Fall 2001 Colloquia

Colloquia during Fall 2001:

Monday, September 17, 2001

A Functional Analysis

Presented by James E. Hanley, Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington (Co-authors: Tomonori Morikawa, Center for International Education, Waseda University, Japan, and John Orbell, Political Science Department, University of Oregon)

Abstract: Because evolution can be expected to design special purpose, domain specific cognitive mechanisms for playing adaptively important social games, a functional analysis of the information requirements of diverse games can inform empirical search for such mechanisms. We provide such a functional analysis for conflict of interest games-certainly an important part of our ancestors' social environment-developing new graphic conventions for doing so. Using those conventions, we identify the opportunity for adaptive advantage from capacities for first, second, third and fourth "orders of recognition," but not more. Four such orders are necessary for both parties to know that a game has become a chicken game, and to know that the other knows that. Any orders of recognition beyond four will be redundant, and that number will only be adaptively useful in games in which both players have a negative expected value from fighting. Because the first order of recognition is the most fundamental, with each subsequent level having to build on the prior ones, first order capacities are predicted to be the most ancient, with subsequent levels having been added at later stages of evolution.

BIO: James Hanley received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Oregon in 2000. His dissertation, "The Role of Non-Cooperative Games in the Evolution of Cooperation," utilized an evolutionary agent-based simulation to show that under certain parameters, the option of conflict (modeled as Hawk-Dove games) was conducive to the evolution of agents who were very cooperative in Prisoner's Dilemma games. These findings are included as a chapter, co-authored by the co-authors of the present paper, in a volume edited by Elinor Ostrom and James Walker, expected to be published soon by Sage. He is currently a Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. His current projects include analysis via a second generation evolutionary simulation with his colleagues from the prior one, and a paper on the evolutionary incentives underlying sexual discrimination.
Paper in PDF format.

Monday, September 24, 2001

A Comparative Analysis of Conjunctive Water Management Programs in California

Presented by Tanya Heikkila, Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

Abstract: Throughout much of the western United States, demand for renewable water often exceeds available supplies. Determining the most efficient way to organize the provision and management of water supplies to meet growing demands is one of the most pressing policy issues facing westerners. It also is a highly complex policy issue. Consumers have diverse and competing needs for water resources, and expectations regarding the quality of those supplies are escalating. One of the responses to the dilemma of ensuring adequate water supplies for growing demands has been to coordinate the management of groundwater and surface water ("conjunctive water management"). In general, the goal of conjunctive water management is to regulate surface water variability and increase available supplies using the natural storage capacity of underground aquifers. For more than 50 years, conjunctive water management has been promoted as an effective alternative to expensive and ecologically damaging dams and reservoirs, which have become less palatable in the West's changing political environment. The use of this management technique, however, has been sporadic across the West. If conjunctive water management is indeed a more sustainable water supply management tool, what explains its sporadic implementation? To answer this question, this paper first looks to two streams of literature, common-pool resource management theory and the literature on public service industries to examine how institutional arrangements affect water management decisions.

Using data from the state of California, this paper then empirically analyzes the relationship between California's various groundwater management institutions and the implementation of conjunctive water management programs. Based on the literature review, the empirical analysis considers a) whether the boundaries of water management jurisdictions need to be organized around the boundaries of groundwater basins in order to engage in conjunctive water management, and b) whether inter-jurisdictional coordination can facilitate conjunctive management when jurisdictions are not organized around resource boundaries. The data are evaluated using both a logit regression model and a method known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), developed by Charles Ragin.

BIO: Tanya Heikkila is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis for the 2001/2002 academic year. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Arizona's School of Public Administration and Policy this spring. Her research interests focus on public policy analysis and water resource management. While at the University of Arizona, Heikkila received the Joseph L. Fisher Dissertation Fellowship from Resources for the Future. Her paper comes out of her dissertation, titled: "Managing Common-Pool Resources in a Public Service Industry: The Case of Conjunctive Water Management." In her dissertation research, she integrates aspects of common-pool resource management theory and local public economy theory, both from the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, to examine the role of jurisdictional boundaries and inter-jurisdictional coordination in managing water resources. Her dissertation research was part of an NSF/EPA-funded study, directed by Professors Edella Schlager of the University of Arizona and Bill Bloomquist of IUPUI (both are Workshop alumni). Heikkila, Schlager, and Blomquist are currently working on a book examining the results of the study. While at the Workshop, Heikkila plans to continue to work on the book on conjunctive water management, develop articles off of her dissertation research, and analyze pieces of her dissertation research further by using GIS models to conduct spatial analyses of water management institutions and conjunctive management projects in Arizona.
Paper in PDF format.

Monday, October 1, 2001


Presented by Christian Müller, Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

Abstract: The paper explores the methodology of hypothetical contractarianism as a means of justifying rules of social conduct. Formally, the contractarian argument has the logical structure of a familiar deductive-nomological (rational choice) explanation. It necessarily requires, however, that at least some premises used in its explanans be empirically false. It is argued that, in contrast to ordinary explanatory arguments, the contractarian thought experiment would be pointless if all assumptions were empirically true. As a consequence, even in the case that a given contract theory can be proven to be logically consistent, it fails to justify binding obligations of real individuals due to an insurmountable logical problem of induction.

BIO: Christian Müller is an Assistant Professor (Wissenschaftlicher Assistent) of Economics at the Department of Business and Economics, Gerhard Mercator University Duisburg/Germany. He also serves as a Visiting Lecturer at Heinrich Heine University and at the University of Applied Sciences in Düsseldorf/Germany. His work focused on problems of economic policy and public finance, fiscal federalism, institutional and constitutional economics and economic methodology. His list of publications includes, among others, papers in Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy and ORDO (see ). His research at the Workshop is devoted to fiscal externalities in the process of vertical tax competition: If two revenue-maximizing units of government at different levels in a federal system have concurrent access to the same tax base a "tragedy of the fiscal commons" may arise which consists in the fact that combined equilibrium tax rates will be higher than in the case where the central government exerts a monopoly power to tax.

Since the paper for this session is soon due to be published in Public Choice, it will not be added to our website. Hard copies of the paper will be available at the Workshop.

Monday, October 8, 2001

How Exclusive?

Presented by Amy Poteete, Postdoctoral Fellow/IFRI Research Coordinator, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

Abstract: Regulation of renewable natural resources involves restriction of resource use, either by limiting extraction by each resource user, limiting the number of resource users, or both. The choice between distribution and exclusion affects the distribution of resource flows, and thus impinges upon political, economic, and social relations. Research on natural resource management and the organization of agrarian societies identifies a number of factors likely to influence the inclusiveness of strategies for resource management: demand for the resource, the difficulty of defending the resource, risk and risk aversion, local conflicts, the presence of marginal groups, and the political opportunity structure. This paper focuses on the probability of exclusionary tactics of forest management. Analysis of data from the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program suggests that political relations among resource users and between resource users and outside authorities are the most important predictors of exclusionary efforts by local actors.

BIO: Amy Poteete is research coordinator for the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University in 1999. Her research examines various aspects of political development in the context of natural resource management, with a geographic focus on Africa. Current research, growing out of a dissertation on policies affecting range management in Botswana, investigates tensions between professionalism in the national bureaucracy and local democracy, and the historical legacies of divergent patterns of historical political consolidation and contemporary political competition in districts with comparable levels of ethnic heterogeneity. Other research utilizing the IFRI database touches upon the implications of complexity for institutional development and the linkages between patterns of resource use and perceptions of forest conditions. She has taught at Duke University, Humboldt University (in Berlin, Germany), and Yale University, and is currently part of the teaching team for a course on IFRI research methods at Indiana University.
Paper in PDF format.

Monday, October 15, 2001

How Exclusive?

Presented by Susan K. Laury, Assistant Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the Experimental Economics Program in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta [Co-Authors: Ronald G. Cummings and Charles A. Holt, Georgia State University]

Abstract: In April 2000, the Georgia legislature passed a law that requires that the state pay some farmers to suspend irrigation in declared severe drought years. Those farmers who will cease irrigation, and the payment they will receive, is to be determined by "an auction-like process." However, the format of the auction was not specified in the legislation. In response to this, we conducted a series of experiments that tested a variety of auction procedures using this specific context, and under constraints specified by state policy makers. On March 1, 2001, a severe drought was, in fact, declared, and an irrigation auction was subsequently conducted on March 17, 2001. This paper reports the results of the laboratory and field experiments that were used to determine the rules of the auction. In addition, it compares the results of these experiments with bidding behavior by farmers in the state-run irrigation auction.

BIO: Professor Laury is an Assistant Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the Experimental Economics Program in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. Her field of specialization is experimental economics. Her current research activities include analyzing the effect of alternative auction mechanisms for a budget-constrained auction for irrigation rights, the effect of payoff scale on attitudes toward risk, and individual motives for giving in public goods experiments. She has received grants from the National Science Foundation and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources. Her research has appeared in such publications as Journal of Public Economics, Public Choice, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and Journal of Economic Perspectives. Professor Laury received a B.A. in economics and journalism from Indiana University in 1988, and a Ph.D. in economics from Indiana University in 1996.

A hard copy of the paper is available, but it is a first draft and will not be put on our website at this time. We will add this paper to our website once the work is completed.

Monday, October 22, 2001

Controlling Coastal Runoff in Southern California

Presented by William Blomquist, Chair of the Department of Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis (IUPUI) [Co-authors: Harvey L. Collins, Consulting Engineer, Sacramento, California, and David B. Friedman, Consulting Economist, Los Angeles, California]

Abstract: In coastal urban watersheds, runoff from the landscape eventually reaches the ocean. If beaches along the ocean are used for recreation, three vital and interrelated questions arise. First, whether and to what extent urban runoff degrades the quality of ocean water that is used for recreation. Second, if so, whether and to what extent this runoff-related ocean pollution poses a risk to the health of recreational water users. Third, what sort(s) of policy response may be in order to address runoff-related ocean water pollution and/or the health risks it poses.

It is commonplace at the beginning of the 21st century to say that such decisions "should be based on science." But other factors are at play. One factor that may affect the development of policy responses to coastal runoff is the portrayal in the public domain of the connections between coastal urban runoff, ocean water quality, and health risks associated with recreational water contact. News media reports are one source of these portrayals, as journalists report on beach warnings, closures, and related newsworthy events. Reports and press releases from other organizations (e.g., environmental groups, surfing or swimming clubs) are another source. Public officials may nevertheless feel pressure to respond to these portrayals.

Along the Southern California coast, a remarkable number of regulatory and remedial actions have been undertaken concerning coastal runoff from mid-1998 through mid-2001. Millions of dollars of public funds have been devoted to a variety of efforts to reduce, intercept, divert, or treat urban runoff before it reaches the ocean, and millions more have been spent on efforts to improve ocean water quality monitoring. In the private sector, beach-oriented tourism has suffered from increased frequency and duration of beach warnings and closures, and land development projects have been placed on hold by new regulatory requirements and more vigorous enforcement of existing ones. An interesting question is whether these actions represent policy responses "based on science" or a reaction to perceptions in the public domain of the risks associated with coastal runoff.

Using a specific time frame (June 1, 1999-December 1, 1999) and two highly developed coastal urban regions for comparison (Southern California and Florida), we have compiled and analyzed a database of news media accounts of health risks associated with recreational ocean water contact. We have also analyzed the health-risk information presented in the most widely-used interest-group portrayal of those risks-the "beach report cards" issued by the environmental group Heal the Bay. We have compared these portrayals with "the science"-i.e., the body of published scientific research literature on health risks associated with recreational ocean water contact. We have summarized and synthesized the published research on (a) the advantages and disadvantages of the various indicators that are and have been used to measure and assess ocean water quality, and (b) the epidemiological studies of the relationships between (i) exposure to ocean water of various levels of quality based on those indicators and (ii) the likelihood of developing illness symptoms. Our paper compares this synthesis of the published literature on health risks of ocean water contact with the public-domain portrayals composed of media reporting and beach report cards.

Finally, our paper analyses the financial and public policy consequences of basing policy responses on one set of portrayals compared with the other. By estimating the costs associated with reducing coastal runoff in Southern California relative to the health benefits achieved, our paper attempts to contribute an alternative perspective to the policy debate on what to do about coastal runoff in Southern California (and presumably, other coastal urban watersheds as well).

BIO: William Blomquist is Associate Professor of Political Science, and Chairman of the Department of Political Science, at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis (IUPUI). He joined the IUPUI faculty in 1987.

He received his B.S. in Economics from the Honors Tutorial College of Ohio University in 1978, an M.A. in Political Science and a Certificate in Public Administration from Ohio University in 1979. After spending a year in graduate study at the Institute for Public Policy Studies at the University of Michigan, he attended Indiana University-Bloomington and received his Ph.D. in political science in August 1987.

The focus of his teaching is American government, particularly federalism. In that connection, he teaches state and local government and politics, American constitutional law, and the introductory course in American government and politics.

His research interests concern local, state, and national governmental organization and public policies, with a specialization in the field of water institutions and water policy, particularly in the western United States, and especially with respect to groundwater.

His research has been supported by the United States Geological Survey, the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the National Water Research Institute, the National Science Foundation, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency. He has provided formal and informal consultation to the United States Army Corps of Engineers Water Resources Division, the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the International Center for Self-Governance, to community groups active in the processes of developing management arrangements for the Edwards Aquifer in Texas, and local agencies involved in the management of water supplies in Southern California.

He is the author of the eight-volume monograph series, The Performance of Institutions for Groundwater Management (1987-91), the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations policy report Coordinating Water Resources in the Federal System: The Groundwater-Surface Water Connection (1991), and the book Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California (1992), as well as several papers, articles, and book chapters.

Paper in PDF format.

Monday, October 29, 2001

A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Presented by Claudia Keser, Research Staff Member at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York [Co-Authors: Siegfried Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, and Annette Kirstein]

Abstract: Many bargaining situations involve both distribution and efficiency effects. For example, in collective bargaining, where employers and unions negotiate about sharing GDP, the division that stimulates economy is not necessarily an equal one. We present a game-theoretical and experimental evaluation of a multi-period bargaining model with intertemporal effects. The model is based on the classical Rubinstein model where two players are to share a pie in every period. Our model differs from the Rubinstein model insofar as each pie size depends on the previous bargaining outcomes. Our game-theoretical solution predicts efficient divisions until almost the end of the game, when efficiency more and more diminishes. Quantitatively, the experimental results deviate significantly from the game-theoretical solution. However, qualitatively in keeping with the game-theoretical solution the subjects deviate more often and to a larger extent from the efficient division in later than in early periods. The deviation from efficiency results from a tendency to equal divisions.

BIO: Claudia Keser is a research staff member at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York. In her research, she is using the tool of experimental economics to examine issues on trust, cooperation, and incentives. She received her doctoral degree at the University of Bonn and her "Habilitation" at the University of Karlsruhe. Among several research stays abroad, she worked for two years as a postdoc at CREED at the University of Amesterdam and one year as a Feodor Lynen Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at CIRANO in Montreal. She has also visited the Workshop several times.

The Paper in PDF format

Figure 2 in PDF format

Figure 3 in PDF format

Figure 4 in PDF format

Monday, November 5, 2001


Presented by James Wilson, Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Abstract: This paper addresses the question of how we cope with scientific uncertainty in exploited, complex natural systems such as marine fisheries. Ocean ecosystems are complex and have proven very difficult to manage as evidenced by the many large-scale fisheries collapses (Ludwig et al., 1993; NRC, 1999; Boreman, et al. 1999). A large part of the problem arises from scientific uncertainty and our understanding of the nature of that uncertainty. The difficulty of the scientific problem in a complex, quickly changing and highly adaptive environment such as the ocean should not be underestimated. It has created pervasive uncertainty that has been magnified by the strategic behavior of the various human interests who play in the game of fisheries management.

This paper argues that we are more likely to find ways to align individual incentives with ecosystem sustainability if we begin to view these systems as complex adaptive systems (CAS). This perspective alters our sense of the extent and kind of control we might possibly exercise in these systems and, especially, raises difficult questions about how we develop appropriate and credible restraining rules. The work of Holland, Simon and others is used to address the individual and collective learning problem. The CAS perspective has strong implications for the kinds of collective governance structures and individual rights that might be consistent with sustainability.


Educational Background

Professional Experience

Research and Special Assignments

Since the paper for this session is soon due to be published in Drama of the Commons (Washington, DC: National Academy Press), it will not be added to our website. Hard copies of the paper will be available at the Workshop.

Monday, November 12, 2001


Presented by Gerhard Glomm, Professor at the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington (Co-authors: Peter Bearse, Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, and B. Ravikumar, Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University)

Abstract:We use computational experiments to study the impact of two institutions, centralized funding and vouchers, on the distribution of income in a dynamic, two-school-district economy where public funding levels are determined by majority rule. In this model, household heads differ by income. They value their own consumption and the quality of their youths' education. Youth earning potential depends on both parental human capital and the quality of education they receive. We calibrate a benchmark regime where public schools are funded by local tax revenues and households are free to opt-out of the public school system in favor of private schooling. We then use computational experiments to examine the impact of switching from this mixed public/private regime to a centralized funding regime and to a voucher regime. Simulation results reveal that the opting-out feature has important consequences for education finance policy.

BIO:Gerhard Glomm received his BA in Economics from the University of Kansas and his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota in 1988. He has held faculty positions at the University of Virginia, Michigan State University, and is very happy to be at Indiana University. His research focuses on economic growth, human capital accumulation, economics of education, and political economy. He has published in the Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Public Economics, and the Journal of Development Economics. In his free time, he practices applied game theory on the soccer field.

The paper in PDF format.

Monday, November 26, 2001


Presented by Dr. Ivan Grdesic, Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to the United States of America

Curriculum vitae of Ambassador Grdesic [from the Embassy of the Republic of Croatia website]

Prior to assuming his ambassadorial duties, Dr. Ivan Grdesic was associate professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb, where he graduated and obtained his Ph.D. in political science.

From 1996 to 1999 he was Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences and President of the Croatian Political Science Association.

Dr. Grdesic is author of the book "Politicko odlucivanje" (Political Decision-making; 1995); he was co-author of several books, among them: "Hrvatska u izborima 1990" (Croatia in the 1990 Election; 1992), "The 1990 and 1992-93 Sabor Elections in Croatia" (Izbori za Hrvatski sabor 1990. i 1992-93.; 1997), "The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe" (Radikalna desnica u Srednjoj i Istocnoj Europi; 1999).

He wrote numerous scientific and scholarly articles on Croatia's political systems, democratic transition, elections and public policies, which were published in domestic and international journals. He was teaching American studies for the postgraduate students at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, and at the postgraduate courses at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb and at the Ljubljana University.

Dr. Grdesic spent several years doing research and teaching at the U.S. universities. He participated in numerous scientific conferences developing a rich international cooperation. He was a Fulbright Visiting Professor at the Virginia Tech University during the academic year 1999/2000, and at the Indiana University, Bloomington, 1992/93.

He was born in 1952; married, two children.


Dr. Ivan Grdesic bio je do stupanja na duznost veleposlanika izvanredni profesor na Fakultetu politickih znanosti Sveucilista u Zagrebu, gdje je studirao i stekao doktorat znanosti iz podrucja politicke znanosti.

Od 1996. do 1999. bio je prodekan Fakulteta i predsjednik Hrvatskog politoloskog drustva.

Dr. Grdesic napisao je knjigu "Politicko odlucivanje" (1995); koautor je vise knjiga medju kojima: "Hrvatska u izborima 1990." (1992), "The 1990 and 1992-93 Sabor Elections in Croatia" (1997), "The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe" (1999). Objavio je velik broj znannstvenih i strucnih tekstova iz podrucja politickog sustava, demokratske tranzicije, izbora i javnih politika, objavljenih u domacim i medjunarodnim casopisima i zbornicima. Predavao je na poslijediplomskom studiju iz americkih studija na Filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu, poslijediplomskom studiju iz medjunarodnih odnosa na Fakultetu politickih znanosti u Zagrebu i na medjunarodnom studiju europske javne politike na Sveucilistu u Ljubljani.

Dr. Grdesic boravio je nekoliko godina na specijalizaciji na sveucilistima u SAD. Sudjelovao je na brojnim znanstvenim skupovima te razvio bogatu medjunarodnu suradnju. Skolsku godinu 1999/2000. bio je Fulbright gostujuci profesor na Virginia Tech sveucilistu u SAD.

Rodjen je 1952. godine, ozenjen i ima dvoje djece.

This presentation is sponsored by:

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
Office of International Programs
Global Programs, Kelley School of Business
Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures
Russian and East European Institute

There will not be a formal paper for this presentation.

Monday, December 3, 2001

The Case of the French Doctrinaires

Presented by Aurelian Craiutu, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Abstract: Although the French doctrinaires built up one of the most important political theories of the nineteenth-century and had a decisive influence on Tocqueville, Marx, and J. S. Mill, they remain largely unknown in the English-speaking world. This paper examines the doctrinaires’ theory of political power by concentrating on François Guizot’s On the Means of Government and Opposition (1821). Special attention is paid to Guizot’s critique of Rousseau and laissez-faire liberalism and to his theory of “the new means of government.” The paper argues that an understanding of liberalism as a crusade to restrict state power amounts to a misreading of the nature and dignity of political power. Guizot’s theory of power goes beyond the ordinary dichotomy small vs. big government to stress the importance of the communication between government and society and the mutual empowerment of state and society. The paper also points out the ways in which the rediscovery of the doctrinaires’ ideas can heighten our awareness of the internal diversity of liberalism and the multifarious dialects that have been spoken by liberal thinkers over time.

BIO: Aurelian Craiutu is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington where he teaches history of political thought and modern political theory. His research interests include French political and social thought (Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Constant, Madame de Staël, Guizot, Raymond Aron), varieties of liberalism and conservatism, democratic theory, conceptions of patriotism and nationalism as well as theories of transition to democracy and democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. Craiutu’s dissertation, The Difficult Apprenticeship of Liberty: Reflections on the Political Thought of the French Doctrinaires won the 2000 APSA’s Leo Strauss Award for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of political theory and will be published by Rowman & Littlefield/Lexington (2002). Dr. Craiutu also edited Guizot’s History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe (Liberty Fund, 2002) and published In Praise of Liberty: Essays in Political Philosophy (1998, in Romanian). His articles were published in History of Political Thought, Political Theory, History of European Ideas, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Government & Opposition, and East European Constitutional Review. He is currently working on a book on political moderation.

Paper in PDF format.

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Last updated:  November 28, 2001