

OSTROM WORKSHOP COLLOQUIUM SERIES

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“Politicians Change Their Behavior and Seek the Public Interest after Achieving Office”



Monday, September 11, 2017

12:00 – 1:00 p.m.

Ostrom Workshop, 513 N. Park

Do newly elected politicians correspond to the public interest after achieving political office? We show that politicians change their behavior once changing from one elected office to another. In particular, we analyze behavioral changes once politicians from the Swiss Lower House of Parliament are elected to the Upper House. Public interest and the constitution stipulate that politicians from the Upper House should more closely represent the preferences of their constituency and they should react less to party pressure. We identify these directional behavioral changes of politicians after they achieved office. Our setting allows us to exclude selection effects due to elections: As long as politicians who will be elected to the Upper House remain in the Lower House, they perform statistically identically to other members of the Lower House. However, once in the Upper House, the newly elected politicians perform statistically as if they are members of the Upper House.



Prof. Dr. David Stadelmann studied Economics (MA/BA) and Mathematics (MSc/BSc) at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). He received his PhD in Economics in 2010 and became a professor at the University of Bayreuth (Germany) in 2013. David Stadelmann has authored more than 30 scientific publications in peer-reviewed journals. He is an editor of the peer-reviewed journal *Kyklos*, a fellow at the Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (Switzerland), at the Queensland Behavioural Economics Group (Australia) and at the Walter-Eucken-Institut (Germany) ([website](#)).

Presentations are open to the public and are live streamed (see our website for URL and papers). You are welcome to bring your lunch. For questions, contact Allison Sturgeon (sturgeon@iu.edu; 812/855-3151).