their regime by granting favors, cabinet positions, or resources to “big men” from other ethnic groups in return for their loyalty (e.g. Arriola 2009). Since the introduction or re-introduction of multiparty competition throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, the importance of political patronage in African governance remains significant.<sup>4</sup>

Leaders’ motives matter for understanding this process. If motivations for ethnic favoritism stem from a sense of loyalty or duty towards one’s co-ethnics, or emerge from political pressure by one’s kin, then diversity itself should be associated with underdevelopment (cf. Schatzberg 2001, Lindberg 2010). Most contemporary political science scholarship, however, often describes ethnicity as instrumental: leaders selectively reward their supporters because they hope to gain some political advantage by doing so, not because they have any more affinity towards co-ethnics than towards non-co-ethnics (Chandra 2004; Posner 2004b, 2005). If ethnically-based patronage is indeed instrumental, then it is not an automatic response to diversity itself. Therefore, while ethnically-based patronage spending may be common in Africa, it is by no means a necessary consequence of the ethnic composition of the continents’ societies.

Previous literature suggesting a negative relationship between diversity and public goods provision has largely neglected to examine empirically how variation in the political *salience* of diversity, rather than diversity itself, impacts public goods provision (Miguel

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<sup>4</sup> Indeed, contemporary Africa is not the only setting in which patronage plays a substantial role in shaping both local and national politics (e.g. Tsai 2007; Chandra 2004).

2004 being an exception; also Lieberman 2009). If ethnicity is indeed instrumental, then ethnicity itself must be a relevant political cleavage which politicians and voters may exploit to gain votes or resources (Posner 2004a; Fearon 2006, 853). When ethnicity is politically salient, politicians and citizens can be sure about the behavior of their friends and neighbors on the basis of their clan, tribe, racial identity (or other categories that define membership in a given ethnic community). In situations such as these, politicians have no incentive to invest resources in communities of non-co-ethnics who will not vote for them regardless of the quality of service provision. By contrast, when political loyalties are disconnected from ethnic criteria, politicians are unlikely to pursue a strategy based on patronage spending directed towards co-ethnics. It is thus the political salience of ethnic divisions, not the presence of diversity itself, which should be associated with ethnically-based patronage spending in Africa and elsewhere.

### **Ability to target**

While the salience of ethnicity affects the incentive structure facing politicians, whether or not they successfully target resources towards their co-ethnics is mediated by their ability to do so. Theories of clientelism suggest that in order for clientelist politics to be a viable strategy, patrons must possess the ability to exclude non-clients from benefitting from a resource, as well as to monitor and discipline those who do (e.g. Stokes et al. 2013; Fearon 2006). Oftentimes politicians will attempt to distribute private goods to clients – this can take the form of personal gifts to individual voters (vote-buying or turnout-buying) (e.g. Wantchekon 2003). Occasionally, however, politicians in Africa will attempt to compete on their ability to reward supporters with “local” public goods – resources whose utility is constrained by their proximity to the recipients (Ichino & Nathan 2013).

Tarmacking a dirt road, for example, is a non-excludable and non-rivalrous good for the people who travel on it every day, but does little for those who do not live near the road. These small-scale infrastructure projects are essentially forms of “pork-barrel” spending (Stokes et al. 2013, 7). Throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the development of government services and basic infrastructure has been limited, these community projects are valued highly by the communities that receive them. As such, control over their allocation constitutes an important political resource for incumbent politicians who are at least nominally subject to periodic elections. In order to channel these types of goods towards their co-ethnic supporters, however, politicians must be able to limit access to them by non-co-ethnics. Given the practical difficulties of excluding citizens from travelling on a road that has been tarmacked or visiting a health clinic that has received new medical equipment, politicians are more likely to employ a strategy of targeting co-ethnics when they are geographically segregated from other ethnic groups. This notion, that geography matters for a variety of political outcomes, has recently been re-discovered by political scientists who have examined the relationship between the spatial distribution of ethnic groups and voting patterns, conflict, and development (e.g. Ichino & Nathan 2013). Recognition that geography mediates the ability of politicians to target specific communities with “pork-barrel” patronage would be a noteworthy extension of this research agenda.

### **Kenya’s Constituency Development Fund**

Kenya’s Constituency Development Fund (CDF) provides an ideal opportunity to test these hypotheses about how ability & incentive shape patterns of patronage by politicians. Every year the Fund divides substantial financial resources (a minimum of 2.5% of all

ordinary government revenue) between the country's parliamentary constituencies (Kenya 2013). Allocation of these resources to different community-based projects is carried out at the local level.

The CDF Act was first passed in 2003 and amended in 2007. In 2013, following the adoption of a new constitution (in 2010) that devolved responsibilities for service provision to new sub-national governments, called counties, the Act was modified again. This failed to assuage critics of the Act, who argued that the Fund infringed on the responsibilities of the county governments for local service provision, and on the powers of the executive to implement government programs (van Zyl 2010, Center on Budget & Policy Priorities 2009, TISA 2013). Two Kenyan civil society organizations filed suit against the government, arguing that the Fund was unconstitutional for these reasons. Kenya's High Court ruled in their favor, but gave the government 12 months to bring the Fund into accord with the constitution before abolishing it completely. The ruling was denounced by MPs, who nonetheless succeeded in meeting the deadline and adopting a new CDF Act ("the National Government Constituencies Development Fund Act") in December 2015 (Capital FM 2015, Mogoia 2015).

Although the CDF has evolved over time, the guiding idea of the Fund remains the same. The CDF provides a substantial pool of resources to all 290 constituencies in Kenya's National Assembly. The Member of the National Assembly (MP) for each constituency serves as the "patron" of the fund at the local level. He or she is responsible for overseeing the selection of the eight members of the CDF Committee at the local level and sits as an *ex officio* member of this committee. Each CDF Committee (CDFC) is responsible for allocating their constituency's share of the national CDF kitty. The Committees select local



infrastructure projects for funding in the constituency. These projects come from a variety of categories including education, water, agriculture, security, and roads. Projects include constructing classrooms or multipurpose buildings in local schools, adding to or repairing community water projects, grading and/or gravelling dirt roads, or adding to a chief's office or police outpost. At the grassroots level, local Project Management Committees (PMCs) are responsible for overseeing construction while the area CDF office signs off on payment for project construction. The fund requires that CDF Committees solicit project ideas from the public but doesn't specify how this process must be carried out or make community voices binding on the CDF Committee.

In theory, this system limits the discretion or decision-making power of the area Member of the National Assembly. In practice, however, MPs possess both formal and informal influence over resource allocation. They ultimately control the appointment of CDF Committee members – the *de jure* decision-makers at the local level – and they possess informal influence over what projects each committee funds. Although the 2013 CDF Act mandates that MPs carry out local “elections” for members of the CDF Committee, it fails to spell out the procedures for this process. While some MPs appear to take a “hands off” approach to the selection of CDFC members (KAH95), in other cases critics allege that Committee members are just puppets of the sitting MP (KAH36, KAH40).<sup>5</sup> While they lack a formal “vote” over which projects the CDFC supports, MPs nonetheless remain extremely engaged in management of the CDF. Throughout each constituency, citizens suggest that their MP is self-interested (KAH4), can fund “his tribe” who voted for him (KAH44R1),

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<sup>5</sup> Citations with this format – KAH## - refer to interviews, conducted by the author in Kenya from July-November 2014 and June-July 2015.

favors his area to “sustain” his position and to get votes (KAH65), or gives substantial amounts of money to the places he got votes and allocates few resources where he faced opposition (KAH87). Polling data shows that Kenyan citizens as a whole view MPs as ultimately responsible for the CDF. When posed with the open-ended question “Who do you think has the most say over how this constituency uses money from the CDF?”, 854 of 1,827 Kenyans (47%) in a nationally-representative survey carried out by Ipsos Kenya in July - August 2015 responded that their MP was ultimately accountable for the Fund’s management. This was more than triple the next highest response category. This reflects a broad public perception that the CDF is a “tool of influence” on the part of MPs, rather than a forum for community-driven development projects (KAH6).

As a financial resource disbursed at the local level by elected representatives, the CDF provides an excellent opportunity to examine the features that influence politicians’ decisions about patronage spending, and who they prioritize in this decision-making process.

## **Research Design**

In order to understand who benefits from CDF projects, as well as how patterns of distribution vary across constituencies, I employ a mixed-methods case study approach that uses original data from semi-structured and survey interviews. I conducted over 150 in-depth, semi-structured interviews in (or focused on) six Kenyan constituencies – Tongaren, Webuye East, Njoro, Wundanyi, Taveta, and Rongo – from July to November 2014, and from June to July 2015. Interview respondents included politicians, civil servants, CDF Committee members, and members of grassroots PMCs from across each constituency. This approach ensured a reasonably comprehensive picture of the politics

and performance of the CDF in each constituency. It also revealed substantial differences between constituencies that successfully explain variation in the priorities of the Fund in each constituency.

The six constituencies were each selected on the basis of their (perceived) ethnic heterogeneity, using previous literature about Kenya as well as information from initial interviews with local “experts” in Nairobi in July and August 2014. These six constituencies are spread throughout Kenya: two in the former Western Province, one in the Rift Valley, two at the Coast, and one in the region occupied by the former Nyanza province. Despite their geographic diversity, there are similarities between the constituencies which makes it fruitful to compare them on the basis of the key independent variables for this study (the political salience of ethnic identity). They are among neither the wealthiest nor the poorest constituencies in Kenya, they are all predominantly rural, and the sitting MP won re-election in each constituency as an incumbent. This latter feature is essential: citizens (and the researcher) can assess the track record of the area MP with respect to CDF management and priorities.

Based on findings from the first round of qualitative interviews, in July-November 2014, I selected three constituencies for a public opinion survey that would clarify who benefited from the Fund at a local level. Staff from Ipsos Kenya Ltd. (a public opinion firm) conducted 1,164 survey interviews from a representative sample of adult residents in Tongaren (N = 390), Webuye East (N = 388), and Njoro (N = 386) from September 15<sup>th</sup> – 26<sup>th</sup>, 2015. Using publically available data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), I stratified the sample according to the population of each sub-location within the constituencies. Within each sampling point, respondents were clustered around a “village” selected at

random from a list of survey Enumeration Areas published by KNBS. Approximately ten respondents were located around any given cluster.<sup>6</sup> In rural areas, survey interviewers would proceed 500m from the initial starting point, and follow an established walking pattern to select subsequent households. Within each household, interviewers used a “Kish grid” to randomly invite one adult household member to participate. Interviewers made up to three call-backs to find the respondent if he or she was not available right away. If respondents were still unavailable, interviewers proceeded to the next immediate household.<sup>7</sup> Ipsos supervisors accompanied interviewers for 15% of the interviews and checked back in with household members in at least 25% of the sampled households to ensure that interviewers had sampled the correct households.

### **Case Selection**

At the national level, ethnicity is highly salient in Kenya. However, the geographic concentration of different groups, their legacy of migration and resettlement, and the ways in which different identities have been constructed and negotiated over time means that in some areas ethnic cleavages are reflected in existing political divisions, while other, equally heterogeneous regions are home to “diverse” groups who find themselves on the same side of the national partisan divide or for whom ethnicity is not a relevant basis of political competition. Critical to this is the “nested” structure of many ethnic identities: clans or sub-tribes contained in larger ethnic groups can support different candidates for local positions while backing the same candidate for national-level positions. As a result,

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<sup>6</sup> So, for example, a sub-location with 40 respondents would have 4 sampling points.

<sup>7</sup> Ensuring gender balance proved difficult. Often household members recorded a male household member but reported that he was working in an urban area and was unavailable. The gender distribution in the final sample reflects this difficulty.

ethnicity is salient in some regions, and for some offices, but not for others. Kenya is thus not only diverse, but contains different kinds of diversity at the local level. These myriad divisions, in turn, impact politics in different ways.

Qualitative interviews reveal that all three constituencies sampled in this paper respondents are aware of, and can name, multiple different clans or tribes in their constituency. How these groups interact with one another and with the political system varies substantially from constituency to constituency. While citizens in some regions disavow the role of ethnicity in area politics, in other places it plays a central role in shaping the behavior of politicians and voters alike. In these latter regions, unlike the former, respondents familiar with the CDF suggest that ethnicity plays a significant role in the management of the Fund. The constituencies of Tongaren, Webuye East, and Njoro offer substantial contrasts in terms of the salience of ethnicity in area politics and the importance of ethnicity as a determinant of who benefits from the Fund itself. Each exhibit a similar degree of ethnic diversity but these ethnic distinctions are more or less salient in different ways in all three constituencies. Webuye East and Njoro have legacies of political tension or conflict between area ethnic groups, while Tongaren lacks this history of conflict. In Njoro, and to a lesser extent in Webuye East, party politics revolve around ethnic differences, while in Tongaren citizens do not perceive local politics in ethnic terms. What's more the geographic concentration of these groups within their constituencies varies as well. Communities in Tongaren are spread throughout the constituency, while ethnic groups in Njoro are segregated in different regions within the constituency.

## **Politics in Tongaren**

Tongaren constituency, in Bungoma county (near the Ugandan border), is routinely described by interview respondents as “cosmopolitan” and home to groups from throughout Kenya (KAH 110, KAH16, KAH19, KAH23, KAH113, KAH116, KAH118). This perception of diversity can be attributed to the manner in which the area was settled after independence. During the colonial era Tongaren was part of the “White Highlands” – a vast swath of fertile agricultural land seized by the British for settlement by white European farmers. As many white settlers left Kenya after independence, the independent Kenyan government parceled out the area around Tongaren for sale to African settlers, starting in 1964 (KAH1, KAH110). Since independence, plots have been subdivided and sold off, with the result being a densely-populated rural constituency filled with smallholder farmers.

As a result of this legacy, Tongaren is a heterogeneous constituency in which ethnic groups are mixed. Although the majority of residents in the constituency come from a single sub-group of the Luhya (the Bukusu), there are significant minorities of other ethnic groups in the constituency, including a sizable number of other Luhya sub-groups, as well as people from the Kikuyu, Kisii, and Teso ethnic groups (KAH1, KAH96, KAH109, KAH112, KAH113). Interview respondents estimated that the Bukusu represented sixty to seventy-five percent of the population (KAH96, KAH20, KAH114, KAH115). Survey data, summarized in Table 1, reflects the reality described by interview respondents in the area: Although over 90% of the survey sample identifies as Luhya, diversity within the larger

Luhya community as a whole means that in total, just over two-thirds of the sampled respondents identify as Bukusu.<sup>8</sup>

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Ethnic groups are not geographically concentrated in different parts of Tongaren. One area resident described how a cousin who had just stopped by was from a different Luhya sub-tribe and lived just one kilometer away – in between their two homes, he said, were residents from a variety of Kenyan ethnic groups (KAH111). Other respondents suggested that ethnic groups “are scattered” throughout the length and breadth of the constituency (KAH115), that Tongaren is a “no man’s land” home to different ethnic groups (KAH113), or that “here everybody is spread out” (KAH117).<sup>9</sup>

Although residents are quick to highlight Tongaren’s ethnic diversity, they are also quick to assert that these ethnic differences are irrelevant to local politics. When asked to describe the primary political divisions in the constituency, many respondents struggled to name the kinds of people or groups who tended to support different parties or candidates. In addition, when explicitly asked about the effects of ethnicity on politics in Tongaren, most interview respondents frequently asserted that these distinctions did not form the basis of competition between political parties (KAH17, KAH19, KAH23, KAH113). Even a critic and rival of the incumbent MP hastened to point out that elections in Tongaren did not hinge on ethnic differences (KAH20). Other respondents suggested that the “voting

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<sup>8</sup> In the survey, respondents were given the opportunity to describe their ethnic identity in an open-ended fashion; interviewers then selected, from a closed list, the identity category which best matched the respondent’s answer. Respondents were able to offer multiple answers, although few did so. The numbers reported in these tables reflect respondents’ first answer to questions about their ethnic identity.

<sup>9</sup> In spite of this, a few respondents did suggest that certain areas were home to higher concentrations of non-Luhya residents (KAH109, KAH114, KAH115). This, however, was not reflected in the survey data.

pattern is not based mainly on tribal clannism” but on incumbent performance (KAH117, also KAH111), that in Tongaren “we need only common interests” (KAH23R1), and that even within a single household a wife and husband may vote for different parties (KAH118). A PMC member from an area secondary school summarized this point of view, responding to a question about ethnicity in politics by saying firmly: “No, we don’t have that bit” (KAH16). While this narrative – that ethnicity is irrelevant to politics in Tongaren – is not universally shared, it is widespread and it serves to distinguish the constituency from other regions in Kenya.<sup>10</sup>

A further reflection of the non-prominent role of ethnicity in the constituency is the fact that the sitting member of parliament is *not* from the dominant Bukusu group, a fact that several respondents mentioned when discussing ethnic politics in the constituency (KAH1, KAH16, KAH110, KAH115). According to the MP himself, his own identity as a Luhya Banyala (not a Bukusu) only came to his attention when he first stood for the seat.<sup>11</sup> According to the MP, when he first contested the parliamentary seat, the revelation of his heritage by opponents was meant as an accusation – ‘how can we vote for someone who isn’t even from our sub-tribe?’ – but the attempted slander backfired.<sup>12</sup> The MP for

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<sup>10</sup> Counterpoints came from respondents who suggested that the political dominance of the largest ethnic group deterred challengers from running (KAH19), that voters would consider a candidate’s clan and ask themselves “whose son is this person? Whose daughter?” before casting their ballot (KAH114), or that “if you don’t get the support of the Bukusu... you cannot manage” (KAH116). A CDF Committee member and supporter of the MP, meanwhile, complained about some Kikuyu voters in the constituency who completely lacked interest in local politics: “Their interest is in the presidential vote because they don’t have any of their own here” (KAH109). At the polls, he alleged such a voter will “only make one vote [i.e. for President] and then he will go” without voting for any other seat (KAH109).

<sup>11</sup> Growing up, the MP had always assumed that he was Bukusu, on his father’s side, until he found out during the campaign period in 2007 that his paternal great-grandparents had moved into the wider region from an area home to the Banyala – which was also the community that was home to his mother’s family (KAH96).

<sup>12</sup> If anything, the MP suggested that his minority ethnicity was advantageous – with citizens from outside the dominant Luhya faction supporting him and those from within it approving of his family’s legacy of public service in the area.



Tongaren also was likely aided by the party he represented (FORD-Kenya), which is historically associated with the Bukusu (KAH1, KAH96, KAH16). That said, the MP's closest challenger in the last election, although Luhya, is also not from the largest Luhya sub-tribe in Tongaren (KAH1, KAH19). Tongaren thus provides a stark contrast to depictions of politics in ethnically diverse African states as dominated by ethnic considerations.

### **Politics in Webuye East**

Unlike Tongaren, which was part of Kenya's "white highlands" during the colonial period, Webuye East – which borders Tongaren to the southwest – was part of the "reserves," land set aside for use by Africans themselves. This legacy is reflected in how residents talk about their community. Despite the presence of a sizable town within the constituency and a legacy of industrial production, no respondent suggested that the area was "cosmopolitan." Instead, citizens pointed to rivalry between the two largest ethnic groups in the constituency as the defining feature of politics in Webuye East. These two largest groups, the Bukusu and the Tachoni, are both Luhya sub-groups. Together they compose about three-fourths of the constituency's total population. Although the Bukusu are one of the largest of the Luhya groups, the Tachoni are much smaller, concentrated in and around Webuye. The ethnic composition of the constituency is reflected in Table 2, which captures respondents' self-identification in the survey.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Divisions between these two groups play an important role in the politics of Webuye East. For decades, the previous incumbent MP was a Bukusu who, supporters of the MP allege, concentrated patronage spending in his own area at the expense of majority-Tachoni sections of the constituency in Mihuu and Ndivisi (KAH27, KAH115, KAH32,

KAH35). After multiple attempts, the current MP managed to unseat the old, multiple-term incumbent in 2007 by affiliating himself with the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), a popular and successful political party in the region, and by capitalizing on the previous MP's alleged failure to deliver meet the developmental needs of his constituency (KAH2, KAH32, KAH35, KAH119, KAH121R2). A political supporter of the MP described how the MP appealed to this larger Luhya identity to rally supporters (KAH27), and the MP himself discussed how he hoped citizens in the region could move from a focus on narrowly ethnic politics to a focus on regional politics and (eventually) to a focus on national politics (KAH26). In 2013, the incumbent MP – standing as the candidate of a different party (known as the United Democratic Forum , or UDF) associated with a popular Luhya politician – coasted to an election victory after the constituency was split in half. This division of Webuye concentrated his co-ethnics in Webuye East (KAH26).<sup>13</sup> The area MP is the sole Member of the National Assembly who hails from amongst the Tachoni (KAH33).

Although the MP appears to have been elected in 2007 on the basis of widespread support (from both within and outside of the Tachoni), respondents were clear that his core areas of support were amongst his co-ethnics in Mihuu and Ndivisi wards (KAH27, KAH30, KAH33, KAH120). Respondents suggested that that it was obvious the MP could win re-election to his seat given the number of his co-ethnics in the constituency (KAH119), that the MP's co-ethnics cast ballots on his behalf because they considered him their “son” (KAH120), that members of the two different Luhya groups could never vote

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<sup>13</sup> A respondent suggested that the MP had pushed for this division in the knowledge that it would be electorally favorable to him (KAH33), a charge which one of the MP's supporters raised independently in an interview and denied, saying that the MP supported the split because he knew it would bring in more government funds to the region (KAH32).

from a candidate from the other group, (KAH121R2), and that in Webuye “if you don’t belong to the land like me” then you can’t win elections (KAH121R1).<sup>14</sup> It’s important to note that not everyone in Webuye East shares this perception: when asked about voting patterns in the constituency, several residents pushed back at the notion that ethnicity *alone* determined the political loyalties of voters in Webuye East (KAH29, KAH30, KAH31, KAH35). Even in these interviews, however, respondents often acknowledged that ethnicity played a role in the choices of voters. One PMC member at a CDF project suggested that “it’s not common to find... where he [the MP] is denied votes *completely*,” (emphasis mine) while simultaneously acknowledging that the MP does collect more votes in his home area and suggesting that ethnicity “plays a major role” in affecting the voting choices of citizens in Webuye East (KAH124).

These discussions of ethnicity and voting patterns often refer to the fact that Bukusu and Tachoni citizens are concentrated in different sections of the constituency, with the area around Webuye town (Maraka ward) home to the Bukusu, and parts of Mihuu and Ndivisi wards home to the MP’s fellow Tachoni. Citizens often highlighted the geographic segregation of these two ethnic communities (KAH27, KAH32, KAH33, KAH35, KAH120, KAH122). The survey data – summarized in Table 3 – reflects this description, at least in part.<sup>15</sup> Although Tachoni are a minority in virtually every sub-location in the constituency,

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<sup>14</sup> These references to “the land” or the notion that an MP was the “son” of his co-ethnics diverge substantially from political rhetoric in the neighboring constituency (Tongaren), where Europeans forcibly seized land during the colonial period. Due to this forced alienation of land and subsequent resettlement by African families who chose to buy plots, the land in Tongaren was not associated with any single ethnic group.

<sup>15</sup> The number of Tachoni in Table 3 differs from the number of Tachoni in Table 2. Some respondents chose to identify with more than one ethnic group. The numbers in Table 3 reflect all respondents who listed Tachoni as an identity, regardless of how they described their primary identity in Table 2.

they are much more heavily concentrated in parts of Mihuu and Ndivisi than in Maraka ward.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The interview and survey data together demonstrate that ethnic identity is important to, if not entirely determinative of, political behavior in Webuye East. Moreover, the “nested” nature of the ethnic divisions means that the area MP has an incentive to appeal to a larger sense of Luhya solidarity during campaigns. While the history of ethnic tensions in Webuye East has created a political culture in which citizens expect to be rewarded with patronage by the winning candidate, the incumbent’s minority status means that this strategy is difficult to pursue.

### **Politics in Njoro**

Njoro, in Kenya’s Rift Valley, stands out from both Tongaren, a “cosmopolitan” constituency without a legacy of ethnic rivalry, and Webuye East, a parochially Luhya constituency with a tradition of political tension between two Luhya factions. Njoro is a “cosmopolitan” constituency with a long history of intense ethnic divisions between two clearly defined, nationally prominent ethnic groups who are geographically segregated. Similar to Tongaren, many of the area residents are recent migrants to the constituency in the last several decades (KAH43, KAH128). Unlike Tongaren, however, the political differences between these groups are highly significant. Kikuyu and Kalenjin respondents alike suggest that ethnic affiliation influences voting patterns. In addition, Njoro is like Webuye East in the sense that settlement patterns reflect ethnic identity, making it physically possible for the CDF Committee to target public goods spending to favored communities.

Like Tongaren, the area in which Njoro lies was part of the “White Highlands” during the colonial period. Following independence, it was progressively settled by African residents, sometimes at the intervention of various political figures (KAH40). During the regime of Kenya’s first President, Jomo Kenyatta, former “Mau Mau” freedom fighters (co-ethnics of the President), were settled in one portion of the constituency known as Ndeffo (KAH36).<sup>16</sup> In one section of nearby Mau Narok region, respondents mentioned that their fathers had worked on, and subsequently purchased, the large farm from the British landlord who had lived there previously (KAH132). President Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi, later “hived off” forested areas in the hills on the western side of the constituency for settlement. These locations, known as Mauche and Nessuit, were settled by his Kalenjin co-ethnics during the 1980s and 1990s (KAH36; also KAH38, KAH50). Area residents of Nessuit include members of the Ogiek (formerly known as the Dorobos) – a Kalenjin sub-group traditionally associated with a hunter-gatherer lifestyle which has been especially marginalized in previous decades (KAH39, KAH49). The other major Kalenjin community are the Kipsigis, who compose a much larger proportion of the constituency’s Kalenjin residents. Although the region is home to other groups, the majority of citizens hail from these two larger ethnic communities: the Kikuyu and Kalenjin. Members of different ethnic groups are clustered in their own distinct regions within the constituency – “wanaishi pamoja” (they live together, KAH131) – and interview respondents readily identified which areas were Kalenjin-dominated (Mauche and Nessuit wards) and which were home to Kikuyu (Lare, Kihingo, and most of Mau Narok). The survey data in Tables 4 and 5 also

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<sup>16</sup> Ndeffo is actually an acronym for “Nakuru District Ex-Freedom Fighters Organization” – a reference to the Mau Mau veterans who settled the area.

reflects these differences. Kihingo and Lare wards are clearly dominated by the Kikuyu, and Mauche and Nessuit wards home almost exclusively to Kalenjin.

[TABLE 4 AND TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Political divisions in the constituency mirror these ethnic differences. Rivalry between Kikuyu and Kalenjin residents has boiled over into political violence on multiple occasions, most notably and most dramatically in 2007-2008 (KAH36, KAH40, KAH131, KAH132, KAH133). Citizens were displaced and homes and businesses were burned in “clashes” between Kikuyu and Kalenjin citizens during this period. Since that time, rapprochement between Kikuyu and Kalenjin leaders at the national level appears to have ameliorated some of the tensions between these groups (KAH43, KAH47, KAH48). “In agreeing to work together even the locals agreed to work together” suggested one PMC member at a CDF project (KAH133R2). “Constituency *yote aliunga mkono*” (“the whole constituency joined hands”), echoed a PMC member from another project (KAH134R2).

In spite of this reconciliation between high-level politicians, area residents were clear that ethnic affiliation was an important criteria in voting patterns, suggesting that everyone voted for their own ethnic group (KAH41), that each ethnic group had its own party (KAH46), that political party labels were “more tribal” (KAH47), that ethnic issues “usually arise in electing a candidate” (KAH128), that a candidate would get support because “He’s a son of the soil” (KAH130), or that communities would support someone because he was “our son” (KAH137). One area politician recalled how he had secured a nomination certificate from one political party, but was called upon by co-ethnics to switch parties. Although he was their preferred candidate, the respondent said that community leaders refused to back him unless he stood as candidate for the party with which their ethnic

group was aligned (KAH44). The area MP made a nearly identical point in a separate interview, saying that failure to align oneself with the proper party could be fatal to one's political ambitions (KAH48). This alignment between ethnic and party identities reflected in the political parties with which local government officials (Members of the County Assembly, or MCAs) are associated. MCAs in Mauche and Nessuit were elected on the United Republican Party (URP) ticket, which was strongly associated with the Kalenjin community, while the MCAs in the other wards represented The National Alliance (TNA), headed by President Uhuru Kenyatta, who is Kikuyu. In Njoro, then, ethnicity is clearly an especially salient political division to both voters and politicians.

### **Modeling ethnic identity and resource allocation**

I leverage (ward-level) fixed-effects models for interview respondents in each constituency in order to establish the veracity of interview respondents' claims about the ethnically-biased allocation of CDF projects.<sup>17</sup> Using data from the survey described above, I employ four different measures to assess citizens' access to CDF projects. The first is a binary measure: whether or not the respondent is aware of a CDF project in their community. In addition to being asked to name a CDF project, survey interviewers also asked respondents if the CDF had worked on specific kinds of projects in their community, including a school, a health clinic, and a road rehabilitation project. I used answers to these questions to form a four-point additive scale of how access to CDF projects.

The third dependent variable is a binary measure of whether or not the respondent believes the CDF is "very helpful" to someone like them. The fourth DV is a linear measure of the respondent's opinion about the CDF's effectiveness at carrying out a variety of tasks:

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<sup>17</sup> All of the data analysis for this paper used Stata version 14 (StataCorp LP)

soliciting public input regarding potential projects, dividing resources fairly between communities, accounting for how public funds were spent, explaining their activities to the public, giving bursaries to needy students, ensuring that projects are completed quickly, and ensuring that buildings are constructed properly.<sup>18</sup>

The key independent variable of interest in these models is a measure of whether or not the respondent shares a politically significant ethnic identity with their Member of Parliament. For Njoro, this measure is relatively straightforward. The most important ethnic division in the constituency is the split between Kikuyu and Kalenjin citizens. As such, these regression models treat Kikuyu respondents as co-ethnics of the MP. In Webuye East, the primary political division is between the Bukusu and Tachoni groups of Luhya. Tachoni, but not Bukusu or other Luhya, are coded as co-ethnics of the MP. Defining the MP's co-ethnics in Tongaren is less clear. Although technically the MP's heritage is Banyala, he represents a political party historically aligned with the Bukusu and has been embraced by the community. So, while it would be possible to code all Luhya as co-ethnics, or to code only the eleven Banyala respondents as co-ethnics, it makes most sense to code Bukusu and Banyala residents as co-ethnics of the MP for the purpose of these regression models. Table 6 presents this measure as "coethnicity #3."

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

In addition to this primary independent variable of interest, the models also include a number of "control" variables capturing individual demographic characteristics that may be associated with access to, knowledge of, or attitudes about CDF projects. These include

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<sup>18</sup> Respondents were asked to rate the CDF on a scale of 1 to 10 according to each of these seven tasks. Adding these responses produces a 70-point measure of citizens' evaluations of the Fund.



respondents' age, gender, level of interest in public affairs, and how often they discuss politics with their friends and family.

Regression models also include composite measures for the extent of respondents' prior engagement with the CDF, for their level of political knowledge, and for their lived experience with poverty. Scales for CDF engagement, political knowledge, and experience with poverty were assembled using principal components factor analyses of responses from a battery of questions related to these topics. Qualitative interviews suggested that the CDF affords several opportunities to engage with the CDF. These include: attending a meeting where officials ask for the public's opinion about what projects the CDF should prioritize, approaching the area CDF office directly to suggest or request help with a community project, requesting information about the Fund from CDF officials, attending a community meeting to help choose a grassroots Project Monitoring Committee (PMC) for a CDF project, serving on a PMC, or attending grassroots "elections" for CDFC members. The questionnaire asked respondents if they had ever taken part in any of these activities; the result is a series of binary variables reflecting their level of participation with the CDF. The value of Cronbach's alpha for these variables in a pooled sample of all three constituencies is 0.7331; the measures likely hang together well enough to form a coherent index of citizen engagement with the CDF.

A similar process was followed to create an index of political knowledge: Respondents answered a series of questions about current political events, which were then used to construct a scale of political knowledge; Cronbach's alpha for these measures was 0.8049. In addition to this measure of political knowledge, two other "knowledge" variables are included in the regression models. These are binary (dummy) variables indicating that the

respondent was able to correctly identify his or her Member of the National Assembly (MP) and his or her Member of the County Assembly (MCA).

Finally, the widely-used Afrobarometer surveys contains a battery of questions that are useful for constructing an index reflecting the extent to which respondents experience poverty (Bratton 2006, MacLean 2011). The survey questionnaire for this project employed these questions as well. Respondents were asked over the previous twelve months whether they, or members of their household, experienced the following hardships “never, just once or twice, several times, many times, or always”: going without enough food, going without access to clean water, going without medication, going without fuel for cooking food, or going without a cash income. Cronbach’s alpha for the index is 0.6397 in the pooled sample.

### **Regression results**

The results of the regression models in Table 7 lends partial support to the hypothesis that ethnic salience, rather than ethnic diversity, matters for patronage outcomes. Kikuyu co-ethnics of the MP in Njoro are significantly more likely than other individuals in the sample to report knowing CDF projects in their community. And Tachoni co-ethnics of the MP in Webuye East are more likely than other individuals in the sample to offer a positive evaluation of the CDF. By contrast, in Tongaren, where ethnicity is not a salient political cleavage, co-ethnic status is not significantly associated with knowledge of CDF projects or with citizens’ evaluations of the CDF. While this does not mean that political criteria is absent from the CDF, it does indicate that this criteria is not ethnic in nature: being Bukusu or Banyala in Tongaren is not a significant predictor in any of the models.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

The fact that this is robust to the inclusion of variables that are likely to be correlated with knowledge of CDF projects, such as political interest, political knowledge, or engagement with the CDF, suggests that this effect cannot be attributed to a greater degree of awareness or interest in the CDF amongst co-ethnics. Rather, it suggests that this effect can be attributed to the fact that CDF projects are more likely to be located where the MP's co-ethnics in Njoro reside. The rationale for this pattern of distribution was provided by one Kalenjin interview respondent who clarified the logic of using the CDF to help one's co-ethnics or one's home area: "*usipotesha kura!*" ("you can't (afford to) lose votes!" – KAH49). A Kikuyu resident from the opposite end of the constituency framed the situation in a less positive light: "if you were against the elected [MP], he will make sure that your area will not receive any [projects], as a punishment" (KAH132R2).<sup>19</sup> The fact that Kikuyu and Kalenjin residents are geographically segregated, to a particularly stark degree, means that such a political strategy is, in theory, viable in Njoro. It is possible to provide targeted patronage benefits in the form of "local" public goods like CDF projects when politically-relevant groups are divided in this way. That being said, Kikuyu residents in Njoro constituency are not necessarily more likely than others to perceive the CDF as helpful to people like them, nor are they more likely to perceive that the CDF as a whole is doing a good job. Evidence from qualitative interviews suggests that an explanation for this is that there are also economic and political divisions between different majority-Kikuyu communities (KAH36). Even some Kikuyu respondents complained that their communities were left behind by the CDF in favor of the home area of the local MP (KAH36, KAH41,

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<sup>19</sup> A co-ethnic ally of the MP suggested that such blatant discrimination would not even pay political dividends – to do so would mean to invite Kalenjin opponents of the MP to support a fellow Kikuyu to unseat him in the next elections (KAH38).

KAH132R2, KAH135). Residents of the MP's home area, however, suggested that the economic and climatic challenges associated with life in this part of the constituency meant that the community required greater assistance from the CDF (KAH47, KAH48).

Results from the regression models for Webuye East also testify to the importance of ethnic identity in this constituency. Although politically relevant groups – the Tachoni and Bukusu – tend to be concentrated at different ends of Webuye East, these groups are not nearly as segregated as are the Kikuyu and Kalenjin residents in Njoro constituency. As a result, targeting co-ethnics with patronage resources would be more challenging than in Njoro from a strictly technical perspective. It would be nearly impossible to exclusively reach co-ethnics at the expense of other area residents. Tachoni residents of Webuye East nonetheless more likely to perceive the fund as efficacious (in Models 3 and 4), reporting that the CDF is “very helpful” to people like them at a higher rate than their neighbors who don't share this ethnic tie with the MP. Some of this may reflect an endogenous relationship between the political loyalties of various ethnic groups and their satisfaction with the resources they receive from the CDF. Tachoni co-ethnics of the MP, particularly those who believe that they were marginalized by the previous MP, may simply perceive the work of the CDF more favorably than do non-co-ethnics.

The lack of any positive relationship between coethnicity and resource allocation in Tongaren testifies to the relative unimportance of this feature in the life of the political community there, as well as to the difficulty associated with excluding non-co-ethnics from community-based projects in a constituency where members of different groups live side-by-side. Interview respondents confirmed this. Even those who believed that the certain areas within the constituency may have been favored did not suggest that ethnic heuristics

were being used in these calculations, instead suggesting that the MP was simply responding to pressures from his friends and neighbors to fund projects in his home area (KAH16, KAH17, KAH110, KAH111, KAH112R1, KAH116, KAH117). And other respondents suggested that citizens exerted substantial political pressures on the MP to allocate resources equitably between different areas in the constituency, to the point where CDF resources were being spread thin on a wide variety of projects (KAH15, KAH21, KAH23R1, KAH110, KAH113, KAH115). None of this suggests that political criteria is *never* used by the CDF in Tongaren, but the nature of this criteria is different from that used in Njoro or Webuye East. Rather than targeting patronage towards communities that are home to co-ethnics of the MP, some interviewees alleged that the CDF is unlikely to award projects to institutions (such as schools) that are associated with individuals who have opposed the MP in the past or who are likely to do so in the future (KAH21, KAH23R1, KAH110, KAH116).

### **Discussion & Conclusion**

The above regression models based on survey data, as well as data from in-depth interviews in Njoro, Webuye East, and Tongaren suggest that the CDF, as an institution, responds to the individual political priorities of each of these constituencies. Patterns of resource allocation and citizen perceptions of the CDF management vary across these constituencies according to the dispersal of relevant ethnic groups within each area, as well as the relative salience of ethnic divisions in the constituency. In the constituency with the most intense ethnic divisions and greatest segregation between groups (Njoro), there is a significant difference between co-ethnics of the MP and non-co-ethnics with respect to access to CDF projects. Webuye East, which also features salient ethnic divisions between

co-ethnics of the MP and non-co-ethnics features a gap in perception between these two groups with respect to the performance of the Fund. In neighboring “cosmopolitan” Tongaren, no such gap exists, nor do co-ethnics of the MP report the presence of CDF projects in their communities more often than do non-co-ethnics. These patterns are a reflection of the ability and incentive of politicians to target “pork-barrel” patronage projects towards their co-ethnics

Patronage politics remain a standard feature of African political life, one which is rooted in the past experiences and patterns of distribution of the continent’s peoples. The move away from dictatorship in the early 1990s and towards electoral regimes (if not democracy itself) has made the study of patronage even more timely. In settings where public demands for accountability also involve demands for resources, discussions about who benefits from public spending become more urgent. It is only fitting, then, that political scientists work to understand the political features that drive decisions about resource allocation at the local level in Africa. The present study seeks to do just that, by demonstrating that the political salience of ethnic differences varies substantially even between ethnically diverse regions, and that salience matters for how resources are allocated.

**Figure 1**  
**Ethnicity and politics in Tongaren, Webuye East, and Njoro**

Less Salient → More Salient		
<b>Tongaren</b>	<b>Webuye East</b>	<b>Njoro</b>
- “Cosmopolitan” - “White Highlands” - Groups spread through constituency	- parochial - “African Reserves” - Groups partially segregated in different areas	- “Cosmopolitan” - “White Highlands” - Groups segregated in different areas
- Ethnic Fractionalization (HHI): 0.535	- Ethnic Fractionalization (HHI): 0.634	- Ethnic Fractionalization (HHI): 0.569
- Ethnic Polarization: 0.657	- Ethnic Polarization: 0.847	- Ethnic Polarization: 0.754

**Table 1**  
**Ethnic groups in Tongaren**

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Bukusu (Luhya)	261	66.9%
Maragoli (Luhya)	22	5.6%
Tachoni (Luhya)	18	4.6%
Banyala (Luhya)	11	2.8%
Kabras (Luhya)	9	2.3%
Other Luhya	35	9.0%
Luo	13	3.3%
Kalenjin	12	3.1%
Other/unknown	9	2.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 2**  
**Ethnic groups in Webuye East**

<b>ethnic group</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>percentage</b>
Bukusu (Luhya)	195	50.3%
Tachoni (Luhya)	82	21.1%
Other Luhya	101	26.0%
Other	10	2.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>388</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 3**  
**Co-ethnics of the MP in Webuye East, by sub-location**

<b>Ward</b>	<b>Sub-location</b>	<b># Tachoni</b>	<b>% Tachoni</b>
Maraka	Maraka	3	6.98
Maraka	Township	6	13.95
<b>Maraka</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>10.47</b>
Mihuu	Magemo	2	11.76
Mihuu	Mihuu	15	25.42
Mihuu	Misimo	15	40.54
Mihuu	Mitukuyu	13	41.94
<b>Mihuu</b>		<b>45</b>	<b>31.25</b>
Ndivisi	Lutacho	14	42.42
Ndivisi	Makuselwa	2	11.11
Ndivisi	Marindi	5	15.15
Ndivisi	Misemwa	2	11.76
Ndivisi	Sitabicha	2	4.88
Ndivisi	Wabukhonyi	8	50
<b>Ndivisi</b>		<b>33</b>	<b>20.89</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>87</b>	<b>22.42</b>

**Table 4**  
**Ethnic groups in Njoro**

<b>ethnic group</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>percentage</b>
Kikuyu	237	61.4%
Kipsigis (Kalenjin)	85	22.0%
Ogiek/Dorobos (Kalenjin)	10	2.6%
Other Kalenjin	9	2.3%
Luhya	19	4.9%
Luo	12	3.1%
Kisii	11	2.9%
Other	3	0.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100%</b>



<b>Table 5</b>						
<b>Ethnic groups in Njoro, by ward</b>						
<b>ethnic group</b>	<b>Kihingo N (%)</b>	<b>Lare N (%)</b>	<b>Mau Narok N (%)</b>	<b>Mauche N (%)</b>	<b>Nessuit N (%)</b>	<b>Njoro (ward) N (%)</b>
Kikuyu	51 (93%)	38 (100%)	62 (83%)	1 (1%)	0	85 (70%)
Kipsigis (Kalenjin)	0	0	3 (4%)	60 (87%)	19 (68%)	3 (2%)
Ogiek / Dorobos (Kalenjin)	0	0	0	2 (3%)	8 (29%)	0
Other Kalenjin	1 (2%)	0	0	6 (9%)	1 (4%)	1 (<1%)
Luhya	0	0	4 (5%)	0	0	15 (12%)
Luo	0	0	3 (4%)	0	0	9 (7%)
Kisii	3 (5%)	0	2 (3%)	0	0	6(5%)
Other	0	0	1 (1%)	0	0	2 (<2%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>55 (100%)</b>	<b>38 (100%)</b>	<b>75 (100%)</b>	<b>69 (100%)</b>	<b>28 (100%)</b>	<b>121 (100%)</b>

<b>Table 6</b>				
<b>Measuring coethnicity in Njoro, Tongaren, and Webuye East</b>				
<b>Constituency</b>	<b>coethnicity #1</b>	<b>coethnicity #2</b>	<b>coethnicity #3</b>	<b>Total N</b>
Njoro	235 Kikuyu 60.88%	235 Kikuyu 60.88%	235 Kikuyu 60.88%	386
Tongaren	357 Luhya 91.54%	11 Banyala 2.82%	272 Bukusu & Banyala 69.74%	390
Webuye East	378 Luhya 97.42%	87 Tachoni 22.42%	87 Tachoni 22.42%	388

**Table 7**  
**Constituency-level fixed effects models**

	<b>DV1: R knows project in community</b>	<b>DV2: R knows clinic, school, road projects (scale)<sup>20</sup></b>	<b>DV3: R says CDF is "very helpful" to people like them</b>	<b>DV4: R's evaluation of CDF</b>
coethnic (Njoro)	0.906** (0.289)	0.530* (0.229)	-0.078 (0.286)	1.312 (1.675)
coethnic (Webuye E.)	0.196 (0.283)	0.071 (0.236)	0.709** (0.270)	3.008† (1.749)
coethnic (Tongaren)	-0.038 (0.258)	0.240 (0.230)	0.105 (0.253)	-2.654 (1.650)
engagement w/ CDF	0.027 (0.077)	0.352** (0.069)	0.228** (0.072)	0.194 (0.463)
gender (male)	0.069 (0.153)	-0.144 (0.129)	-0.035* (0.151)	-1.226 (0.946)
age	>0.000 (0.005)	>0.000 (0.004)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.057† (0.033)
political knowledge	0.222** (0.088)	0.079 (0.073)	-0.027 (0.084)	-1.998** (0.540)
knows MP	0.085 (0.235)	-0.037 (0.205)	0.336 (0.246)	-1.313 (1.549)
knows MCA	0.303† (0.177)	0.261† (0.151)	-0.020 (0.178)	0.474 (1.137)
political interest	0.254** (0.077)	0.122* (0.065)	-0.048 (0.110)	0.896† (0.477)
discusses politics	-0.023 (0.114)	0.193* (0.095)	0.041 (0.110)	0.962 (0.697)
secondary ed.	0.147 (0.165)	0.114 (0.140)	-0.144 (0.160)	1.240 (1.005)
poverty scale	-0.003 (0.074)	-0.161* (0.064)	-0.162* (0.075)	0.843† (0.467)
/cut 1	-	-1.146* (0.465)	-	-
/cut 2	-	0.279 (0.460)	-	-
/cut3	-	1.804** (0.464)	-	-
Constant	-	-	-	30.395** (2.294)
N	951	950	953	881
** significant at p < 0.01		* significant at p < 0.05		† significant at p < 0.1

<sup>20</sup> Model 2 is a mixed-effects ordered logit model

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